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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation for this Research 
 Research Topic Contextualization 1.1.1
Citizens are increasingly concerned about political corruption, and parties, 
especially during the electoral campaigns, promise voters not only that they will 
implement strictly measurements to avoid it, but also that they will expel of their parties 
those politicians involved in corruption. However, although the politicians not always 
keep these promises, there are several electoral processes which show they are not as 
much penalized as it could be expected. Citizens’ attitude towards political corruption 
seems to be the key to explain what is behind of this behaviour.  
Political corruption is damaging democracies’ quality. In political corruption, it can 
be distinguished two different levels of responsibility: legal and political. Although they 
are naturally connected and citizens’ attitude towards political corruption impacts on 
both of them, it is necessary to analyse each one independently.  
From a legal perspective, there is a legislative branch, which develops the laws 
against political corruption; and a judicial branch, which judges it based on them. 
Regarding this perspective, in a short term, it seems citizens cannot do too much, 
although it is worth noting that the legislation also depends on citizens’ attitudes and 
behaviour. History shows a multitude of laws which have been modified after citizens’ 
mobilizations.  
Nevertheless, from a political perspective, citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption has a quicker impact. When a corruption case comes to light, the politician 
involved should left his position immediately and his party should expel him. 
Unfortunately, it does not happen always and citizens are forced to keep being governed 
by corrupted politicians who claim they are not convicted. In these cases, on one hand, 
citizens can show their disapproval through citizens’ movements. It has not always a 
direct and immediate impact, but, as discussed before, it can contribute in a long term to 
modify the legislation. On the other hand, citizens can effectively punish corrupted 
politicians and also the parties which hold them, by exerting their right of voting. 
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Citizens would be expected to punish those politicians who have been involved in 
corruption, however, not always political corruption has major electoral consequences. 
Taking as a starting point the situation described above, the main goal of the thesis 
is the analysis of citizens’ attitude towards political corruption. For this purpose, it will 
be identified and analysed the factors which play a key role. The information extracted, 
on one side, will allow developing better strategies in order to reach a greater impact on 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption; and on the other side, it will help to 
understand the results of some electoral processes. 
The first part of this thesis will be focused on the analysis of what it has been called 
“Real World”. In this part, it will be analysed the role played in citizens’ tolerance 
towards political corruption by the following variables: economic context, social 
pressure, political awareness, political leaning, the new parties’ emergence and political 
sympathy. For this purpose, on one hand, it will be used information provided by two 
independent entities: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
1
 (CIS) and Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística
2
 (INE); and on the other hand, it will be designed and 
conducted a specific survey where participants will face questions related to each of the 
previous variables. 
 Then, it will be studied what it has been called “Virtual World”. In this part, it will 
be analysed the online debate generated about political corruption. For this purpose, it 
will be selected the social network Twitter, one of the most popular forums globally 
increasingly considered by scholars as political platform. Furthermore, in general, the 
conversations on Twitter are open and accessible to all, and consequently, it is relatively 
easy to identify and collect conversations relating to any debate in progress. 
 The suitability of the Spanish case  1.1.2
Recently, Cordero and Blais (2017) underlined that Spain clearly illustrates how 
corruption does not have the electoral consequences it could be expected. In particular, 
they highlighted firstly, how during the period 2011-2015 where Spain was going 
through an economic crisis, the party in the government was affected for multitude 
cases of corruption. Secondly, that these cases of corruption were widely covered by the 







media: newspapers, radio, TV, and social media. Thirdly, that the vast majority of 
Spanish society was aware and worried about corruption. Concretely, a consequence of 
all the corruption scandals, following the CIS
3
, while in 2011 just 2% of the population 
mentioned corruption as one of the main Spanish problems, this percentage increased 
until 56% in 2015. In fact, corruption became the second greatest problem for Spaniards 
after unemployment
4
 and the Spain’s score on the Corruption Perception Index by 
Transparency International
5
, on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very 
clean), fell from 65 in 2011 to 58 in 2015. Finally, they stressed how in this context, the 
party which was in the government, although being party plagued of corruption, was 
still able to win the General Election of December 2015. 
Accordingly, Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2016) considered that Spain was an 
excellent case to analyse citizens’ attitudes towards political corruption as this country 
is a clear example where although voters disliked corruption, incumbents rarely suffered 
electoral consequences for their illegal actions. Besides, they pointed out how on a scale 
anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean), Spain generally scored poorly in all 
cross-country rankings of perception of corruption at all administrative levels. Finally, 
they emphasised that, as most of the Spanish corruption scandals are investigated by 
judicial authorities, there is an extensive press coverage which increased citizens’ 
political awareness.  
Previously, Anduiza et al. (2013) also found Spain was a clear example where 
political corruption has not the electoral consequences it could be expected. They 
justified the convenience of focusing on Spain the study of citizens’ attitudes towards 
political corruption underlining that at the time in which their research was conducted, 
political corruption was a salient issue in the country. Particularly, they highlighted on 
one side, how the Spain’s score on the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency 
International was 6.1 on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean); and on 
the other side, that Spain had an institutionalised party system with more than 60% of 
its population reporting feeling close to a political party, which in their opinion clearly 
benefited the goal of measuring the political sympathy impact. 
                                                 
3
 CIS January 2011 and January 2015 
4





Summarising, this research will be focused on Spain because it constitutes a 
suitable case to the study of citizens’ attitudes towards political corruption. Firstly, the 
last years, Spanish citizens have been facing a multitude scandals of corruption in which 
their government has been involved. Secondly, it has recently broken into the political 
scene two new parties which claim to be the solution to regenerate a democracy strongly 
affected by political corruption: “Podemos” (We can) and “Ciudadanos” (Citizens). The 
irruption of these new parties on one hand, has divided the electorate breaking the 
traditional bipartisanship; and on the other hand, has contributed to the impossibility of 
reaching agreements after the General Elections of December 2015. As a consequence, 
the General Elections were repeated on June 2016. Noted that, in the last General 
Elections of 2016, Podemos presented a single list in coalition with “Izquierda Unida” 
(United Left) under the name “Unidos Podemos” (Together We Can). Finally, Spain, as 
mentioned, represents a clear case where political corruption, although Spaniards 
declare to be concerned, has not the electoral consequences it could be expected. The 
party which was in the government, in despite of being plagued with corruption, not 
only won the General Elections in December 2015 with a vote share of 28.7%, but also 
the repeated General Elections in June 2016 increasing their support until 33%. 
In the following section, it will be described the recent evolution of the Spanish 
political situation, how the main parties are perceived in the left-right axis, their last 
electoral results, and the electorate’s distribution by age. These characteristics also 
make this country especially interesting for this research.  
 The Spanish Political Landscape  1.1.3
Once it has been explained the reasons to focus the research on Spain, the aim of 
this section is to briefly introduce the lector into the current Spanish political situation. 
Traditionally, the main parties in Spain have been “Partido Popular” (Popular Party) and 
“Partido Socialista Obreo Español” (Social Worker Spanish Party), which have been 
associated with the right and left political leaning respectively, and have represented 
more than 70% of the Spanish voters. However, in recent years, as a consequence of the 
multitude scandals of political corruption and the economic and social crisis, it has 
appeared the new parties mentioned before: Podemos, which since the last General 
Elections of 2016 is presented in coalition with Izquierda Unida as Unidos Podemos; 
and Ciudadanos. For convenience of reference in the discussions, the four main parties 
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will be referred by the acronyms as follows: “Partido Popular” as PP; “Partido 
Socialista Obreo Español” as PSOE; “Unidos Podemos” as UP; and “Ciudadanos” as 
C’s. 
In order to draw a quick picture of the four main Spanish parties, firstly, it will be 
analysed where Spaniards place political parties in the traditional left-right axis. Then, it 
will be shown the electoral results of the last General Elections which were in June 
2016 and those obtained in 2011 in order to better understand the recent evolution of the 
Spanish political situation. Finally, it will be studied the age distribution of Spanish 
voters. 
Regarding the Spaniards’ perception about parties’ political leaning, following the 
CIS
6
, in Figure 1-1 it is shown how being 1 left political leaning and 10 right political 
leaning, UP and PSOE are identified as having a left political leaning while C’s and PP 
as having a right political leaning.  
Figure 1-1 Parties’ Political Ideology perceived 
 
 
Source: CIS May 2016 
Concretely the mean of the citizens’ perceptions are 8.4 for PP, 6.4 for C’s, 4.6 for 
PSOE and 2.2 for UP. It is especially relevant how in spite of the efforts that new 
parties have made to avoid being classified following the left-right axis, Spaniards 
clearly identify them as having a left and a right political leaning. Accordingly, Orriols 
and Cordero (2016), when characterising the new parties’ voters, found that UP voters 
were mainly politically disaffected citizens with a left political leaning while C’s voters 
were citizens with lower levels of political trust and ideologically moderate. 
Related to the electoral results, in Figure 1-2 it is represented the recent evolution 
of the parties’ support, by comparing the electoral results of June 2016 with those 
obtained in November 2011.   
  
                                                 
6
 CIS May 2016 
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Figure 1-2 Electoral results 2011 vs. 2016 
Source: www.elpais.com 
It is highlighted how traditional parties PP and PSOE have lost supporters, 
concretely 13.6pp and 6pp; while new parties UP and C’s have strongly burst into the 
political scene with a vote share of 21.1% and 13.1% respectively. 
Related to the voter’s distribution by age, following the CIS
7
, in Figure 1-3 it is 
shown how voters between 18 and 44 years feel closer to new parties while those with 
more than 55 years clearly prefer traditional parties, therefore, it is underlined how new 
parties especially engage with younger voters. 
Figure 1-3 Spanish Voters' Distribution by Age 
Source: CIS January-March 2016 
Finally, it is worth noting how in May 2018, a sentence that condemned for 
corruption the government of PP, led to a wide agreement among several parties of the 
opposition which allowed PSOE to win a no-confidence motion in June 2018.  
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Analysing all the information above, the main conclusion is that the Spanish 
political situation has recently lived the greatest revolution of the last decades. Two new 
parties have appeared and one of them has been really close to reach the second position 
in its first General Elections. 
Considering new parties’ ideology, it has been highlighted how both have been 
clearly identified as having a left and a right political leaning, which is not a big 
difference with the traditional parties. However, the new parties’ emergence has 
introduced the age as a decisive variable when classifying voters. New parties’ 
supporters are clearly younger than those who support traditional parties. Youth 
support, being currently a handicap in a society where more than 45% of the population 
with voting right is more than 50 years old, is also the main strength of new parties, as 
traditional parties will need to attract younger voters if they want to stay in power. 
1.2 Research Statements 
The main research question of this thesis, based on the fact that political corruption 
has not the electoral consequences expected and in order to design better strategies to 
promote citizens’ political criticism and achieve a higher quality democracy is: Which 
are the factors that have a greater impact on citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption and which is the role played by social media? 
In order to address this issue, it will be studied the following aspects:  
 What is the tolerance’s level towards political corruption? Does it vary 
during an economic crisis? 
 
It will be analysed citizens’ evaluation about the economic and political 
situation to determine if it is possible to establish a positive correlation 
between both indicators. It will be used public data from the CIS, an 
independent entity whose main objective is “to contribute scientific 
knowledge on Spanish society”. The CIS carries out surveys which allow 
finding out the Spaniards opinion in a very different fields and its evolution 
over time. For this purpose, it will be studied the evolution of citizens’ 
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opinion on economic and political situation measured through the following 
indicators: “Economic situation assessment” and “Political situation 
assessment”. 
 
Moreover, it will be analysed the relationship between the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and the concern over corruption to determine if it is possible 
to establish a negative correlation between both indicators. In this case it will 
be used data from the INE, an independent entity whose main objective is “to 
collect, produce and disseminate relevant, high-quality, official statistical 
information”; and also from the CIS. Concretely, it will be studied the 
evolution of the following indicators: “GDP growth rate” and “Growth rate 
of the concern over corruption”.  
 
Finally, and taking into account that Spain has recently moved from a 
situation of economic expansion to an economic crisis, participants will be 
directly asked in the survey how is their criticism’s level towards political 
corruption since the economic crisis started. 
 
 The impact of social pressure on citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption.  Has the information emphasizing other citizens’ reactions 
against political corruption any effect? Has the information focused on 
citizens’ losses a greater impact than the provision of factual 
information?   
 
It will be designed two versions of the survey with different scenarios 
assigning each one aleatory to half of the sample. The scenario of the first 
version will exclusively describe a political corruption case discovered while 
in the scenario of the second version, this description will be accompanied by 
information about how citizens are reacting. After reading the scenarios, 
participants will be asked to indicate their opinion. In order to be able to 
focus exclusively on the impact of the different scenarios, these responses 
will be compared with the responses expressed by participants in a previous 
question where they will be required to indicate their opinion about the same 
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case of political corruption, in this case presented just with a short sentence 
without any contextualization. 
 
Besides, in order to analyse if it possible to reach a higher impact on citizens’ 
criticism towards political corruption through information focused on 
citizens’ losses, it will be presented a list of four hypothetical pieces of news 
about political corruption (two of them just providing factual information, 
and the other two emphasizing the economic and social losses they provoke). 
After reading the four hypothetical pieces of news, participants will be asked 
to choose the one which they feel as the most serious.   
 
 Are citizens with a higher political awareness less tolerant towards 
political corruption? 
 
For the purpose of measuring the level of political awareness, participants 
will be asked about two questions related to politics; then, they will be 
classified taking into account the number of correct questions. Regarding the 
analysis of the attitude towards political corruption, participants will be asked 
to indicate their opinion on four different cases of political corruption; then, 
it will be considered the mean of these opinions. 
 
 The effect of citizens' political leaning on their tolerance towards 
corruption. Do progressive citizens and conservative citizens exhibit 
different level of tolerance?  
 
In order to find out participants’ political leaning, they will be required to 
place themselves on a left-right scale. Regarding the analysis of the attitude 
towards political corruption, as it has been already described, it will be used 
the mean of participants’ evaluations of four political corruption cases. 
 
 The impact of the new parties’ emergence. Have new parties’ supporters 
different attitude towards political corruption compared with traditional 
parties’ supporters?  
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Participants will be asked to indicate the party which they feel closer to their 
ideas among a list containing the four main Spanish parties (PP, PSOE, UP 
and C’s) and also the option “Other Party”; then, they will be classified as 
new parties’ supporters when they select UP or C’s, and as traditional 
parties’ supporters when they chose PP, PSOE or the option “Other party”. 
Regarding the analysis of the attitude towards political corruption, it will be 
also used the mean of participants’ evaluations of four political corruption 
cases. 
 
 Citizens’ perception about corruption in political parties. How strong do 
citizens associate different parties with corruption? Does this association 
vary among party’s supporters? Does citizens’ attitude towards a 
political case of corruption change when it affects to their own party?  
 
In order to measure the association between parties and corruption, 
participants will be asked about the level of corruption perceived in each of 
the four main Spanish parties (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s).   
 
For the purpose of analysing if the attitude towards political corruption varies 
when it is the preferred party the one involved, participants will face a 
hypothetical case of corruption where their preferred party is involved and 
they will be required to indicate their opinion. In order to isolate the 
partisanship effect, these responses will be compared with the responses 
expressed by participants in a previous question where they will be required 
to indicate their opinion about the same case of political corruption but 
without specifying the party involved. 
 
 Who is leading the online debate held on Twitter related to political 
corruption? Which is their political leaning? Which is their preferred 
party? 
 
It will be analysed the online debate about politics held on Twitter to detect 
the political leaning and the preferred party of those users who are 
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contributing to disseminate the messages with the highest rate of diffusion 
against political corruption. For this purpose, it will be exhaustively 
performed a detailed analysis of the Twitter accounts of those users: their 
tweets, their websites, and the information provided in their profiles.   
 
 Which are the parties most reported on corruption in the online debate 
about political corruption held on Twitter? 
 
It will be also examined the content of the messages most retweeted against 
political corruption in the online debate about politics held on Twitter in 
order to identify which political parties are the most reported on corruption.  
 
 Is it possible to establish any association between users’ preferred party 
and parties reported on corruption in the online debate about political 
corruption held on Twitter? 
 
Finally, it will be studied the relationship between users’ preferred party of 
those users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political 
corruption, and parties reported on corruption in the corruption most reported 
on Twitter.  
1.3 Contributions of this Thesis 
In this section it will be briefly summarised the major contributions of this thesis: 
 It has been established that an economic crisis impacts on citizens’ attitude 
towards political corruption, turning them less tolerant. 
 It has been found how in order to increase citizens’ criticism towards 
political corruption, social pressure is more effective than factual 
information.   
 It has been proved the political awareness’ impact on citizens’ attitude 
towards political corruption, being less tolerant as higher it is.   
 It has been shown the role played by political leaning in citizens’ attitude 
towards political corruption, being less tolerant as more progressive they are. 
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 It has been demonstrated the effect of the new parties’ emergence, which are 
being supported by younger and less tolerant towards political corruption 
citizens than traditional parties’ supporters. 
 It has been established the political sympathy’s impact, which makes citizens 
to downplay political corruption when it affects to their preferred party.  
 The characterisation of the most active users in the online debate about 
political corruption held on Twitter as users who feel closer to UP, the new 
party with a left political leaning.  
 The establishment that the party most reported on corruption in the online 
debate about political corruption held on Twitter is PP, the traditional party 
with a right political leaning. 
 It has been proved the political sympathy’s impact in the online debate about 
political corruption held on Twitter, establishing an association between the 
preferred party of the most active users and the parties reported.  
1.4 Organisation of this Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1, the current chapter, is an 
introduction to the work that will be developed in the following chapters. Chapter 2 
contains the literature review while in Chapter 3 it is established and motivated the 
hypotheses. The hypotheses themselves are tested in the following two chapters, with 
Chapter 4 describing the “Real World” experiments and Chapter 5 containing those 
related to the “Virtual World”. Finally, in Chapter 6 it is presented the conclusions of 
the thesis.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 Political Corruption Definition 2.1.1
Political corruption’s definition can be approached from different perspectives. 
Peters and Welch (1978) identified three different general criteria based on legality, 
public interest and public opinion.  
Following the legal criteria, Nye (1967) stated that a political act is corrupt when it 
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding wealth or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence. This includes bribery, nepotism and misappropriation. Berg et al. (1976) 
pointed out that all corrupt acts are not necessary illegal. 
Based on the public interest criteria, Rogow and Lasswell (1963) considered a 
political act as corrupt when it violates responsibility towards at least one system of 
public or civic order. This definition would enable a politician to justify almost any act 
by claiming that it is in the public interest (Peters and Welch, 1978). 
Accordingly to the third criteria, a political act is corrupt when the weight of public 
opinion determines it (Peters and Welch, 1978; Rundquist and Hansen, 1976). If it is 
difficult to agree what is “public interest”, it is even harder to consider a definition 
involving the public opinion, as it clearly varies depending on the citizens who are 
judging a particular act. Heidenheimer (1970) concluded that an act is corrupt when it is 
considered by the general public and also by political elites.  
Peters and Welch (1978) designed a study to analyse the attitudes about corruption 
held by a large group of public officials. One of their findings was that even if the vast 
majority of the public officials were aware that most of the public would identify a 
particular act as corrupt, some of them kept not considering it a corrupt act. As an 
example, the act of holding a large amount of stock in Standard Oil by a member of 
Congress who is working to maintain the oil depletion allowance was viewed as corrupt 
just by 55% of the public officials even if 81% considered that this act would be 
condemned by the most of the public.  
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As it has been just shown, there are different criteria to approach the corruption, 
and all of them seem to be unable by themselves to define this term. In this thesis, it will 
be considered a general definition of corruption given by the online Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary as “dishonest or illegal behaviour especially by powerful people (such as 
government officials or police officers)”
8
.  
 Political Corruption’s Impact  2.1.2
It has been empirically demonstrated the negative impact of political corruption on 
a society (Charron and Bågenholm, 2016). There is a wide agreement about the harmful 
effects not only from a political perspective (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Anderson and 
Tverdova, 2003; Seligson, 2002; Nye, 1967); but also from an economic and social 
perspective (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Lambsdorff, 
2006; Svensson, 2005; Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2000). Although most of the effects are 
connected, in this thesis they will be classified into three different categories: political, 
economic and social.    
Regarding the political consequences, it has been shown how political corruption 
affects political trust (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Burlacu, 2011; Morris and Klesner, 
2010; Chang and Chu, 2006); reduces citizens’ support for political institutions 
(Cordero and Blais, 2017; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003) and damages regime 
legitimacy (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Burlacu, 2011; Bowler and Karp, 2004; Anderson 
and Tverdova 2003; Della Porta, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Besides, it has been 
found that as higher is the corruption perceived, as lower is the percentage of citizens 
going to the polls (Chong et al., 2015; Stockemer et al., 2013). Finally, is has been 
demonstrated how high level of corruption represents an opportunity for new parties to 
emerge (Ecker et al., 2016).  
From an economic perspective, corruption is associated with less economic 
development (Charron and Bågenholm, 2016). The World Bank underlined that it is the 
most important impediment for development, having a negative impact on efficiency 
(Olken and Pande, 2012), deterring investment (Wei, 2000; Kaufman et al., 1999; 
Mauro, 1995) and reducing growth (Costas-Pérez et al., 2010; Mauro, 1995). 
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Focusing on the social effects, Charron and Bågenholm (2016) highlighted the 
negative relationship between corruption and inequality, Olken and Pande (2012) 
underlined how corruption has an adverse effect for equity and Sandholtz and Koetzle 
(2000) for fairness. Li et al. (2000) emphasized the association between corruption and 
the increase of income inequality and poverty. Mauro (1995) concluded that political 
corruption creates distortions on the allocation of public spending damaging the 
education and health systems. 
The Spanish case 
Since 2008, on one hand, Spain is going through an economic and social crisis; and 
on the other hand, the traditional parties PP and PSOE have been involved in a 
multitude of corruption scandals. As a consequence, following the CIS
9
, in May 2011 
Spaniards were overwhelmingly concerned with the unemployment (which rate was 
over 20% of the active population), the economic situation and the party political 
system. 
In this precarious context, the political debate moved onto blogs and online social 
networks as Facebook and Twitter (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012), which managed to 
channel the collective indignation (Anduiza et al., 2014). The online political debate 
quickly gained adherents and, as a result of merging more than 200 smaller citizen 
grassroots organisations, student organisations and other civil movements, it was born 
the collective “¡Democracia Real, Ya!” (Real Democracy, Now!), which had a definite 
bias to the left (Peña-López et al., 2014; Anduiza et al., 2012). This collective called for 
public protests against the established situation to be held on 15 May 2011 in more than 
fifty cities across Spain, which led to activists setting up camps in many of the cities, 
originating the well-known “Movimiento 15M” (15M Movement), which members 
called themselves “Los Indignados” (The Indignant) (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012). 
The role played by the online social networks was crucial to generate and spread the call 
(Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-Sánchez, 2012; González-Bailón et al., 2011). The interaction 
between the physical and the virtual world was essential for this movement to succeed, 
feeding both each other with information, coordination and a sense of collective identity 
(Peña-López et al., 2014). This movement managed to communicate the Spanish feeling 
of indignation to the whole world (Giraldo-Luque, 2018). 
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In November 2011, PSOE, which had been in the government since 2004, lost the 
General Elections; and PP, not only won but also reached the outright majority. During 
the period 2011-2015 PP was affected for multitude cases of corruption which were 
widely covered by the media. In the following lines it will be summarised four of the 
most popular cases of corruption which are still in trial, the so-called “Gürtel case”, 
“Barcenas’ papers”, “Púnica operation” and “Brugal case”. 
The “Gürtel case” consists in a corrupt organisation which laundered money and 
evaded taxes, bribing many PP local and regional leaders mostly in Valencia and 
Madrid (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Orriols and Cordero, 2016; Cordero and Montero 
2015). One of the consequences of this scandal was the resignation in June 2011, of the 
Regional President of Valencia, Francisco Camps.  
The “Barcenas’ papers” which is considered as a piece of the “Gürtel case”, is 
probably the case of corruption with the strongest impact on PP (Cordero and Blais, 
2017). In January 2013, it was published and widely diffused an alleged double 
counting of the PP between 1990 and 2009. In these papers, it was registered illegal 
bonus payments to several leaders of the party, including Prime Minister Mariano 
Rajoy. Concretely, following this information, he was accused to receive 25000 € 
between 1997 and 2008.  
The “Púnica operation” refers to an investigation of a corruption plot which 
involves politicians, officials and businessmen. This corrupt plot operated mainly in 
Madrid and, following the information published, it was awarded public services worth 
250 million euros in two years in exchange for illegal payments and commissions, 
which were subsequently laundered through a societal network (Orriols and Cordero, 
2016). One of the main consequences was the arrest in October 2014 of the PP’s 
General Secretary of Madrid, Francisco Granados. Nowadays, he is still in prison.  
The “Brugal case” involves a corrupt organization of local and provincial leaders of 
the PP of Valencia who were investigated for improper awarding of public tenders 
(Cordero and Blais, 2017). One of the consequences of this scandal was the resignation 
in December 2014, of the Mayor of Alicante (Valencia), Sonia Castedo. 
As a consequence of all the corruption scandals, the majority of Spanish society 
was aware and worried about corruption and many Spaniards were actively participating 
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in demonstrations against it (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Robles-Egea and Delgado-
Fernandez, 2014). Following the CIS
10
, while in 2011 just 2% of the population 
mentioned corruption as one of the main Spanish problems, this percentage increased 
until 56% in 2015. In fact, corruption became the second greatest problem for Spaniards 
after unemployment
11
. Accordingly, the Spain’s score on the Corruption Perception 
Index by Transparency International
12
 during the government of PP, on a scale anchored 
at 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), fell from 65 to 58. 
In this context, Podemos and C’s broke into the national political scene claiming to 
be the solution to regenerate a democracy strongly affected by political corruption. 
Podemos was closely related to the Movimiento 15M (15M Movement) (Kioupkiolis 
and Katsambekis, 2018; Franzé, 2017) while C’s was a regional party of Catalonia 
opposed to Catalonian nationalism (Rodríguez-Teruel and Barrio, 2016) which jumped 
into the national scene focused on the defence of territorial centralisation (Orriols and 
Cordero, 2016). These parties reached to break the traditional bipartisanship in the 
General Elections of December 2015 and also in the repeated General Elections of June 
2016. Concretely, the bipartisanship’s support fell from 73.3% in 2011 to 55.7% in 
2016. Orriols and Cordero (2016), when analysing the electoral results, concluded that 
the irruption of the new parties supposed the end of the bipartisanship. 
However, PP was still able to win both General Elections reaching a vote share of 
33% in June 2016. This party has remained in the government until June 2018, when a 
sentence that condemned this party for corruption led to a wide agreement among 
several parties of the opposition which allowed PSOE to win a no-confidence motion. 
Its mandates have been plagued with scandals of corruption which are still in trial and 
constantly on the focus of the media, nevertheless, it is remarkable how PP is still today 
the first political force with 7906185 votes and 137 seats out of 350. 
The Spanish case clearly illustrate how political corruption impacts from a political, 
economic and social point of views. Summarising the information above, political 
corruption contributed to impoverish population, which in 2011 participated in massive 
protests against the established party system and its corruption originating the so-called 
“Movimiento 15M” (15M Movement). In turn, this movement contributed to the 
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emergence of the new party Podemos in 2014, which has shaken Spanish politics 
putting an end to the two-party political system (Sola and Rendueles, 2017). 
 Political Corruption's electoral consequences 2.1.3
The democratic theory holds that elections act as mechanisms of accountability 
against politics who abuse power for their own personal gain (Charron and Bågenholm, 
2016). Accordingly, Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2016) underlined that elections are a 
citizens’ tool to select and discipline politicians. Therefore, it could be theorised that 
voters punish corrupted parties, however, parties’ electoral results are not penalised as 
much as it could be expected (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Ecker et al., 2016; Fernández-
Vázquez et al., 2016; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Golden, 2007; Davis, Camp, and 
Coleman, 2004; Jiménez and Caínzos, 2004; McCann and Dominguez, 1998; Dobratz 
and Whitfield, 1992; Rundquist et al., 1977). Despite the general disdain for corruption, 
it is a high re-election rate of corrupted politicians not only in developing countries but 
also in developed democratic countries (Chang and Kerr, 2009). The lack of 
consequences have been documented in different countries as Spain (Muñoz et al., 
2016; Anduiza et al., 2013), Canada (Blais et al., 2015), Mexico (Chong et al., 2015; 
Chong et al., 2011), the United Kingdom (Vivyan et al., 2012; Egger, 2011), Italy 
(Chang et al., 2010), and the US (Dimock and Jacobson, 1995; Peters and Welch, 1980; 
Rundquist et al., 1977). 
There are citizens who do not consider political corruption as an important problem 
to take into account before voting compared with other elements (Anduiza et al., 2013). 
There are corrupt politicians who are enjoying repeated electoral success (Cordero and 
Blais, 2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016) even in countries where citizens have a 
high perception of political corruption (Chang and Kerr, 2009).  
Many researches have analysed how politics being tried in court have not suffered 
serious electoral consequences or even have been re-elected. For instance, Eggers 
(2011), when analysing the electoral consequences of the 2009 UK parliamentary 
expenses scandal on the 2010 General Elections, demonstrated that the support of those 
MPs implicated was reduced only by 1.5 pp. 
Chang et al. (2007) showed how in post-war Italy, during ten legislatures, Italian 
voters did not penalize legislators being involved in corruption. They also found that the 
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probability of a legislator to be re-elected under judicial investigation for political 
malfeasance was over 50%. Chang and Kerr (2009) underlined how Silvio Berlusconi 
was re-elected as Prime Minister in Italy in three times, despite of being involved in a 
variety of corruption cases, including malfeasance charges and alleged links to the 
mafia.  
Reed (2005) found that between 1947 and 1993, the 62% of legislators in Japan 
who had been convicted of corruption charges were re-elected. Johnson (1986) analysed 
how the Japanese Prime Minister, Tanaka Kakuei, being involved in the Lockheed 
sandal, was re-elected after the 1983 “Tanaka Verdict Election”. 
Peters and Welch (1980) showed that in the U.S. House of Representatives 
elections, corruption charges only reduced candidates’ vote share by 6 to 11% and were 
unable to avoid corrupted candidates won.  
The Spanish case 
Cordero and Blais (2017) analysed how corruption could impact on the Spanish 
electoral results in the context of the electoral pre-campaign of the Spanish General 
Elections of 2015. For this purpose, it was used data from an online survey conducted in 
Spain by the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in June 2015 which had a sample size of 2410 
respondents. It is remarkable that at the time in which the data was collected political 
corruption was a salient issue. The incumbent party (PP) which had won the General 
Elections in 2011 with a support of the 44.6%, had had a mandate (2011-2015) plagued 
with scandals of corruption as the so-called “Gürtel case”, “Barcenas’ papers”, “Púnica 
operation” and “Brugal case”. These corruption cases are still in trial and were on the 
focus of the media during the electoral campaign in December 2015. 
As a consequence of all the corruption scandals, following the CIS
13
, while in 2011 
just 2% of the population mentioned corruption as one of the main Spanish problems, 
this percentage increased until 56% in 2015. In fact, corruption became the second 
greatest problem for Spaniards after unemployment
14
. Accordingly, the Spain’s score on 
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the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International
15
 during the government 
of PP, on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), fell from 65 to 58. 
Cordero and Blais (2017) justified the convenience to focus their research on Spain 
because this country clearly illustrate how corruption does not have the electoral 
consequences it could be expected. Firstly, during the period 2011-2015 where Spain 
was going through an economic crisis, the party in the government was affected for 
multitude cases of corruption; secondly, these cases of corruption were widely covered 
by the media: newspapers, radio, TV, and social media; thirdly, the majority of Spanish 
society was aware and worried about corruption and many Spaniards were actively 
participating in demonstrations against it; and finally, the incumbent party plagued of 
corruption was still able to win the General Election in December 2015. PP lost 
electoral support in 2015 in reference to the previous General Elections of 2011, 
concretely, PP obtained a 44.6% of votes in November 2011 while in December 2015 
its support was 28.7%. It is worth noting that this decrease must be relativized taking 
into account the emergence of the new parties Podemos and C’s. However, in despite of 
its corruption and the emergence of new parties which were traduced in electoral losses 
of 17pp, PP still reached the first position in the General Elections in 2015 with more 
than 7 million of votes and 123 seats.   
In this context, these researchers were interested in investigating citizens’ 
willingness to support a corrupt party. In order to address this issue, participants were 
required to indicate the likelihood in which they would vote for the incumbent 
government (PP) which was strongly affected by corruption on a scale anchored at 0 
(not at all likely) to 10 (very likely). This variable was recoded following a very 
conservative criterion as follows: “1”, when participants completely reject the idea of 
voting for the government; and “0”, otherwise.  
The results showed that 35% of respondents considered it was not totally 
unacceptable to support the incumbent government in despite of being plagued with 
corruption scandals. These results contribute to explain why political corruption has not 
the electoral results it could be expected. 





Previously, Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2016) analysed the impact of corruption on 
the electoral results of the Spanish Local Elections held in May 2011. For this purpose, 
it was prepared an original dataset with the electoral results of the Local Elections in 
May 2007 and May 2011. Besides, following an exhaustive process, it was identified 
the corruption scandals between both Local Elections and the municipalities affected. 
The result of this process yielded a dataset of 75 municipalities affected by corruption 
(1% of Spanish municipalities). 
These authors justified the convenience to choose Spain for the study of corruption 
underlining how at that time this country was a clear example where although voters 
disliked corruption, incumbents rarely suffered electoral consequences for their illegal 
actions. Besides, on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean), Spain 
generally scored poorly in all cross-country rankings of perception of corruption at all 
administrative levels. Finally, they emphasised that, as most of the Spanish corruption 
scandals are investigated by judicial authorities, there was an extensive press coverage 
which increased citizens’ political awareness.  
The results showed on one side, how while 67.9% of the incumbent mayors were 
re-elected, this rate was just slightly lower when considering exclusively those mayors 
involved in scandals of corruption (62.7%); and on the other side, focusing on the vote 
share, how the average loss for the incumbent mayors was -3.4%, while it was slightly 
higher when considering exclusively those mayors involved in scandals of corruption (-
8.5%). Moreover, when estimating the impact of political corruption on the vote share 
of the incumbent mayors controlling potential confounders, it was found that mayors 
involved in corruption scandals just lost an average of 1.8pp. As a consequence, it was 
concluded that political corruption has not the electoral consequences it could be 
expected.  
These results are in agreement with those obtained by Vallina-Rodriguez et al. 
(2012) when analysing citizens’ attitude towards political corruption and the established 
political system in the online debate held on Twitter during the electoral pre-campaign 
of May 2011. For this purpose, these authors identified on one hand, 400 hashtags and 
key words related to the political debate; and on the other hand, a set of 200 Twitter 
accounts used by political parties, their candidates, the “Democracia Real, Ya!” (Real 
Democracy, Now!) organisation, which was against the established political system and, 
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the main media sources. Then, it was collected through the Twitter Streaming API those 
tweets between 10 and 24 May 2011 which contained one hashtag of the list, were 
mentioning a Twitter account of the list or, were published by a Twitter account of the 
list. This process yielded a dataset of 3 million tweets sent by about 500000 Twitter 
users. These tweets contained more than 115000 different hashtags. 
These researchers found especially interesting to study Spain as at that time this 
country was going through a convulsed political, economic and social situation. Since 
2008, Spain was going through an economic and social crisis like many other European 
countries. Following the CIS
16
, in May 2011 Spaniards were overwhelmingly concerned 
with the unemployment (which rate was over 20% of the active population), the 
economic situation and the party political system. Besides, Spain was facing Regional 
and Local Elections. Concretely, 13 out of 17 Spanish autonomous areas and more than 
8000 municipalities were facing elections.  
The results showed how although the vast majority of the tweets were against the 
traditional party system and its corruption, it was still able to reach a vote share of the 
65.3% in the Local Elections, which meant a loss of just 6pp with respect to the Local 
Elections of May 2007. Once again, it is shown how political corruption has not the 
electoral consequences it could be expected.  
In this chapter it will be reviewed the literature related to the most relevant 
variables which influence citizens’ attitude towards political corruption. Concretely, the 
chapter is structured as follows: in section 2.2, it will be reviewed the literature 
regarding the role played by political awareness in citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption; it will be studied if there is any difference between individuals with a 
different political leaning; it will be investigated the effect of the political sympathy 
when citizens are analysing the information about corruption; it will be examined the 
impact of the economic context on the attitude towards corruption; it will be studied the 
impact of the new parties’ emergence; and finally, it will be deeply analysed the effect 
of social pressure in different domains and how it is spread. Then, in section 2.3, it will 
be studied the role played social media on politics. For this purpose it will be analysed 
the impact of social media on citizens’ political attitudes and behaviours; it will be 
investigated different approaches that have been proposed in order to measure influence 
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on Twitter; it will be characterised the political debate held on Twitter; and finally, it 
will be analysed Twitter conversations on politics. At the end, it will be highlighted the 
most relevant conclusions in section 2.4. 
2.2 Citizens’ attitudes towards political corruption: The key 
variables 
 Introduction 2.2.1
Citizens’ attitude towards political corruption is heterogeneous and depends on 
several factors (Ecker et al., 2016). When political corruption is studied, it has been 
identified the following variables as the most important: political awareness, political 
leaning, political sympathy, economic context, new parties’ emergence and social 
pressure. 
Jennings et al. (2017) underlined that in order to make rational voting decisions, 
citizens need to be aware of who the candidates are and, at least, their main political 
proposals. Cordero and Blais (2017), Anduiza et al. (2013) and Weitz-Shapiro and 
Winters (2010) proved a negative relationship between citizens’ political awareness and 
their tolerance towards political corruption. Accordingly, Arceneaux (2007) and Kam 
(2005) pointed out that sophisticated citizens tend to be more critical with parties than 
those who are not interested in political issues. On the basis of the previous findings, in 
this thesis, it will be investigated if citizens with higher levels of political awareness are 
less tolerant towards political corruption.  
Festinger (1962)  stated that the existence of dissonance, being psychological 
uncomfortable, motivates the person to try to reduce it and achieve consonance. 
Besides, this author also underlined that citizens tend to actively avoid situations and 
information which would likely increase that dissonance. It explains why do exist 
consistency between one citizen’s social and political attitudes, and between what that 
citizen knows or believes and his acts. Citizens tend to analyse political information 
accordingly with their political predispositions (Jennings et al., 2017; Lodge and Taber, 
2013; Brader and Tucker, 2009; Anderson and Singer, 2008; Coan et al., 2008; 
Malhotra and Kuo, 2008; Anderson et al., 2005; Bartels, 2002, 2000; Gerber and Green, 
1999; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Zaller, 1992; Sherrod, 1971). As a consequence, it is 
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expected that political leaning and political sympathy will play interesting roles on 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption. 
Many authors agree that citizens’ criticism towards political corruption differs 
when the country’s economy is growing or decreasing. Citizens tend to be more tolerant 
when their country is in a stage of economic growth (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron 
and Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Klasnja and Tucker, 2013; Winters and 
Weitz-Shapiro, 2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013; Jerit and Barabas, 
2012; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Manzetti and Wilson, 2007; Golden, 2007; 
Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2000; Duch et al., 2000; Mauro, 1995). As a consequence, it will be 
considered the economic context as one of the variables which has a relevant role when 
analysing citizens’ attitude towards political corruption.  
The economic, social and political crisis has recently shaken the traditional political 
system contributing to the emergence of new parties (Altiparmakis and Lorenzini, 2018; 
Muro and Vidal, 2017; Della Porta, 2015). It represents an opportunity for citizens to 
punish traditional parties affected by political corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017). 
Engler (2015), Pop-Eleches (2010) and Mainwaring et al. (2009) found that corruption 
benefits new parties pushing voters away from all the traditional parties, not only from 
the one which is in the government. In this thesis, it will be studied if those citizens who 
feel closer to new parties are less tolerant towards political corruption than those who 
support traditional parties. 
In a context of an economic, social and political crisis, it has been proved how 
social pressure plays a key role in mobilising citizens against the established political 
system and its corruption (Giraldo-Luque, 2018; Anduiza et al., 2014; Peña-López et 
al., 2014; Toret, 2013; Anduiza et al., 2012; Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-Sánchez, 2012; 
Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012; González-Bailón et al., 2011). In this this thesis, it will 
be analysed the impact of social pressure in citizens’ criticism towards political 
corruption.    
 Political Awareness 2.2.2
There is a wide agreement among scholars in pointing out that political awareness 
is a salient factor in explaining citizens’ attitude towards corruption. Siegel (2018) 
highlighted how democracy depends on citizens’ political awareness, being necessary to 
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become educated politically. Bode (2016) underlined that a basic tenet of democracy 
theory is that voters’ political choices must be based on informed thinking about 
political issues. Accordingly, Jennings et al. (2017) emphasised that in order to make 
educated and rational voting decisions, citizens need information about candidates and 
issues. Habermas (1962) stated that an informed electorate is fundamental to a 
deliberative democracy.  
 It has been shown how as higher is the political awareness as lower is the level of 
tolerance towards corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Anduiza et al., 2013; Weitz-
Shapiro and Winters, 2010). Sophisticated citizens tend to be more critical with parties 
than those who are not interested in political issues (Arceneaux, 2007; Kam, 2005).  
One of the theories which could explain why citizens keep voting for corrupt 
politicians is the lack of information. Charron and Bågenholm (2016) underlined how to 
reach an efficient electoral accountability mechanism, the first prerequisite is that the 
information on political corruption is reliable, available and comes to the knowledge of 
the voters. Fackler and Lin (1995) established a negative relationship between 
information published about corruption cases and electoral results. As greater is the 
amount of information about corruption being spread through the media, as higher is the 
impact on the electoral results of the party which was in the government. As a 
consequence, the role of the media is absolutely crucial, citizens who do not have access 
to plural and high quality information will be more likely to vote for corrupt politicians 
(Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013; Geddes, 1994; Rose-Ackerman et al., 1980).  
Following this theory, it would be expected that if the information is available and 
citizens perceive an increase in the level of corruption, they will vote against corrupt 
politicians (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Fernández-Vázquez et al., 2016; Anduiza et al., 
2013; Costas-Pérez et al., 2010; Figueiredo et al., 2010; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 
2010; Chang and Kerr, 2009; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Tavits, 2007; Gerring and 
Thacker, 2005; Adserá et al., 2003; Treisman, 2000; Rundquist et al., 1977). In the rest 
of this section, it will be analysed some researches in which it has been studied the role 
played by political awareness in citizens’ attitude towards political corruption. 
Cordero and Blais (2017) analysed the effect of political awareness in Spaniards’ 
attitude towards political corruption. For this purpose, it was used data from an online 
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survey conducted in Spain by the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in June 2015 which had a 
sample size of 2410 respondents. It is remarkable that at the time in which the data was 
collected political corruption was a salient issue. The incumbent party (PP) which had 
won the General Elections in 2011 with a support of the 44.6%, had had a mandate 
(2011-2015) plagued with scandals of corruption as the so-called “Gürtel case”, 
“Barcenas’ papers”, “Púnica operation” and “Brugal case”. 
As a consequence of all the corruption scandals, following the CIS
17
, while in 2011 
just 2% of the population mentioned corruption as one of the main Spanish problems, 
this percentage increased until 56% in 2015. In fact, corruption became the second 
greatest problem for Spaniards after unemployment
18
. Accordingly, the Spain’s score on 
the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International
19
 during the government 
of PP, on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), fell from 65 to 58. 
Cordero and Blais (2017) justified the convenience to focus their research on Spain 
because this country clearly illustrate how corruption does not have the electoral 
consequences it could be expected. Firstly, during the period 2011-2015 where Spain 
was going through an economic crisis, the incumbent party was affected for multitude 
cases of corruption; secondly, these cases of corruption were widely covered by the 
media: newspapers, radio, TV, and social media; thirdly, the majority of Spanish society 
was aware and worried about corruption and many Spaniards were actively participating 
in demonstrations against it; and finally, the incumbent party plagued of corruption was 
still able to win the General Election in December 2015. PP lost electoral support in 
2015 in reference to the previous General Elections of 2011, concretely, PP obtained a 
44.6% of votes in November 2011 while in December 2015 its support was 28.7%. It is 
worth noting that this decrease must be relativized taking into account the emergence of 
the new parties Podemos and C’s. However, in despite of its corruption and the 
emergence of new parties which were traduced in electoral losses of 17pp, PP still 
reached the first position in the General Elections in 2015 with more than 7 million of 
votes and 123 seats. 
In this context, these researchers were interested in analysing the relationship 
between citizens’ perception of corruption in the government and the likelihood to 
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support it. Concretely, these authors hypothesised that as higher is the perception of 
corruption in the incumbent government, as higher is the propensity to consider 
completely unacceptable to vote for it. In order to address this issue, on one side, 
participants were required to indicate the likelihood in which they would vote for the 
incumbent government (PP) on a scale anchored at 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (very 
likely). This variable was recoded following a very conservative criterion as follows: 
“1”, when participants completely reject the idea of voting for the government; and “0”, 
otherwise. On the other side, they were asked to manifest their perceptions of corruption 
in the government on a scale anchored at 0 (the government is not corrupt at all) to 10 
(the government is very corrupt). 
The results showed that the difference in the predicted probability to completely 
reject the idea of voting for the incumbent government between those respondents who 
perceived it was not corrupt at all and those who perceived it was very corrupt was -
40pp. In other words, the likelihood of totally rejecting the idea of supporting PP of 
those who perceived this party was not affected by corruption was 40pp lower than 
those who perceived PP was involved in a multitude of corruption scandals.  
As a consequence, it was concluded that political awareness plays a key role on 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption: as higher it is, as higher is the propensity 
to punish the party affected by corruption.  
Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2016) also studied how political awareness impacts on 
Spaniards’ attitude towards political corruption. For this purpose, it was prepared an 
original dataset with the electoral results of the Spanish Local Elections in May 2007 
and May 2011. Besides, following an exhaustive process, it was identified the 
corruption scandals between both Local Elections and the municipalities affected. Then, 
these cases of corruption were classified according to the economic externalities they 
generated, i.e., it was distinguished between those cases where corruption provoked 
welfare decreasing and those which provoked welfare enhancing. The result of this 
process yielded a dataset of 75 municipalities affected by corruption (1% of Spanish 
municipalities), being 46 classified as welfare enhancing and 29 as welfare decreasing.  
These authors justified the convenience to choose Spain for the study of corruption 
underlining how at that time this country was a clear example where although voters 
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disliked corruption, incumbents rarely suffered electoral consequences for their illegal 
actions. Particularly, between 2003 and 2007, the 70% of mayors who were involved in 
corruption were re-elected. Accordingly, Costas-Pérez et al. (2012) found that the 
electoral cost of corruption was on average just a 4%. Besides, on a scale anchored at 0 
(highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean), Spain generally scored poorly in all cross-country 
rankings of perception of corruption at all administrative levels. Moreover, and taking 
into account the classification of the scandals of corruption used to test their hypothesis, 
where it was distinguished those cases where corruption provoked welfare decreasing 
and welfare increasing, Spain represented a suitable case as it offered a significant 
number of cases in which mayors irregularly changed the established land use allowing 
an excess of construction which benefited the local economy in the short time (Villoria 
and Jiménez, 2012). Finally, Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2016) emphasised that, as most 
of the Spanish corruption scandals are investigated by judicial authorities, there was an 
extensive press coverage which increased citizens’ political awareness.  
The results showed how as higher the media coverage of the corruption scandal 
was, as higher was the magnitude of the electoral punishment. Accordingly, when 
comparing the electoral results of the Spanish Local Elections in 2003 and 2007, 
Costas-Pérez et al. (2010) found how the vote losses were around 9% when the 
corruption cases were widely reported while the effect was just around 3% when voters 
were not properly informed about it.  
Distinguishing those corruption cases which provoked welfare decreasing and 
welfare increasing for the municipality, Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2016) found that, in 
order to reach a larger electoral punishment, those cases classified as provoking welfare 
increasing needed higher media coverage. As a consequence, it was concluded that 
political awareness plays a key role when analysing citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption. 
Previously, Anduiza et al. (2013) analysed the impact of political awareness on 
Spaniards’ attitude towards political corruption as well. For this purpose, it was 
designed and conducted an online survey focused on the political attitudes and 
behaviours. The universe studied was the population resident in Spain, and the sampling 
was carried out in this country in November 2010. The sampling units were men and 
women with Internet access, older than 15 and younger than 45. These age limits were 
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selected because the percentage of people with access to Internet in that age range was 
over 83% while the Internet diffusion rate above this age was much lower. The sample 
size was 2300 respondents. 
These authors justified their research was focused on Spain underlining that at the 
time in which the data was collected, political corruption was a salient issue. 
Accordingly, the Spain’s score on the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency 
International was 6.1 on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). In this 
context, the researchers expected more realistic answers. Besides, Spain had an 
institutionalised party system with more than 60% of its population reporting feeling 
close to a political party which clearly benefited the goal of measuring the political 
sympathy impact. Finally, it was also pointed out that Spain was a clear example where 
political corruption has not the electoral consequences it could be expected. 
These researchers were interested in testing their belief that citizens are more 
tolerant towards political corruption as higher is their political awareness. In order to 
address this issue, firstly, participants were required to indicate which their preferred 
party was and, in order to measure their political awareness, to respond four questions 
related to politics. Then, they faced a randomly assigned vignette in which it was briefly 
reported a hypothetical corruption case related to one of the followings: a mayor of their 
preferred party; a mayor of a different party; a mayor of a party not specified. This 
design allowed isolating the impact of partisanship. After reading the vignette, 
respondents were asked to indicate how serious they considered the situation was on a 
scale anchored at 0 (not serious at all) to 10 (very serious). 
The analysis was restricted to the supporters of the main parties (PP and PSOE) 
which at this time represented the 83.8% of the population. The reason was that this 
restriction ensured that the distance between “preferred party” and “different (rival) 
party” was the same for both parties’ supporters.  
On one hand, it was performed a multivariate test, which dependent variable was 
their opinion about the scandal of corruption, including political awareness as a factor. 
The conclusion was that, on average, political awareness plays a key role on the 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption, being severely judged by those citizens 
with a higher level.  
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On the other hand, taking into account the type of vignette participants faced, it was 
calculated the average values of the attitude towards political corruption for each of the 
three groups in which the sample was randomly divided (citizens who faced a scandal of 
corruption in their preferred party, in the rival party and in a party not specified) with 
the political awareness as moderator. The main conclusion was that among those 
respondents whit a high level of political awareness, the difference between the three 
groups was not statistically significant. However, among those respondents with the 
lowest level of political awareness, there was a difference statistically significant 
between the group who evaluated the scandal of corruption in their preferred party and 
the group who evaluated the scandal of corruption in their rival party. Concretely, the 
mean of the attitude towards political corruption was 1.6 higher in the group who faced 
the scandal in the rival party. In other words, while there was a widespread consensus 
about the seriousness of the scandal of corruption among those citizens with a high level 
of political awareness, citizens with a lower level of political awareness tended to 
downplay corruption, especially when it was their preferred party the one which was 
being involved. 
There are other studies where it has been analysed the political awareness impact. 
For instance, Figueiredo et al. (2010) found in the 2008 São Paulo Mayoral Race, that 
the information about corruption spread about one of the candidates, had a negative 
impact on his electoral support. Acordingly, Ferraz and Finan (2008) showed how in the 
2004 Brazil municipalities those incumbent Mayors who were involved in a multiple 
cases of corruption, had less electoral support than those who were perceived as less 
corrupt. Concretely, they found that when there was evidence of corruption, Mayors lost 
between 10% and 30% of the votes, and this percentage was even higher when there 
was a local radio station.  
 Political Leaning  2.2.3
It has been already proved that the attitude towards political corruption depends on 
the degree to which citizens are aware that a politician is involved in corruption, but it is 
worth noting that two citizens having the same degree of awareness may have different 
attitude towards political corruption (Chang and Kerr, 2009), therefore, it will be 
necessary to take into account other variables. In this section, it will be analysed the role 
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played by political leaning, which has been identified as crucial when analysing 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption (Charron and Bågenholm, 2016).  
It has been shown that citizens tend to analyse political information accordingly 
with their political predispositions (Jennings et al., 2017; Lodge and Taber, 2013; 
Brader and Tucker, 2009; Anderson and Singer, 2008; Coan et al., 2008; Malhotra and 
Kuo, 2008; Anderson et al., 2005; Bartels, 2002, 2000; Gerber and Green, 1999; Miller 
and Shanks, 1996; Zaller, 1992; Sherrod, 1971).  
Political leaning provides a shared values and beliefs system that allows individuals 
with the same ideology to view and react to many issues of the world around them in a 
similar way (Knight, 2006; Feldman, 2003). There are substantial differences among 
people on the left and right leanings, and a high degree of coincidence between people 
belonging to the same political leaning (McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Dunlap et al., 
2001). The scale left-right or alternatively, progressive and conservative, summarizes 
political positions on a wide range of issues and the vast majority of the citizens can 
position themselves and parties on this scale (Mair, 2009). The Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES)
20
, accordingly with other cross-national studies which 
specifically ask citizens to place themselves and parties along a left-right scale, 
concluded that almost 90% of citizens are able to indicate their position and parties’ 
position on this scale (Dalton and McAllister, 2015; Rohrschneider, 2015; Esaiasson 
and Holmberg, 1996). 
Researchers have found a wide variety of variables which are useful to identify the 
main differences between left and right parties. The predisposition to change is a 
commonly analysed variable when studying these differences, being left, associated 
with an openness to change; while right, with conservativism (Anderson and Singer, 
2008; Devos et al., 2002; Schwartz, 1992).  
Freire (2006) and Knutsen (1997) studied on one side, the role played by social 
class, concluding that left is linked with the working class while right represents the 
interests of the middle class and professionals; and on the other side, the role played by 
religion, finding that from the left position it is claimed the limited social and political 





role for religious organisations while the right position defends a greater relevance of 
religion in society.  
Hellwig (2014); Dalton (2006); Knutsen (1995); Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) 
and Downs (1957) found that when studying economic issues, there are substantial 
differences between citizens’ positions depending on their political leaning. There is a 
broad agreement to highlight the level of government’s intervention in an economy as 
one of them. Left is traditionally associated with a greater intervention while right with 
free market and few restrictions in the economy.  
Regarding the inequality, there is a wide agreement to note that those citizens who 
identify themselves as having a right political leaning tend to legitimate and justify 
inequality while those who feel themselves as having a left political leaning are more 
sensitive to this issue (Alesina et al., 2004; Jost et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 2003b; Jost and 
Hunyady, 2002; Listhaug and Aalberg, 1999; Tyler and McGraw, 1986; Lane, 1962). 
It has been also identified a set of cultural variables which are key classifiers to 
discern if an individual has a left or right political leaning: issues of gender equality, 
immigration, multiculturalism, lifestyle choices, quality of life and environmental 
policy (Inglehart, 1990). 
As it has been shown, political leaning involves and summarizes citizens’ position 
in a wide variety of social, economic and cultural issues (Jou and Dalton, 2017). Left 
and right are the most common tags to place parties into a common framework (Mair, 
2009), which is useful in many parliamentary systems where citizens face a wide variety 
of parties and, as a consequence, to evaluate all the proposals in order to decide how to 
cast the vote becomes a challenging task (Best and McDonald, 2011; Converse, 1964). 
These tags are an efficient way to understand, organise and store political information 
and, therefore, they clearly simplify the parties’ evaluation and vote’s decision (Jou and 
Dalton, 2017; Downs, 1957). It has been found how the relation between political 
leaning and party choice is stronger than the relation between other social, economic or 
cultural variables and party choice.  
Focusing on the topic of this thesis, Rundquist, et al. (1977) proved that when 
corrupt politicians have a policy position on an important issue to the voter according 
with him, his reaction towards corruption is less negative. In the rest of this section, it 
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will be analysed some researches in which it has been studied the role played by 
political leaning in citizens’ attitude towards political corruption. 
Charron and Bågenholm (2016) analysed the role played by political leaning in 
Europeans’ attitude towards political corruption. Their analysis was based on the largest 
multi-country survey focused on the matters of governance and corruption. The universe 
studied was the population resident in Europe, and the sampling was carried out in 24 
European countries between February and April 2013 by the authors in collaboration 
with the European Commission. The sampling units were men and women over 18 
years old and the sample size was roughly 85000 respondents.    
Participants, on one hand, were required to place themselves in the left-right axis on 
a scale anchored at 1 (extreme left) to 7 (extreme right); and on the other hand, were 
asked about which would be their most likely reaction if their first party choice was 
involved in a corruption scandal. They had to choose among the following three 
options: keep voting for their first party choice; vote for an alternative party not 
involved in corruption; or not vote at all. 
The results showed that in a multiparty system, i.e., when citizens have reasonable 
ideological alternatives, voters with a right political leaning were more likely to keep 
supporting their party than voters with a left political leaning. Besides, when focusing 
on those who decide not to keep sustaining their corrupted party, it was found that the 
percentage of voters who decide to not vote at all was higher for citizens with a right 
political leaning while the percentage of voters who switch to an alternative party was 
higher for citizens with a left political leaning.  
In other words, compared with those citizens with a left political leaning, those on 
the right found harder to stop sustaining their party and, when they did, they had more 
difficulties to vote for an alternative party and decided to abstain from voting in a higher 
proportion. 
When analysing each country separately, these researchers found that Spaniards 
were those with the highest difference on the attitude towards political corruption 
between those with a left and right political leaning. The overall results indicated that 
the vast majority was against to keep supporting its corrupted party, concretely, a 52% 
selected the abstention and a 34% to vote for an alternative party. The percentage of 
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participants who expressed their desire to keep sustaining their party in despite of 
corruption was a 10% (a 4% declined to answer the question). However, Charron and 
Bågenholm (2016) emphasised the contrast between Spanish supporters with a left and 
right political leaning underlining how while those on the left were strongly against to 
keep supporting their corrupted party, the likelihood of a citizen with a right political 
leaning to keep voting for his or her corrupted party was the highest of all the European 
countries studied.   
In addition, it is worth to highlight that the Spanish results are even more relevant 
when taking into account the period in which the data was collected (February - April 
2013). At this time, Spain was going through an economic crisis and the incumbent 
party was PP, the traditional Spanish party with a right political leaning. The 
government which was in the middle of its first mandate (2011-2015) was plagued with 
a multitude of corruption cases. Besides, part of the Spanish civil society was actively 
participating in protest movements against corruption and the economic and social 
situation. Both, scandals of corruption and protest movements were widely covered by 
the media and, as a consequence, Spaniards were aware about of the salient corruption. 
In this context, not only a 10% of participants selected the option of keep voting for 
their corrupted party when the data of the multi-country survey was collected in 2013, 
but also the party most involved in corruption was re-elected with a vote share of 28.7% 
in the the General Elections of 2015. 
Anduiza et al. (2013) analysed the role played by political leaning in the Spaniards’ 
attitude towards political corruption. For this purpose, it was designed and conducted an 
online survey focused on the political attitudes and behaviours. The universe studied 
was the population resident in Spain, and the sampling was carried out in this country in 
November 2010. The sampling units were men and women with Internet access, older 
than 15 and younger than 45. These age limits were selected because the percentage of 
people with access to Internet in that age range was over 83% while the Internet 
diffusion rate above this age was much lower. The sample size was 2300 respondents. 
These authors justified their research was focused on Spain underlining that at the 
time in which the data was collected, political corruption was a salient issue. 
Accordingly, the Spain’s score on the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency 
International was 6.1 on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). In this 
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context, the researchers expected more realistic answers. Besides, Spain had an 
institutionalised party system with more than 60% of its population reporting feeling 
close to a political party which clearly benefited the goal of measuring the political 
sympathy impact. Finally, it was also pointed out that Spain was a clear example where 
political corruption has not the electoral consequences it could be expected. 
These researchers analysed the differences between PP supporters and PSOE 
supporters in relation with their tolerance towards political corruption. In order to 
address this issue, participants, who had been previously required to indicate which 
their preferred party was, faced a randomly assigned vignette in which it was briefly 
reported a hypothetical corruption case related to one of the followings: a mayor of their 
preferred party; a mayor of a different party; a mayor of a party not specified. This 
design allowed isolating the impact of partisanship. After reading the vignette, 
respondents were asked to indicate how serious they considered the situation was on a 
scale anchored at 0 (not serious at all) to 10 (very serious). 
The analysis was restricted to the supporters of the main parties, PP and PSOE, 
which at this time represented the 83.8% of the population and were clearly identified as 
having a right and left political leaning respectively. The reason was that this restriction 
ensured that the distance between “preferred party” and “different (rival) party” was the 
same for both parties’ supporters.  
The main conclusion was that in all the cases, i.e., when participants faced a case of 
corruption in which the party affected was their preferred party, was a different party, or 
was a party not specified, sympathizers of PP were more tolerant towards political 
corruption.  
Accordingly, when comparing the electoral results of the Spanish Local Elections 
in 2003 and 2007, Costas-Pérez et al. (2010) concluded that when corruption was 
widely reported, left voters punished corruption cases more than right voters. 
Concretely, it was found how corruption detracted 22.3% of the votes in a municipality 




 Political Sympathy 2.2.4
After studying the role played by political leaning, it is worth analysing the specific 
role played by citizens’ political sympathy towards their preferred party. When citizens’ 
preferred party is involved in corruption, they have to face a crucial decision: keep 
supporting their party, not vote or vote for an alternative party. In order to punish a 
corrupted party, support an alternative one represents the most effective option, 
however, it has been widely proved how certain voters not only decide not voting but 
also continue supporting their party even being aware it is plagued of corruption 
scandals and having reasonable ideological alternatives. Charron and Bågenholm (2016) 
highlighted how when citizens face a scandal of corruption affecting to their preferred 
party, the “home team” psychology factor makes them find hard assigning blame. In 
this section, it will be studied the role played by political sympathy in citizens’ attitude 
towards political corruption. 
Cordero and Blais (2017) underlined that those citizens who feel closer to an 
incumbent party involved in corruption tend to be more tolerant towards it. Anduiza et 
al. (2013) found that citizens evaluate information differently depending on if that 
information affects or not the party they are supporting. Mullainathan and Washington 
(2009) and Beasley and Joslyn (2001) showed that party’s supporters evaluate more 
positively its candidate than the rival. There is a wide agreement among scholars in 
pointing out that voters’ political sympathy can balance the impact of corruption on the 
electoral results, being even the candidate involved in a corruption case re-elected 
(Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Welch and Hibbing, 1997; 
Peters and Welch, 1980). According with this finding, Ecker et al. (2016) found that 
citizens have a strong predisposition to keep voting the same party in despite of 
corruption. The role played by political sympathy in the attitude towards political 
corruption has been documented in different countries as Canada (Blais et al., 2015), 
Spain (Anduiza et al., 2013), the UK (Vivyan et al., 2012), Mexico (Chong et al., 2011), 
Italy (Chang et al., 2010), and the US (Dimock and Jacobson, 1995; Peters and Welch, 
1980; Rundquist et al., 1977). 
A citizen who is informed about corruption in his preferred party may experiment a 
contradiction between two cognitions: on one hand, the preference for the political 
party; and on the other hand, his preferred party is affected by corruption. As the 
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dissonance is psychological uncomfortable, the citizen may try to modify one of his two 
cognitions, his party’s preference or his degree of tolerance towards political corruption. 
Anduiza et al. (2013) underlined that modifying the second cognition may be easier. 
Party’s supporters may find difficulties to believe information about corruption in 
their party (Blais et al., 2015), especially, when it is not confirmed by court corruption 
(Rundquist et al., 1977). It may be easier to think that this information is just the result 
of the partisan conflict, especially, in contentious political contexts. Anduiza et al. 
(2013) highlighted how partisans are more likely to believe corruption scandals when 
they affect to other party rather than when it is their preferred party involved. In these 
cases, partisans tend to consider political noise made by competing parties and 
magnified by media and, when the scandal of corruption is too obvious to deny, it is 
easier for partisans to think that the other parties are also corrupt (Charron and 
Bågenholm, 2016). However, it is not just a question of credibility. There are cases 
where although citizens know and believe the political corruption information which is 
being spread about their party, they choose to downplay it and focus on other benefits 
the politicians are delivering (Anduiza et al., 2013). In the following lines, it will be 
analysed some researches in which it has been studied the role played by political 
sympathy in citizens’ attitude towards political corruption.  
Charron and Bågenholm (2016) analysed the political sympathy’s effect on 
Europeans’ attitude towards political corruption. Their analysis was based on the largest 
multi-country survey focused on the matters of governance and corruption. The universe 
studied was the population resident in Europe, and the sampling was carried out in 24 
European countries between February and April 2013 by the authors in collaboration 
with the European Commission. The sampling units were men and women over 18 
years old and the sample size was roughly 85000 respondents.    
Concretely, these authors analysed the likelihood of European citizens to keep 
supporting their preferred party being aware it was involved in corruption. In order to 
address this issue, participants were asked about which would be their most likely 
reaction if their preferred party was involved in a corruption scandal. They had to 
choose among the following three options: keep voting for their preferred party; vote for 
an alternative party not involved in corruption; or not vote at all. 
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The results showed that a 21% of all respondents would support their preferred 
party in despite of corruption, a 34% would vote for an alternative party and a 39% 
would abstain from voting (a 6% declined to answer the question).  
Anduiza et al. (2013) analysed the role played by political sympathy in the 
Spaniards’ attitude towards political corruption. For this purpose, it was designed and 
conducted an online survey focused on the political attitudes and behaviours. The 
universe studied was the population resident in Spain, and the sampling was carried out 
in this country in November 2010. The sampling units were men and women with 
Internet access, older than 15 and younger than 45. These age limits were selected 
because the percentage of people with access to Internet in that age range was over 83% 
while the Internet diffusion rate above this age was much lower. The sample size was 
2300 respondents. 
These authors justified their research was focused on Spain underlining that at the 
time in which the data was collected, political corruption was a salient issue. 
Accordingly, the Spain’s score on the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency 
International was 6.1 on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). In this 
context, the researchers expected more realistic answers. Besides, Spain had an 
institutionalised party system with more than 60% of its population reporting feeling 
close to a political party which clearly benefited the goal of measuring the political 
sympathy impact. Finally, it was also pointed out that Spain was a clear example where 
political corruption has not the electoral consequences it could be expected. 
These researchers theorised that citizens are more tolerant towards political 
corruption when it is their preferred party the one which is being involved in a 
corruption scandal. In order to address this issue, participants, who had been previously 
required to indicate which their preferred party was, faced a randomly assigned vignette 
in which it was briefly reported a hypothetical corruption case related to one of the 
followings: a mayor of their preferred party; a mayor of a different party; a mayor of a 
party not specified. This design allowed isolating the impact of partisanship. After 
reading the vignette, respondents were asked to indicate how serious they considered 
the situation was on a scale anchored at 0 (not serious at all) to 10 (very serious). 
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The analysis was restricted to the supporters of the main parties (PP and PSOE) 
which at this time represented the 83.8% of the population. The reason was that this 
restriction ensured that the distance between “preferred party” and “different (rival) 
party” was the same for both parties’ supporters.  
The main conclusion was that those participants who faced a scandal of corruption 
in which their party was involved were more tolerant towards political corruption than 
those who faced a scandal of corruption in their rival party. Concretely, the mean of the 
attitude towards political corruption was 7.6 and 8 respectively, and the difference was 
statistically significant.  
Deeply analysing the difference between sympathizers of PP and PSOE, it was 
found that although sympathizers of both parties evaluated hardly corruption when it 
affected their rival party than when it was their preferred party the one which was being 
involved, that difference was just statistically significant in PP supporters.  
The attitude towards political corruption clearly depends on how close citizens feel 
to the party which is being affected. When analysing what is behind the political 
sympathy towards a party, it has been identified two different sources which will be 
analysed in the rest of this section: clientelism and political identification (Chang and 
Kerr, 2009). 
Clientelism and political identification 
Clientelism can be considered as the informal, mutually beneficial exchange 
relationship in which a party offers material benefits in return for the electoral support 
(Stokes 2007). There are citizens who keep supporting parties involved in corruption 
because of the expectation of benefits (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron and 
Bågenholm, 2016; Fernández-Vázquez et al., 2016; Kurer, 2010). Chang and Kerr 
(2009) and Lemarchand (1972) identified a “norm of reciprocity”, which considers that 
a citizen feels obliged to reciprocate after receiving some benefit from the party. 
Clientelism tends to be stable and persistent (Brusco et al., 2004). Stokes (2005) 
underlined the “perverse accountability”, which bases the explanation of the 
clientelism’s persistency on the clients’ fear to lose their benefits.   
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Chang and Kerr (2009) underlined how on one side, it is easier to realise party’s 
corruption when someone forms part of the corrupted system; and on the other side, 
how it is more difficult to criticise corruption when someone is being benefited from it. 
Citizens belonging to a patronage network, even if perceiving a high level corruption, 
are more tolerant (Chang and Kerr, 2009). Manzetti and Wilson (2007) argued that a 
corrupt government keeps its public support by satisfying their clientelist networks.  
Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2016) analysed how clientelism impacts on Spaniards’ 
attitude towards political corruption. Concretely, they theorised that when corruption 
provokes gains for a wide segment of the electorate in a short term, these voters tend to 
keep supporting the incumbent government in despite of their corrupted practices. For 
the purpose of testing their hypothesis, it was prepared an original dataset with the 
electoral results of the Spanish Local Elections in May 2007 and May 2011. Besides, 
following an exhaustive process, it was identified the corruption scandals between both 
Local Elections and the municipalities affected. Then, these cases of corruption were 
classified according to the economic externalities they generated, i.e., it was 
distinguished between those cases where corruption provoked welfare decreasing and 
those which provoked welfare enhancing. The result of this process yielded a dataset of 
75 municipalities affected by corruption (1% of Spanish municipalities), being 46 
classified as welfare enhancing and 29 as welfare decreasing.  
These authors justified the convenience to choose Spain for the study of corruption 
underlining how at that time this country was a clear example where although voters 
disliked corruption, incumbents rarely suffered electoral consequences for their illegal 
actions. Particularly, between 2003 and 2007, the 70% of mayors who were involved in 
corruption were re-elected. Accordingly, Costas-Pérez et al. (2012) found that the 
electoral cost of corruption was on average just a 4%. Besides, on a scale anchored at 0 
(highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean), Spain generally scored poorly in all cross-country 
rankings of perception of corruption at all administrative levels. Moreover, and taking 
into account the classification of the scandals of corruption used to test their hypothesis, 
where it was distinguished those cases where corruption provoked welfare decreasing 
and welfare increasing, Spain represented a suitable case as it offered a significant 
number of cases in which mayors irregularly changed the established land use allowing 
an excess of construction which benefited the local economy in the short time (Villoria 
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and Jiménez, 2012). Finally, Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2016) emphasised that, as most 
of the Spanish corruption scandals are investigated by judicial authorities, there was an 
extensive press coverage which increased citizens’ political awareness.  
The results proved that clientelism plays a key role when analysing citizens’ 
attitude towards political corruption. Concretely, those mayors involved in corruption 
without benefits for the municipality reduced their vote share by a statistically 
significant 4.2%, while those mayors involved in corrupt practices which exerted 
benefits for the municipality increased their vote share by 1.9%.  
There are other studies where it has been analysed the impact of clientelism. For 
instance, Bratton and van de Walle (1997), analysing the democratic transitions in 
Africa, found that the elites which had access to patronage benefits were more tolerant 
with the incumbent regime than the other elites which were being excluded from those 
benefits. 
As seen, when citizens’ sympathy towards a corrupted party comes from the 
obtaining of direct benefits, it becomes harder to find a strong criticism towards 
political corruption (Chang and Kerr, 2009). Bratton (2007) concluded that clientelism 
and corruption are the two sides of the same coin. However, not always political 
sympathy towards a party comes from the expectation of material benefits, many times 
it is based on a sense of shared identity with the political party (Charron and 
Bågenholm, 2016; Campbell et al. 1960). There are citizens who feel close to the social 
groups that comprise the party base and develop an affective identity towards the party 
(Goren, 2005). Party identification provides citizens with a partisan orientation through 
which they analyse political information and build their opinions (Zaller, 1992; 
Campbell et al. 1960). As higher is the party identification as higher is the tolerance 
towards corruption in this party (Chang and Kerr, 2009). Rundquist, et al. (1977) 
concluded that there are citizens who overlook corruption just in exchange for 
ideological satisfaction. 
Cordero and Blais (2017) analysed the role played by political identification in 
Spaniards’ attitude towards political corruption. For this purpose, it was used data from 
an online survey conducted in Spain by the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in June 2015 
which had a sample size of 2410 respondents. It is remarkable that at the time in which 
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the data was collected political corruption was a salient issue. The incumbent party (PP) 
which had won the General Elections in 2011 with a support of the 44.6%, had had a 
mandate (2011-2015) plagued with scandals of corruption as the so-called “Gürtel 
case”, “Barcenas’ papers”, “Púnica operation” and “Brugal case”. 
As a consequence of all the corruption scandals, following the CIS
21
, while in 2011 
just 2% of the population mentioned corruption as one of the main Spanish problems, 
this percentage increased until 51% in 2015. In fact, corruption became the second 
greatest problem for Spaniards after unemployment
22
. Accordingly, the Spain’s score on 
the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International during the government 
of PP, on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), fell from 65 to 58. 
Cordero and Blais (2017) justified the convenience to focus their research on Spain 
because this country clearly illustrate how corruption does not have the electoral 
consequences it could be expected. Firstly, during the period 2011-2015 where Spain 
was going through an economic crisis, the party in the government was affected for 
multitude cases of corruption; secondly, these cases of corruption were widely covered 
by the media: newspapers, radio, TV, and social media; thirdly, the majority of Spanish 
society was aware and worried about corruption and many Spaniards were actively 
participating in demonstrations against it; and finally, the incumbent party plagued of 
corruption was still able to win the General Election in December 2015. PP lost 
electoral support in 2015 in reference to the previous General Elections of 2011, 
concretely, PP obtained a 44.6% of votes in November 2011 while in December 2015 
its support was 28.7%. It is worth noting that this decrease must be relativized taking 
into account the emergence of the new parties Podemos and C’s. However, in despite of 
its corruption and the emergence of new parties which were traduced in electoral losses 
of 17pp, PP still reached the first position in the General Elections in 2015 with more 
than 7 million of votes and 123 seats.   
In this context, these researchers were interested in analysing the relationship 
between citizens’ ideologically identification with the party in the government plagued 
with corruption and the likelihood to support it. Concretely, these authors hypothesised 
that as ideologically closer is perceived the incumbent government involved in 
                                                 
21
 CIS January 2011 and January 2015 
22
 CIS January 2015 
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corruption, as lower is the propensity to consider completely unacceptable to vote for it. 
In order to address this issue, on one side, participants were required to indicate the 
likelihood in which they would vote for the incumbent government (PP) on a scale 
anchored at 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely). This variable was recoded following 
a very conservative criterion as follows: “1”, when participants completely reject the 
idea of voting for the government; and “0”, otherwise. On the other side, they were 
asked to locate themselves and the incumbent party (PP) on the traditional left-right axis 
anchored at 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Then, it was constructed a new 
variable: “Ideological distance from the government”. This variable had a range of 
values fluctuating from 0 (when respondents locate themselves and the party in the 
government on the same score) to 10 (when respondents perceived the party in the 
government as being ideologically very far from their position). 
The results showed that the difference in the predicted probability to completely 
reject the idea of voting for the incumbent government affected by corruption between 
those respondents who were ideologically the closest to the government and those who 
were the most distant was 74pp. In other words, the likelihood of totally rejecting the 
idea of supporting PP of those who felt this party exactly represented their ideology was 
74pp lower than those who felt PP was the most distant party to their ideology.  
As a consequence, it was concluded that political sympathy towards a party is a key 
variable when studying citizens’ attitude towards political corruption: as higher it is, as 
lower is the propensity to punish the party in despite of being aware of its corruption.  
There are other studies where it has been analysed the impact of political 
identification. For instance, Banerjee and Pande (2009) showed how in North India 
were elected more corrupt politicians as a consequence of the voter ethnicization, i.e., as 
a greater preference for the party representing one's ethnic group. 
 Economic context 2.2.5
Once it has been reviewed the role played by political awareness, political leaning 
and political sympathy, in this section it will be analysed the impact of the economic 
context. 
It has been established in numerous empirical studies how the economic context is 
one of the key variables when explaining why political corruption is not always as 
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penalized as it could be expected. Cordero and Blais (2017) and Zechmeister and 
Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) highlighted how citizens tend to be more tolerant towards 
political corruption when the government is perceived to handle the economy 
satisfactorily. There are certain voters who keep supporting incumbent governments in 
despite of corruption when they perceive a good job in managing the economy (Charron 
and Bågenholm, 2016). Conversely, the worse is perceived the governments’ economy 
performance, the more corruption becomes salient, especially in countries with a high 
level of corruption (Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Klasnja and Tucker, 2013). The 
punishment of corruption clearly varies depending on the country’s economic situation 
(Jerit and Barabas 2012; Duch et al., 2000; Mauro, 1995).  
The problem of corruption is not only the extractive behaviour of some politicians, 
but also the society who tolerates such behaviour (Hutter et al., 2018). Weitz-Shapiro 
and Winters (2010), Manzetti and Wilson (2007), Golden (2007) and Diaz-Cayeros et 
al. (2000) found that there were citizens who kept supporting a corrupt politician 
because of the material benefits they were delivering to their constituency. These 
citizens perceived that there was a risk to stop the flow of those benefits by punishing 
the corrupt politician.  
There are many cases in the literature where it has been proved that only when the 
country is going through an economic crisis, citizens react against political corruption. 
In the rest of this section, it will be analysed some researches in which it has been 
studied the role played by the economic context in citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption. 
Charron and Bågenholm (2016) analysed the impact of the economic context on 
Europeans’ attitude towards political corruption. Their analysis was based on the largest 
multi-country survey focused on the matters of governance and corruption. The universe 
studied was the population resident in Europe, and the sampling was carried out in 24 
European countries between February and April 2013 by the authors in collaboration 
with the European Commission. The sampling units were men and women over 18 
years old and the sample size was roughly 85000 respondents.    
These authors theorised that when citizens are satisfied with the economic situation, 
they are more likely to keep supporting their preferred party in despite of corruption. In 
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order to address this issue, participants, on one hand, were required to indicate their 
level of satisfaction with the economy; and on the other hand, were asked about which 
would be their most likely reaction if their first party choice was involved in a 
corruption scandal. They had to choose among the following three options: keep voting 
for their first party choice; vote for an alternative party not involved in corruption; or 
not vote at all. 
The results indicated how there was a relationship statistically significant between 
citizens’ satisfaction with the economy and their likelihood to still vote for their first 
party choice in despite of corruption. This relationship was strongly and positive, i.e., as 
higher was the economic satisfaction, as higher was the likelihood to keep supporting 
their first party choice in despite of corruption.  
Anduiza et al. (2013) analysed the role played by the economic context in the 
Spaniards’ attitude towards political corruption. For this purpose it was designed and 
conducted an online survey focused on the political attitudes and behaviours. The 
universe studied was the population resident in Spain, and the sampling was carried out 
in this country in November 2010. The sampling units were men and women with 
Internet access, older than 15 and younger than 45. These age limits were selected 
because the percentage of people with access to Internet in that age range was over 83% 
while the Internet diffusion rate above this age was much lower. The sample size was 
2.300 respondents. 
These authors justified their research was focused on Spain underlining that at the 
time in which the data was collected, political corruption was a salient issue. 
Accordingly, the Spain’s score on the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency 
International was 6.1 on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). In this 
context, the researchers expected more realistic answers. Besides, Spain had an 
institutionalised party system with more than 60% of its population reporting feeling 
close to a political party which clearly benefited the goal of measuring the political 
sympathy impact. Finally, it was also pointed out that Spain was a clear example where 
political corruption has not the electoral consequences it could be expected. 
These researchers were interested in analysing if citizens are more tolerant towards 
political corruption when they have a positive evaluation of the economic situation. In 
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order to address this issue, firstly, participants were required to express their opinion 
about the Spanish economic situation on a scale anchored at 1 (very bad) to 5 (very 
good). Then, they faced a vignette in which it was briefly reported a hypothetical 
corruption case. After reading the vignette, respondents were asked to indicate how 
serious they considered the situation was on a scale anchored at 0 (not serious at all) to 
10 (very serious). 
It was performed a multivariate test, whose dependent variable was their opinion 
about the scandal of corruption, including their evaluation of the Spanish economic 
situation as a factor. The conclusion was that the economic context plays a key role on 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption, being severely judged by those with a 
negative evaluation.   
Analysing the electoral results of the Spanish Local and Regional Elections held in 
May 2011 it is found how the economic context played a stronger role than political 
corruption. At that time Spain was going through an economic and social crisis which 
started in 2008 and, on one side, the government’s economy performance was being 
strongly criticised for opposition media groups and political parties which claimed that 
the government (PSOE) was not adopting the measures needed to tack the crisis; and on 
the other side, PP was being affected by corruption (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012). In 
this context, in the Local Elections of May 2011, PSOE lost 7.5pp. while PP won 1.5pp. 
with respect to the Local Elections of May 2007 in despite of being involved in 
corruption scandals. Similarly, in the General Elections of November 2011, PSOE lost 
15.1pp and PP won the elections increasing their support by 4.7pp. 
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013), exposed that in 1995, when Argentine’s 
economy was growing, even if citizens knew that there were accusations of corruption 
against President Carlos Menem, they not only supported a constitutional change to 
permit their President to run for re-election, but also he won by a large margin. 
However, in 1999, when the Argentine’s economy was in decline, citizens did not 
support their President to run for a third term. In agreement, Manzetti and Wilson 
(2007) underlined how in Argentina, those citizens with a positive opinion about the 
regime’s economic performance were more tolerant with political corruption. 
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A similar case happened in Brazil, where two Brazilian Presidents whose 
collaborators were involved in political corruption cases suffered different 
consequences. While Fernando Collor de Melo (1990-1992), who did not success in 
economic issues, had to resign after corruptions allegations; Luis Ignácio Lula da Silva 
(2003–2010), in the context of economic growth, was elected to a second term and 
enjoyed high levels of public support (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013).  
 The New Parties’ Emergence 2.2.6
The economic, social and political crisis shakes the traditional political system and 
contributes to the emergence of new parties (Altiparmakis and Lorenzini, 2018; Muro 
and Vidal, 2017; Della Porta, 2015). In this section, it will be studied the impact of 
news parties on citizens’ attitudes towards political corruption.  
The definition of “new party” has been widely discussed in the literature. Powell 
and Tucker (2014) labeled as new parties all those which take part in the elections with 
a new brand, regardless of whether the new party is the result of the union or separation 
of already existing parties (except when the new party is the result of the sum of one or 
several insignificant parties with an existing major party). Authors as Engler (2015), 
Tavits (2008) and Hug (2001) excluded those which are the result of merging existing 
parties and others researchers as Sikk (2005) excluded also those which appear as a 
consequence of the separation of existing parties. In this thesis, it will be followed the 
strictest definition, excluding those parties which are the result of the mix or division of 
traditional parties in order to be able to clearly figure out if there are differences in the 
attitudes towards political corruption between traditional and new parties’ supporters.  
The stabilization of the party system is usually noted as a relevant factor for the 
well-functioning democracy (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Bielasiak, 2002), while the 
emergence of new parties is associated with volatility (Powell and Tucker, 2014). Party 
systems have been traditionally stable, making hard for new parties to burst onto the 
scene (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), however, after the third wave of democratization, 
electoral volatility has been installed in many countries. Electoral volatility measures 
the aggregate of change in party systems (Mainwaring et al., 2009; Tavits, 2008, 2005; 
Lane and Ersson, 2007; Caramani, 2006; Gunther, 2005; Madrid, 2005; Mozaffar and 
Scarritt, 2005; Sikk, 2005; Tavits, 2005; Birch, 2003; Bielasiak, 2002; Roberts and 
Wibbels, 1999; Toka, 1998; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Shamir, 1984; Pedersen, 1983, 
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1979). Mainwaring et al. (2009) emphasized the importance to distinguish between 
within-system volatility (the electoral volatility among established parties) and extra-
system volatility (the electoral volatility among established parties and new parties), 
noting the second option as the one which represents the strongest change in the party 
system.  
Mainwaring et al. (2009), analyzing the new parties’ success along the twentieth 
century, found how the third wave of democratization was an impulse for the new 
parties’ emergence. Their vote share increased from 2.4% to 13.4%. Considering what 
they labeled as “young parties”, i.e., those parties with 10 years or less, the evolution of 
the vote share was from 8.2% to 26.6%. 
Hutter et al. (2018) pointed out that the party systems are more institutionalised in 
the Northwest than in the Southern Europe. These researchers underlined that the party 
systems in the Northwest have been transformed on one side, in 1970s and early 1980s 
by new parties with a left political leaning which advocated individual autonomy, the 
free choice of lifestyle and other universalistic values; and on the other side, since 1990s 
by new parties with a right political leaning focused on immigration and European 
integration as threats to the homogenous nation-state. The new left and the new right 
were labelled as “Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL)” and “Traditional-
Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN)” by Hooghe et al. (2002) and, as “Integration” and 
“Demarcation” by Kriesi et al. (2012). Conversely, in Southern Europe the party 
systems have been less transformed and the left-right axis still plays a strong role.  
Nevertheless, the recent economic, social and political crisis has shaken the 
traditional political system of many countries in Southern Europe, being austerity, 
political renewal and political corruption the salient conflicts (Muro and Vidal, 2017; 
Della Porta, 2015). A large share of population has felt frustrated with the established 
political system and, this frustration has been translated into mobilisations on the street 
(Altiparmakis and Lorenzini, 2018). In turn, these mobilisations have contributed to the 
emergence of new political parties. 
There is a wide set of democracies where it has appeared new political parties 
which have successfully broken into the political scene making the fight against 
corruption their leitmotif (Bågenholm and Charron, 2014; Hanley and Sikk, 2014; 
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Bågenholm, 2013; Sikk, 2012; Bélanger, 2004). In the following lines it will be 
summarised the emergence of new parties which have reached remarkable electoral 
results in three countries of Southern Europe (Greece, Italy and Spain), which besides of 
being suffering an economic, social and political crisis, were affected by political 
corruption (Hutter et al., 2018). 
In Greece, in 2004 was founded Syriza, an electoral coalition of radical left political 
parties and extra parliamentarian organisations. This party is closely related to the 
Greek mobilisations on the street against the established political system (Hutter et al., 
2018) and evolved into a formal party in 2012. Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014) 
emphasised how Syriza’s discourse is focused on the dilemma between “us” (the 
people) as opposed of “them” (the elite). Besides, these authors underlined that this 
party specially supports equal right for immigrants, gender equality and LGTB rights. In 
reference to its electoral results, Syriza increased its support from 4.6% in October 2009 
to 26.9% in June 2012 which led it to gain unprecedented visibility in Europe 
(Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014). Its quick growth is related to the fact that this 
party was perceived as being the only viable hope for an alternative way out of the crisis 
(Spourdalakis, 2013). More recently, in the General Elections of January 2015 and 
September 2015, Syriza won with a vote share of 36.3% and 35.5% respectively. 
In Italy, in 2009 was founded the “Movimento Cinque Stelle” (Five Star 
Movement). This party engaged with citizens with a left but also with a right political 
leaning (Ceccarini and Bordignon 2016). The discourse of Movimento Cinque Stelle is 
focused on the “good citizens” versus “the elite” (existing parties, media and business 
leaders) who is oppressing people’s well-being and democratic rights (Bobba and 
McDonnell, 2015). This party advocates to remove the corrupt and incapable elite and 
to empower citizens by online direct democracy (Hutter et al., 2018). With respect to its 
electoral results, this party caused a major impact at the General Elections in 2013, 
becoming the most voted party with a vote share of 25.6% (Tronconi, 2018). Passarelli 
and Tuorto (2016) underlined how its success is mainly attributed to its ability to 
represent those citizens disenchanted with the old politics. In the recent General 
Elections of March 2018, its support increased until 32.7%.  
In Spain, as mentioned, in 2014 was founded Podemos, a left new party which is 
closely related to the Movimiento 15M (15M Movement) (Kioupkiolis and 
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Katsambekis, 2018; Franzé, 2017), a movement of citizens disgruntled with the 
established party system and its corruption (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, Kioupkiolis and Pérez (2018) underlined that this party was born in 
response to a crisis of political representation. Podemos claims greater citizens’ 
participation in the policy-making and its discourse is focused on defending the “social 
majority” against the “casta” (the degenerate political elite) (Ramiro and Gomez, 2017). 
Regarding its electoral results, this party reached in the General Elections of December 
2015 a vote share of 20.7% and, after the coalition with “Izquierda Unida” which 
originated the current party UP, in the General Elections of June 2016 its support was 
21.1%.  
The emergence of new parties represents an opportunity for citizens to punish 
traditional parties affected by political corruption and, therefore, a threat of losing 
power for existing parties (Cordero and Blais, 2017). Engler (2015), Pop-Eleches 
(2010) and Mainwaring et al. (2009) found that corruption benefits new parties pushing 
voters away from all the traditional parties, not only from the one which is in the 
government. It has been proved a negative relationship between corruption and citizen’s 
trust in government, administration, parliament and political parties (Kostadinova, 
2012; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Seligson, 2002; Mishler and Rose, 2001); and a 
positive relationship between citizens’ disenchantment with traditional parties as a 
consequence of corruption and the new parties’ share of votes (Böhler and Falathová, 
2013; Haughton and Krašovec, 2013).  
In the rest of this section, it will be analysed some researches in which it has been 
proved how the existence of reasonable ideological alternatives not perceived as 
corrupted impacts positively on the attitude towards political corruption, increasing 
citizens’ punishment to parties involved.  
Cordero and Blais (2017) analysed how the perception of a widespread corruption 
impacts on Spaniards’ attitude towards political corruption. For this purpose, it was 
used data from an online survey conducted in Spain by the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in 
June 2015 which had a sample size of 2410 respondents. It is remarkable that at the time 
in which the data was collected political corruption was a salient issue. The incumbent 
party (PP) which had won the General Elections in 2011 with a support of the 44.6%, 
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had had a mandate (2011-2015) plagued with scandals of corruption as the so-called 
“Gürtel case”, “Barcenas’ papers”, “Púnica operation” and “Brugal case”. 
As a consequence of all the corruption scandals, following the CIS
23
, while in 2011 
just 2% of the population mentioned corruption as one of the main Spanish problems, 
this percentage increased until 56% in 2015. In fact, corruption became the second 
greatest problem for Spaniards after unemployment
24
. Accordingly, the Spain’s score on 
the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International
25
 during the government 
of PP, on a scale anchored at 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), fell from 65 to 58. 
Cordero and Blais (2017) justified the convenience to focus their research on Spain 
because this country clearly illustrate how corruption does not have the electoral 
consequences it could be expected. Firstly, during the period 2011-2015 where Spain 
was going through an economic crisis, the incumbent party was affected for multitude 
cases of corruption; secondly, these cases of corruption were widely covered by the 
media: newspapers, radio, TV, and social media; thirdly, the majority of Spanish society 
was aware and worried about corruption and many Spaniards were actively participating 
in demonstrations against it; and finally, the incumbent party plagued of corruption was 
still able to win the General Election in December 2015. PP lost electoral support in 
2015 in reference to the previous General Elections of 2011, concretely, PP obtained a 
44.6% of votes in November 2011 while in December 2015 its support was 28.7%. It is 
worth noting that this decrease must be relativized  taking into account the emergence of 
the new parties Podemos and C’s. However, in despite of its corruption and the 
emergence of new parties which were traduced in electoral losses of 17pp, PP still 
reached the first position in the General Elections in 2015 with more than 7 million of 
votes and 123 seats.   
In this context, these researchers were interested in analysing the relationship 
between citizens’ perception of corruption in the parliament and the likelihood to 
support the incumbent government plagued with corruption. Concretely, these authors 
hypothesised that as higher is the perception of corruption in the parliament, as lower is 
the propensity to consider completely unacceptable to vote for the incumbent 
government involved in corruption. In order to address this issue, on one side, 
                                                 
23
 CIS January 2011 and January 2015 
24





participants were required to indicate the likelihood in which they would vote for the 
incumbent government (PP) on a scale anchored at 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (very 
likely). This variable was recoded following a very conservative criterion as follows: 
“1”, when participants completely reject the idea of voting for the government; and “0”, 
otherwise. On the other side, they were asked to manifest their perceptions of corruption 
in the parliament on a scale anchored at 0 (the parliament is not corrupt at all) to 10 (the 
parliament is very corrupt). 
The results showed that the difference in the predicted probability to completely 
reject the idea of voting for the incumbent government affected by corruption between 
those respondents who perceived the parliament was not corrupt at all and those who 
perceived it was very corrupt was 19pp. In other words, the likelihood of totally 
rejecting the idea of supporting PP of those who perceived the parliament was not 
affected by corruption was 19pp higher than those who perceived the corruption was 
widespread in the entire parliament.  
This finding emphasises the importance of the emergence of new and clean parties 
in order to fight against political corruption. Following Cordero and Blais (2017), the 
presence of new alternatives not involved in corruption reduce the perception of 
corruption in the parliament and, therefore, increase the probability to punish those 
incumbent governments plagued with corruption. 
Charron and Bågenholm (2016) analysed the impact of the presence of reasonable 
ideological alternatives on Europeans’ attitude towards political corruption. Their 
analysis was based on the largest multi-country survey focused on the matters of 
governance and corruption. The universe studied was the population resident in Europe, 
and the sampling was carried out in 24 European countries between February and April 
2013 by the authors in collaboration with the European Commission. The sampling 
units were men and women over 18 years old and the sample size was roughly 85000 
respondents.    
These authors theorised that when citizens are considering voting for a different 
party, the presence of reasonable ideological alternatives plays a key role. Concretely, 
these authors hypothesised that when the voters’ first party choice is affected by 
scandals of corruption, the likelihood to switch to an alternative party was higher as 
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higher was the number of viable alternatives. In order to address this issue, participants 
were asked about which would be their most likely reaction if their first party choice 
was involved in a corruption scandal. They had to choose among the following three 
options: keep voting for their first party choice; vote for an alternative party not 
involved in corruption; or not vote at all. 
The results indicated how when citizens are facing corruption scandals affecting to 
their first party choice, in a strong multiparty system, voters became more likely to 
switch to an alternative party not involved in corruption compared with those party 
systems with less number of parties. On one side, in limited party systems, the 
percentage of citizens who would keep supporting their first party choice affected by a 
scandal of corruption is higher and, among those citizens who would not support the 
corrupted party, to abstain from voting was the preferred option for most of 
respondents. On the other side, in multiparty systems, the percentage of citizens who 
would keep supporting their first party choice affected by a scandal of corruption is 
lower and, among those citizens who would not support the corrupted party, to vote for 
an alternative party was the preferred option for most of participants. 
As it has been shown, the emergence of new parties is a key factor to fight against 
political corruption, not only because it decreases the probability to keep supporting a 
corrupted party, but also because it increases the probability to vote for an alternative 
party to the detriment of the abstention. 
The key role played by the new parties’ emergence has been also demonstrated 
when comparing the electoral results of the Spanish General Elections held in 
November 2011 with those of the General Elections held in December 2015. 
In November 2011, Spain was going through a convulsive political, economic and 
social situation. Following the CIS
26
, Spaniards were mainly concerned with the 
unemployment, the economic situation and the party political system. Moreover, the so 
called “Movimiento 15M” (15M Movement), which was born in May 2011 during the 
Spanish Revolution was still actively fighting against the established party system and 
its corruption. Finally, the traditional parties PSOE and PP were being strongly 
criticised because of its poor management of the economy and its corruption 
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respectively (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012). In this context, without the presence of 
new alternatives not involved in corruption, in the General Elections of November 
2011, PSOE reached a vote share of 28.8% and PP won the elections with a rate of 
44.6% in despite of its corruption. However, in the General Elections of December 
2015, in a similar economic and social situation but with the presence of new 
alternatives not affected by corruption (Podemos and C’s), PSOE was supported by the 
22% of the electorate; and PP, still won the elections but with a vote share of 28.7%. 
Simplifying, with the presence of reasonable ideological alternatives, PSOE lost 6.7pp. 
and PP 15.9pp. Besides, the turnout was 4pp higher in the General Elections of 2015 in 
respect to General Elections of 2011. Orriols and Cordero (2016), when analysing the 
electoral results of the General Elections of 2015, concluded that the irruption of the 
new parties Podemos and C’s supposed the end of the bipartisanship.  
 Social Pressure 2.2.7
The last variable analysed in this thesis will be social pressure, which has been 
identified as a key variable when analysing citizens’ attitude and behaviour in a wide 
variety of domains (Giraldo-Luque, 2018; Belda et al., 2015; Anduiza et al., 2014; 
Peña-López et al., 2014; Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-Sánchez, 2012; Vallina-Rodriguez et 
al., 2012; Allcott, 2011; DellaVigna et al., 2010; Gerber and Rogers, 2009; Gerber et 
al., 2008; Nolan et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2007; Frey and Meier, 2004). Social 
pressure is defined by the online Psychology Dictionary as “the influence that is exerted 
on a person or group by another person or group. It includes rational argument, 
persuasion, conformity and demands”
27
. Citizens act different when they believe their 
actions are going to be public (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini and Trost, 1998; 
Lerner and Tetlock, 1999).   
As analysed in Belda et al. (2015), managing communities can be extremely useful 
to disseminate knowledge, opinions or propaganda and, as a consequence, to exert 
influence on the community members (Dholakia et al., 2004; Dholakia and Bagozzi, 
2001). In the following lines, it will be explained the processes by which social pressure 
is spread in a social network. 





From a psychological perspective, a social influence network is a cognitive process 
where actors integrate conflicting influential opinions to form revised opinions on an 
issue and, as a result, social influence pressures towards the mean of the initial opinions 
(McGarty et al., 1992; Turner and Oakes, 1989; Asch, 1951; Sherif, 1936). From a 
sociological perspective, there is wide agreement among researchers that a social 
influence network involves a social structure that deals with an influence network 
defined by the pattern and strengths of the interpersonal influences among the members 
of the group. As a consequence, it results in a structure of stratification or domination 
(Friedkin and Johnsen, 1999; Isenberg, 1986; Lamm and Myers, 1978), which considers 
other options of group's agreement different from the mean of initial opinions.  
Friedkin and Johnsen (1999) developed a model of social influence where the 
process of opinion change in a group is an interpersonal accommodation. In this model, 
each member of the community weighs his own and others members' opinions on an 
issue, and repetitively modifies his opinion until a settled opinion on the issue is 
formed. The result of this process has different options: the opinion settle on the mean 
of group members' initial opinion; on a compromise opinion that is different from the 
mean of initial opinions; on an initial opinion of a group member; on an opinion that is 
outside the range of group members' initial opinions because of a reinforcement 
process; or the group is not able to reach an agreement. 
Assuming that it is possible to settle the group's agreement in a different point of 
the mean of initial members' opinions, it will be studied how to propagate social 
pressure through a network from different perspectives. 
The processes by which ideas and influence are spread through a social network 
have been analysed by several researchers in different domains. For instance, 
Richardson and Domingos (2002), Domingos and Richardson (2001), Goldenberg et al. 
(2001a), Goldenberg et al. (2001b), Mahajan et al. (1990), Brown and Reinegen (1987) 
and Bass (1969) investigated the “word of mouth” and “viral marketing” processes 
related to the adoption of a new product; Young (2002), Morris (2000), Young (1998), 
Blume (1993) and Ellison (1993) studied the sudden and widespread adoption of 
various strategies in game theoretic settings; and Valente (1995) and Coleman et al. 
(1966) analysed the diffusion of medical and agricultural innovations.  
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The traditional view assumes that there is a small and well-connected group in a 
society perceived as informed, which has the ability to propagate ideas to others (Cha et 
al., 2010). Gladwell (2002) referenced them as the hubs, connectors, or mavens. 
Previously, Rogers (1962) identified them as innovators in his Diffusion of innovations 
theory and Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) as the opinion leaders in their Two-step flow 
theory. 
These theories have been criticised because its information flow process does not 
consider the role of ordinary users. Watts and Dodds (2007) analysed both type of users,  
influential and ordinary, and concluded that although influential users were those who 
initiated more frequent and larger cascades, they were not enough to explain all 
diffusions. These authors found that the spread of influence depends on how susceptible 
the society is overall to the idea or innovation more than on the person who starts it. In 
other words, being both necessaries it is more relevant the topic than the influential 
users. Domingos and Richardson (2001) underlined how in the new information age, 
people take into account the opinions of their friends and peers rather than the 
traditional influential users’ opinions. 
There are many papers which show the evidence of social pressure in a wide variety 
of domains: studies related to energy efficiency (Belda et al., 2015); crime (Ludwig et 
al., 2001; Glaeser et al., 1996; Case and Katz, 1991), educational outcomes (Sacerdote, 
2001), health (Katz et al., 2001), unemployment (Topa, 2001), welfare participation 
(Bertrand et al., 2000), and social mobility (Borjas, 1994, 1992). Below, it will be 
exposed the main conclusions of some interesting researches collected in Belda et al. 
(2015). 
Belda et al. (2015), when studying citizens’ attitudes and behaviours towards 
energy efficiency, proved the effectiveness of social pressure in order to motivate 
improvements in consumers' energy behaviour. Specifically, it was theorised that 
among the variables which influence people to adopt energy efficient behaviours, social 
pressure had a higher impact than factual information related to the climate change. In 
order to address this issue, it was conducted a survey where participants randomly faced 
a vignette in which it was described one of the following scenarios: an scenario 
warming of the risks of the climate change through factual information; or an scenario 
emphasizing their neighbours were saving on their energy bills by following energy tips 
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received on their mobile phone. After reading the vignette, participants were asked to 
indicate how much they were more likely to adopt an energy efficiency behaviour in a 
scale anchored at 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely). The results showed that although both 
scenarios had a positive impact, social pressure was more effective than factual 
information in order to motivate improvements in the consumers' energy behaviour. 
Concretely, the mean of the citizens who faced the “social pressure scenario” was 4.27 
while the mean of those who faced the “factual information scenario” was 3.45. 
DellaVigna et al. (2010) found how social pressure is crucial when analysing 
charitable donations. Most of Americans (90%) give money to charities, but not all of 
them have the same motivations. There are altruistic people, but there are also people 
who prefer not to give money although they do because they feel uncomfortable saying 
no. They carried out a study where fliers were placed on the front door of a household, 
informing residents when the collection of a door-to-door fund raiser will be conducted. 
The results of this experiment was that the households opening the door decreased by 
10-25% (being even stronger when homeowners had the option of ticking a “Do Not 
Disturb” box). This study also showed how about half of donors would prefer not to be 
contacted by the fundraiser, to donate less or directly to not donate. 
Christakis and Fowler (2007) demonstrated that social pressure affects the spread of 
obesity in a large social network. They showed how the chances of becoming obese of 
an individual increased by 57% if he had a friend who became obese; by 40% if he had 
a sibling who became obese; and by 37% if his spouse became obese. This influence 
was stronger between people of the same sex. 
Social pressure has also proved its effectiveness when analysing the workers' 
productivity. Falk and Ichino (2006) conducted an experiment where workers were 
putting letters into envelopes for an independent of output remuneration and found that 
those who were working in pairs in the same room were more productive than those 
who worked alone. Workers’ productivity increased because they knew they were being 
observed and/or because they were observing other workers. Accordingly with the 
previous research, Mas and Moretti (2009) conducted an experiment in a supermarket 
and found that the cashiers’ productivity increased when they were observed by other 
cashiers with a higher productivity. Charness and Kuhn (2011) found that workers 
working side by side, without interaction but observing each other's activity were more 
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productive. Moreover, Georganas et al. (2013) showed how workers being observed 
increased their productivity at least initially when compensation was team based.  
Dohmen (2005) and Garicano et al. (2005) showed that social pressure is a 
determinant of corruption. Dohmen (2005) found that professional soccer referees tend 
to assist the local team. Concretely, it was concluded how professional soccer referees 
on one hand, awarded more injury time in close matches when the home team was 
behind; and on the other hand, awarded goals and penalty kicks to aid the home team. 
This behaviour was even stronger as higher was the size of the crowd, as closer was the 
crowd to the stadium and as higher was the importance of the game (Garicano, et al., 
2005). 
Finally, it will be analysed the role played by social pressure on citizens’ attitude 
towards political corruption. Concretely, it will be studied the Spanish Revolution of 
May 2011 as it is directly related to the social pressure exerted by Spaniards in the field 
of politics. Firstly, it will be briefly contextualised the Spanish political situation at this 
time. Since 2008, Spain was going through an economic and social crisis which was 
impoverishing the population. Following the CIS
28
, in May 2011, Spaniards were 
particularly worried with the unemployment, the economic situation and the party 
political system. Besides, the incumbent party (PSOE) was being accused to do not 
make the efforts needed at tackling the crisis while the main party of the opposition (PP) 
was being accused of corruption. 
In this context where many citizens were dissatisfied with the Spanish economic 
and social situation and disaffected with the traditional parties, it was born the collective 
“¡Democracia Real, Ya!” (Real Democracy, Now!). This collective, by exerting social 
pressure reached to mobilize thousands of citizens who participated on 15 May 2011 in 
protests in more than fifty cities across Spain (Toret, 2013). In turn, these protesters by 
the contagious effect, influenced other citizens creating the broad movement 
“Movimiento 15M” (15M Movement) (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012) which was able 
to communicate the Spanish feeling of indignation to the whole world (Giraldo-Luque, 
2018). 
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As it has been seen, social pressure, when exerted positively, is able to impact on 
citizens’ attitude by encouraging them to fight against political corruption, and 
therefore, to contribute to the goal of achieving a higher quality democracy. 
2.3 Social media role on politics 
 Introduction 2.3.1
Social pressure can be exerted in both, real and virtual world. Social media has 
broken into the field of communication and is considered a powerful tool to spread 
social pressure (Belda et al., 2016; Demirhan and Çakır-Demirhan, 2016; Zhu et al., 
2012; Hui and Buchegger, 2009). Dholakia et al. (2004) developed a social influence 
model of online community participation which considered individual motives, social 
influences and, finally, the decisions and behaviours. These researchers concluded that 
higher levels of value perceptions lead to a stronger social identity which leads in turn 
higher levels of participation in the online community. Social pressure is the key to 
understand how virtual communities behave (Belda et al., 2015). 
Nowadays, following the 2018 Global digital suite of reports
29
 published by We are 
social and Hootsuite, there are more than 4 billion people using internet around the 
world (53% of the world population), being nearly a 250 million of new users in 2017, 
which supposes an increase of 7%. Besides, each user spends by average around 6 
hours.  
Social media is defined as “websites and applications that enable users to create 
and share content or to participate in social networking”
30
. Regarding their use, in 2018 
there are near of 3.2 billion people of active users (42% of the world population), a 13% 
more than 2017. Facebook is at the top, being used by almost 2.2 billion people, 
followed by Youtube (1.5) and WhatsApp (1.3).  
Social media is seen as platforms for interactive and public discussions (Demirhan 
and Çakır-Demirhan, 2016). From a creators of content point of view, social media 
represents an opportunity to reach a larger audience; and from a consumers of content 
perspective, it supposes not only an opportunity to reach a greater amount of 







information by free, but also, to share and comment that information, which also 
converts them into creators. In the following lines, it will be briefly introduced some 
examples collected in Belda et al. (2015) which show how information and influence 
flow through the virtual world. 
Belda et al. (2015) analysed the role played by online social pressure in the energy 
efficiency debate held on Twitter. Concretely, these researchers analysed the 
conversation about energy efficiency held on Twitter from July to December 2014. On 
one side, it was shown how the top mentioned users were altruistic; and on the other 
side, that the information which was being spread on Twitter was written by mostly 
altruistic users. These authors concluded that the energy efficiency debate was not 
dominated by people who had a commercial interest and, therefore, that Twitter was an 
interesting platform to spread information and tips about energy efficiency and motivate 
consumers to engage with better practices. 
Zhu et al. (2012) proved the ability of social pressure to impact on citizens’ online 
choices. They conducted an online experiment to test how often people’s choices were 
changed by others’ recommendations when facing different levels of pressure. 
Participants were first asked to choose between pairs of items and once they had 
finished, they were provided about the preferences of others. Then, they were asked to 
make second choices about the same pairs of items. The results depicted that other 
people’s opinions significantly sway people’s own online choices. This influence was 
stronger when people were required to make their second decision sometime later 
(22.4%) than immediately (14.1%); when individuals were facing a moderate, as 
opposed to large number of opposing opinions; and when they spent a short amount of 
time making the first decision. However, the demographic variables such as age and 
gender did not affect the results.  
Hui and Buchegger (2009) conducted a study which demonstrated the neighbours’ 
influence on the probability of a particular person to join a group on four popular Online 
Social Networks: Orkut, YouTube, LiveJournal, and Flickr. The “neighbours” in these 
networks had a mutually acknowledged relationship, most often defined as friendship, 
and they were directly connected on a graph of a social network. Users could join 
groups of users which represented common areas of interest. The results indicated that a 
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set of neighbours was about 100 times more powerful in influencing a user to join a 
group than the same number of strangers. 
Focusing on the topic of this thesis, social media is a new tool in political 
communication and it is used by an increasing number of politicians and citizens to 
critique and advocate for policies, candidates and protests (Siegel, 2018).  
On one side, social media has noticeably changed the way politics work (Dimitrova 
and Bystrom 2013). Politicians use social media to disseminate information and connect 
with voters (Siegel, 2018).  It represents a new communication channel which allows 
politics to be more accessible (Koc-Michalska et al., 2016). Murthy (2015) underlined 
that it is a low cost channel which enables to reach a great audience. 
On the other side, it has been proved how citizens, especially young adults, tend to 
rely on social media when seeking political information rather than on traditional media 
as newspapers or radio broadcasts (Baumgartner and Morris, 2010; Kushin and 
Yamamoto, 2010). Viewing political information through the social networks has 
become popular (Bode, 2016). Besides, social media also provides opportunity for 
sharing political content and set up political debates (Diehl et al., 2016). 
In the following sections, it will be analysed the impact of social media on citizens’ 
political attitudes and behaviour; it will be investigated different approaches that have 
been proposed in order to measure influence on Twitter; it will be characterised the 
political debate held on Twitter; and finally, it will be analysed Twitter conversations on 
politics.  
 Analysing the impact of social media on political attitudes and 2.3.2
behaviour 
Social media has been shown as a powerful tool when studying political science 
(Barbera, 2014; Settle, 2014; Messing et al., 2014; Aragón et al., 2013; Bond et al., 
2012). It has been found a strong relationship between social media use and political 
engagement (Manrique and Manrique, 2016; Demirhan, 2016a; Xenos et al., 2012). 




Hendricks and Denton (2010) and Williams and Gulati (2008) concluded that the 
use of social media as a political communication platform was a key factor to explain 
the Barack Obama’s success in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election. However, it is seen 
by some governments as a threat (Gusinki, 2015; Gohdes, 2014, Zuckerman, 2014; and 
Wong and Brown, 2013), as the social pressure exerted through social media has proved 
its capacity to involve people to sign petitions and contribute to different causes 
(Coppock et al., 2014; Hale et al., 2014; McClendon, 2014). Tufekci and Wilson (2012) 
underlined the key role of social media to encourage people to take part in anti-regime 
protests. Social media contributes to create, organize and implement social movements 
around the world (Giraldo-Luque, 2018; Elantawy and Wiest, 2011).  
Focusing on political corruption, Zinnbauer (2014) highlighted how social media 
allows citizens to complain loudly, visibly, and nearly instantaneously when they 
perceive corruption (Zinnbauer, 2014). It has been proved its potential to fight against 
political corruption in cases as WikiLeaks (Demirhan, 2016b; Jha, 2016; Waller, 2016). 
Marinov and Schimmelfennig (2015) emphasized that social media is not as easily 
silenced as traditional media which has stronger ties with the economic and political 
forces (Essien, 2016). Herkman and Matikainen (2016) underlined its capacity to keep 
the scandals in the public eye. 
In the rest of this section, it will be summarised some researches where it has been 
analysed the impact of social media on politics. Marinov and Schimmelfennig (2015) 
proved the ability of online social pressure to impact on civic activism and politics. 
They conducted an experiment with 3000 respondents between the ages 18 to 60 in all 
Bulgaria’s towns with population of 50.000 or more. Firstly, they filtered them by 
considering just those who had a Facebook account and found that almost 66% of their 
random sample was a member of the social network. These users were invited to 
participate in the experiment and 1.000 agreed. Then, they were randomly classified 
into three different groups: “Facebook group”, who received a message encouraging to 
like a Facebook page devoted to the preservation of a threatened natural resource, the 
country's Black Sea coast; “E-mail newsletter group” who received a message 
encouraging to sign up for an email newsletter promoting the same campaign; and 
“Control group”. After two months, it was asked the participants’ opinion about the 
likelihood of success of different civic initiatives. The results depicted that the 
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“Facebook group” was the one who had a more positive attitude towards the success of 
the campaign. Besides, it was also found that about 40% considered social media as the 
most reliable resource when they were looking for political information. As a 
consequence, these authors concluded that social pressure when promoting activism had 
a greater impact when it was spread through an online social network rather than 
through an email newsletter, and therefore, that online social pressure was  an effective 
tool to fight against corruption. 
Bond et al. (2012) found how the social pressure spread through an online network 
is also able to impact on political behaviour. Concretely, they conducted a randomized 
controlled trial in US with Facebook users of at least 18 years who accessed on 2nd 
November 2010, the day of the US Congressional Elections. Users were randomly 
classified into three different groups: “Social message group”, “Informational message 
group” and “Control group”.  
The “Social message group” received a message at the top of their “News Feed” 
encouraging them to vote where it was provided a link to find local polling places, a 
clickable button in which it was written “I Voted”, a counter indicating how many other 
Facebook users had reported they had voted, and finally, six randomly “profile pictures” 
of user’s Facebook friends who had already indicated they had voted. The 
“Informational message group” received the same message with the only difference that 
it was not shown any picture of user’s Facebook friends who had already reported they 
had voted. Finally, the “Control group” did not receive any message. The researchers 
distinguished among the following direct and indirect impact.  
Focusing on the direct impact, the results showed that users who received the social 
message where they could see the face of six of his Facebook’s friends were more likely 
to report they had already voted than those who received the informational message 
where it was not any picture. Besides, users belonging to the “Social message group” 
were also more likely to seek information about the polling places than those belonging 
to the informational group. Finally, it was found that users receiving the social message 
were more likely to vote than those who received the informational message or did not 
received any message. However, it was not any difference between users belonging to 
the informational group and those belonging to the control group.  
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They concluded that social pressure exerted through an online community had 
impact on political self-expression (user’s desire to report their vote to their social 
community); on political information seeking (user’s desire to seek political information 
about the polling places); and on voting behaviour.  
Regarding the indirect impacts, i.e., the social pressure that a person who has been 
directly influenced can exert towards his friends through an online network, Bond et al. 
(2012) proved that the effectiveness of spreading online influence depended on the 
closeness of the relationship. For this purpose, they classified individuals by decile 
analysing the degree to which they interacted with each other on Facebook and then, 
considered two different groups: “Close friends”, those in the eighth decile or higher; 
and “Friends”, the rest of the Facebook’s friends.  
The results depicted that users were more likely to report they had already voted, to 
seek information about the polling places, and also to vote, when they had a close friend 
who had received a social message than when their close friend had not received any 
message. However, they were just more likely to report they had already voted, when it 
was a friend who received the message. 
In this case, they concluded that while close friends were able to impact on political 
self-expression, political information seeking and voting behaviour; friends were able to 
impact on online expressive behaviour (as users were more likely to report their 
Facebook’s friends they had already vote), but not on private or real world behaviour 
(as it was no effect on increasing the probability to seek political information or to 
vote). 
Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) studied the effectiveness of social media during the 
Egyptian revolution. Concretely, they analysed the role played by social media in the 
anti-government protests occurred between 25
th
 January and 11
th
 February of 2011 
which led to the resignation of the Egyptian President Honsi Mubarak. These authors 
emphasized how social media allowed implementing greater speed and interactivity in 
the traditional dynamics of social mobilizations. Networks as Facebook and Twitter 
played a key role to engage citizens in online discussions about the political situation in 
Egypt. The exchange and diffusion of the information was not only helpful to mobilize 
and organize citizens before the protests, but also to report what it was happening 
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during the demonstrations inside and outside of Egypt and to disseminate safety 
information.    
Shirky (2011) studied some cases where there was evidence of the impact of social 
media on political corruption. This researcher examined how citizens of Philippine were 
organised in 2001 through a text message to converge on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue 
in order to protest against the President Joseph Estrada when it was voted in the 
Congress to do not consider the evidence of corruption against him. Almost seven 
million of messages were sent and over a million people were mobilised. A few days 
later the president was gone. This author also analysed the Spanish massive 
demonstrations organised in 2004 through a text message against the government of 
José María Aznar, when he inaccurately blamed the Madrid attacks on the Basque 
separatists. A few days later, his party lost the General Elections. Finally, in this 
research it was also investigated how in Moldova, in 2009, protests were coordinated 
against the Communist Party after the fraudulent election triggering his loss of power.   
Gerber and Rogers (2009) and Gerber et al. (2008) proved how it was possible to 
increase political participation by exerting influence through a set of e-mails. These 
authors analysed a study of 180,002 households receiving an e-mail encouraging them 
to vote. It was prepared four different e-mails. The first type emphasised simply the 
civic duty; the second claimed the citizens were going to be studied, which can be 
interpreted as a mild form of social pressure; in the third e-mail, each household was 
informed that a letter will be sent to inform the recipients about household’s voting 
records (whether they vote or not), which can be interpreted as a higher level of social 
pressure; and in the fourth email, the recipients were informed that a letter will be sent 
with a list of the household’s voting records and also of those living nearby, which 
according to the research was the highest level of social pressure that was tested.  
The results showed that while the control group voted at a rate of 29.7%, the 
households to which first e-mail was sent voted at a rate of 31.5%, those who received 
the second mail at a rate of 32.2%, the households to which the third mail was sent at a 
rate of 34.5%, and finally, those who received the fourth mail at a rate of 37.8%. 
Therefore, the results proved that the level of social pressure had a direct impact on 
participation, showing that the turnout increased over the control group by up to 8.1% 
(Gerber et al., 2008). 
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 Twitter Platform Analysis 2.3.3
As summarised in Belda et al. (2015), Twitter is one of the most popular and 
relevant online social networks. It was created in 2006 by Jack Dorsey, Evan Williams, 
Biz Stone and Noah Glass. In 2007, 1.600.000 tweets were posted but its popularity 
increased rapidly and nowadays this social network has 3.3 billion of active users who 
post 500 million tweets per day. 
This social network allows registered users to publish short messages called 
“tweets” with a maximum length of 280 characters. Users can also become “followers” 
of people they find interesting, thereby receiving all the information they publish.  
In additional to publishing messages, users can also re-publish messages of interest 
from others through a mechanism called a “retweet” (often abbreviated to RT). Users 
can make their messages to be read by other users by using a “mention”, which consists 
in adding the character “@” in front of a username anywhere in the body of the tweet, 
allowing them to see the tweet. A variation of a “mention” is a “replies to”, where the 
character “@” in front of the username appears at the beginning of the tweet, which can 
be used to send a private direct message that can be just read for the user mentioned. 
Finally, users can also group posts together by topic using “hashtags”, which are 
descriptive words with the “#” character in front of them (a “tag”). When a hashtag is 
tagged in large amounts, the hashtag is said to become a “trending topic”. This can 
occur as a result of a concerted effort by users, but also as a consequence of the interest 
of an event by itself, which prompts people to talk about this specific topic. These topics 
aid users and communities to understand what is happening in the world. 
In the rest of this section, it will be presented interesting results of some researches 
collected in Belda et al. (2015) in which it has been successfully applied the social 
network analysis on Twitter. Schwartz et al. (2013) and Wagner and Strohmaier (2010) 
proved that it was possible to predict the happiness of one set of people from the tweets 
of other people living in the same county by analysing sets of co-occurring words. It 
was especially interesting to discover how donating money and job satisfaction were 
discussed more than material possessions in happier communities. 
Lumezanu et al. (2012) focused their research on how users sent their tweets and 
identified four extreme patterns: sending high volumes of tweets over short periods of 
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time; retweeting while publishing little original content; quickly retweeting; and 
colluding with others users, seemingly unrelated, to send duplicate or near duplicate 
messages on the same topic simultaneously. Besides, these authors compared 
hyperadvocated users (those who consistently disseminate content which subscribe to a 
single ideology or opinion), with neutral users. The main conclusion was that they 
exhibited different publishing behaviour patterns, but also that the tweeting behaviour 
of the hyperadvocates was affected by the specific characteristics of the community 
being analysed. In communities with a higher than average number of tweets and 
fraction of retweets, hyperadvocates tended to adopt volume-based patterns, i.e., sent 
many tweets over short periods of time and retweeted without publishing much original 
content; while in communities with a lower average of tweets and fraction of retweets, 
they tended to adopt time-based patterns, i.e., sent similar messages close in time and 
retweeted quickly. 
Quercia et al. (2012) demonstrated how established sociological theories of real 
world (offline) social networks worked on Twitter. These researchers detected that 
social brokers (those who connect various set of users in a network) were opinion 
leaders with a higher network status who tweeted about diverse topics (while influential 
users tended to be specialised in concrete topics). In addition, it was observed that while 
social brokers expressed positive and negative emotions and had geographically wide 
networks; the vast majority of users expressed their emotions in intimate networks 
(although negative emotions were expressed in less constrained networks) and had 
geographically local networks. 
Kouloumpis et al. (2011) analysed the utility of linguistic features for detecting the 
sentiment of Twitter messages. These authors focused their research on part-of-speech 
features (POS), hashtags and emoticons to identify positive, neutral and negative tweets. 
Their main finding was that while POS seemed to be not useful for sentiment analysis; 
hashtags and emoticons were powerful to detect the sentiments behind the tweets, 
especially when both were used together. 
Hughes and Palen (2009) analysed how users’ behaviour changed in mass 
convergence events (two related with national security and two with emergency 
situations). These researchers concluded that Twitter had evolved over time to offer 
more of an information-sharing purpose. Besides, it was seen that users who join 
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Twitter during a mass convergence event tended to become long-term users. Comparing 
the users’ behaviour during mass convergence events with the general behaviour pattern 
in Twitter, it was detected on one hand, that the number of replies posted during the 
mass convergence events was higher; and on the other hand, that the number of tweets 
containing URLs was lower. Finally, related to the distribution of tweets among users 
during mass convergence events, the pattern observed was similar to the general 
behaviour pattern in Twitter, i.e, the number of messages sent increased as the number 
of senders decreased. In other words, there were a few people that act like “information 
hubs” (collecting and deploying information), while the majority of members had 
minimal participation. 
 Detecting and Measuring Influence on Twitter 2.3.4
In this section, it will be presented the research related to how to detect and 
measure influence on Twitter conducted by Belda et al. (2015). 
Social network analysis not only helps to identify specific nodes but also to 
describe the structure of the entire communicative network (Kleinberg, 1999; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Directed links represent anything from intimate 
friendships to common interests about a relative topic.  
Analysing these connections on Twitter, Cha et al. (2010) concluded that those 
links show the flow of information and, as a consequence, that they are a good indicator 
to determine the users’ influence. This influence appears when a user’s action inspires a 
reaction from a second user (Berger and Strathearn, 2013). In order to analyse influence 
on Twitter, it is necessary to identify a relationship between two users in which at least 
one of them (X) follows another one (Y) because X is interested in the updates of Y. 
Using Twitter terminology, the previous relationship implies that X is a follower of Y. 
Once X has consumed the content, there are two possibilities: passive consumption, 
when X just read (or even ignore) the tweet published by Y; or active consumption, 
when X takes some action based on the original message. This action could be one of 
following: a) X sends a private direct message to the original publisher; b) X 
communicates with the original publisher by using the reply option; c) X post a message 
in which the original publisher is mentioned; or d) X amplifies the message by 
retweeting it. In these cases where X is choosing an active consumption option, it is 
concluded that X has been influenced by Y (Anger and Kittl, 2011).  
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For a better understanding of the reasons that explain why X adopts an active or 
passive consumption after reading a tweet of Y, Anger and Kittl (2011) propose the 
following classification based on Kelman (1958):  
- Identification, which means that X follows an influential person who is liked, 
respected and/or has a celebrity status. In this case, it is expected that X replies to Y 
because of the status of Y rather than the content of the tweet. 
- Compliance, which means that X publicly agrees with Y and keeps any 
disagreeing thoughts and opinions to himself. It could trigger a retweet if X perceives 
the content published by Y as popular and helpful for establishing its own reputation 
and social status on Twitter. 
- Internalisation, which means that X accepts a belief or behaviour both publicly 
and privately. This is the most impacting social influence process and could involve 
recommendations, retweets and also dialogues. 
- Neglect, which means that X ignores the content posted by Y. 
- Disagreement, which means that X strongly disagrees with B, and as a result, X 
express his disagreement or even decides to unfollow Y. 
It has found that a relatively small group of users can be considered as influencers. 
An influencer has a large and active number of followers that consume and spread the 
content published by him (Bakshy et al., 2011). As a result, this content not only 
reaches a large number of followers, but also a larger circle of users that are not direct 
followers (Anger and Kittl, 2011).  
Once it has been identified from where the influence comes and that there are a 
reduced group of users that amass a lot of influence, it is valuable to describe several 
indicators in order to measure their influence. 
A popular indicator of the influence of a user is his number of followers. However, 
Anger and Kittl (2011) underlined that solely taking into account the number of 
followers a person has can be misleading as many users follow a large number of other 
users just to increase their own following. Besides, it should be also considered that 
there are several companies that offer “follow” clicks for payment. 
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These researchers considered the follower/following ratio. It compares the number 
of users who have subscribed to the updates of a user with the number of users that the 
relative user is following. If this ratio is well below 1, it will mean the user needs to 
show interest in other users in order to gain more followers. However, if this ratio is 
well above 1, it will mean that this user is being followed by a relative large number of 
users without showing interest in too many users. However, these authors also 
highlighted that considering just this metric could lead to misinterpretations, as it clearly 
depends on the number of users that are being considered. As an example, a result of 
this ratio equal to 2 when it comes from a user who is followed by 200 users and 
follows 100 should not be interpreted as if it comes from a user who is followed by 2 
users and follows 1.  
Cha et al. (2010), when studying the user’s influence on Twitter, pointed out how 
the number of mentions (as the user’s name value) and the number of retweets (as the 
tweet’s content value) are better indicators of the user’s popularity than the number of 
followers, i.e., instead of having a large volume of followers, it is more effective to have 
an active audience mentioning the user and retweeting his tweets. When selecting those 
users with the highest number of followers, mentions and retweets, it was discovered 
that there is a little overlap. Moreover, these researches found on one hand, that the 
most influential users hold significant influence over a variety of topics; and on the 
other hand, that the best way to gain influence is by being creative and insightful. 
Bruns and Stieglitz (2013) emphasised the importance of considering on one side, 
the number of tweets sent by a user with a particular hashtag, as it shows how strong 
the commitment of the user is to a specific topic; and on the other side, the tweets 
received (replies, mentions and retweets), as it shows the number of other users who 
take notice of or engage with him. Considering both measures, the ratio tweets 
received/tweets sent could be considered as a measure of the social pressure of a 
specific user on the overall hashtag conversation. If this ratio is well below 1, it will 
mean he is tweeting frequently but receiving few replies, mentions and retweets, 
therefore, his impact is limited and cannot be considered an influencer. However, if this 
ratio is well above 1, it will mean that user is tweeting considerably less than the replies, 
mentions and retweets he is receiving and, as a consequence, that he has the significant 







In addition, these researchers also highlighted the relevance of counting the number 
of tweets containing URLs, as it provides a powerful insight into the number of external 
resources a user is introducing or retweeting.   
Anger and Kittl (2011), taking into account the ratio follower/following and tweets 
received/tweets sent proposed the Social Networking Potential (SNP) metric, which 
consists of the sum of both ratios divided by 2:  
SNP = [(Follower/Following)*100 + (tweets received/tweets sent)*100] / 2 
The interpretation of this metric is as follows: as higher is the SNP score, as more 
influential the user is.  
Finally, there are other commercial approaches with proprietary algorithms focused 
on the analysis of user’s online influence (Anger and Kittl, 2011). One of the most used 
online rating services is Klout
31
, which uses a proprietary algorithm that considers more 
than 25 variables. Klout measures the user’s overall online influence on Twitter (and 
also on Facebook and LinkedIn) with a score ranging from 1 (lowest) to 100 (highest) 
amount of influence. Once the score is calculated, Klout also places the user in a so-
called influence matrix with 16 possible classifications created from the combination of 
eight attributes. Other commercial services which offer measures of influence on 
Twitter are Brandwatch
32
 or Website Grader
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.      
 Political Debate on Twitter 2.3.5
Twitter is increasingly considered by scholars as political platform, where 
politicians, media professionals and citizens engage in a personal type of political 
communication (Murthy, 2015; Ekman and Widholm, 2014; Aragón et al., 2013). Peña-
López et al. (2014) underlined that this platform is mainly used to broadcast opinions, to 
voice discontent and to call for gatherings in real time. Publishing a political opinion 
through a tweet, which means an intellectual processing of analysis, criticism and 
synthesis of political arguments, is becoming usual among a growing number of citizens 
(Jennings et al., 2017). Anger and Kittl (2011) and Leavitt et al. (2009) emphasised how 
Twitter is as a network where users exchange information around topics and subjects 









rather than personal issues like others platforms. Political conversations on Twitter have 
been more successfully normalized than on other social media such as Facebook and 
Instagram (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2013).  
Investigating how Twitter is used in politics, it has been established a positive 
correlation between political events in the offline world and the use of Twitter (Aragón 
et al., 2013; Lehmann, 2012). Accordingly, Christensen (2011) proved how the 
engagement in online political debates correlates positively with offline political 
participation. Besides, McKinney et al. (2013) established that the online political 
debate held on Twitter contributes positively to the political knowledge. In agreement, 
Jennings et al. (2017) demonstrated a positive relationship between the frequency of 
tweeting about politics and the acquisition of knowledge.   
Analysing online political debates held on Twitter, Peña-López et al. (2014) noted 
that Twitter is also being used to focus users’ attention on specific topics. Aragón et al. 
(2013) and Wu et al. (2011) warmed the risk of homophily, i.e., as users choose which 
conversations to participate in and which users to follow, there is a high likelihood that 
it appears clusters of users engaged in a political conversation where most of them have 
the same political leaning or even the same preferred party. Guadián-Orta et al. (2012), 
studying the relationship between users and message proved that it works in both ways: 
based in a specific topic is created a social network, but then, the social network shapes 
the message over the time.  
In the following lines, it will be summarised the use of Twitter as a platform to 
spread propaganda and generate political debate during the electoral campaigns 
(Jennings et al., 2017; Aragón et al., 2013); as a mobilizing platform for social 
movements (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012); and as a predictor of electoral outcomes 
(Tumasjan et al., 2010).  
Twitter has shown its usefulness as a platform to spread propaganda and generate 
political debate during the electoral campaigns (Aragón et al., 2013). For instance, this 
platform has been actively used during political events as the elections in Iran, Spain or 
USA (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012). In particular, it has been found how it increases 
the use of Twitter during political debates (Siegel, 2018; Bruns and Burgess, 2011). 
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Jennings et al. (2017) underlined that Twitter shows, in real time, not only the salience 
of political issues, but also the successes or failures of public sphere arguments.  
Twitter has also shown its usefulness as a mobilizing platform for social 
movements (Peña-López et al., 2014), allowing marginalized or oppressed groups to 
coordinate and express their concerns (Gladwell, 2010). This social network was crucial 
in the Women’s Marches, which started in 2017 in Washington and used Twitter to 
spread information; in the Black Lives Matter movement, which started in 2013 with 
the hashtag #blacklivesmatters, allowing citizens to communicate with other like-
minded citizens, supportive communities and legislators (Ince et al., 2017); in the Arab 
Spring, which started in 2010 and owes part of its success to the strategic use of Twitter 
(Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012).  
In the case of Spain, Twitter played an essential role on the birth and development 
of the Movimiento 15M (15M Movement). In a precarious context of an economic, 
social and political crisis, Twitter was used not only as a platform for political debate 
(Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012), allowing citizens to channel their outrage (Anduiza et 
al., 2014); but also as channel to spread the call for protests (Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-
Sánchez, 2012; González-Bailón et al., 2011). Peña-López et al. (2014) underlined how 
the interaction between the physical and the virtual world was crucial for this movement 
to succeed, as it facilitated the sharing of information and a better coordination, giving 
their members a sense of collective identity.  
Moreover, it is worth noting how some researches have even highlighted the 
usefulness of analysing the online political debate in order to predict electoral outcomes 
as real world political coalitions and parties’ vote share (Skoric et al., 2012; Vallina-
Rodriguez et al., 2012; Bermingham and Smeaton, 2011; Congosto et al., 2011, Livne et 
al., 2011; Sang and Bos, 2011; O’Connor et al., 2010; Tumasjan et al., 2010).  
However, it is fair noting that there are also other studies that have questioned the 
previous results (Metaxas et al., 2011; Jungherr, 2010).  
Finally, it will be briefly described some results of the literature review conducted 
about the role played by users’ political leaning, the emergence of new parties and 
users’ political sympathy on the online political debate held on Twitter. 
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Peña-López et al. (2014) and Anduiza et al. (2012), when characterising the 
Spaniards political leaning of those users who actively participate in the online political 
debate held on Twitter against the established system and its corruption, found how the 
majority has a left political leaning. This result is consistent with the one obtained by 
Robles-Morales (2008) when studying the political ideology of Spanish Internet users, 
since he discovered that they were significantly more likely to be left-wing than the 
average Spaniard. Besides, Vallina-Rodriguez et al. (2012) found how, before the 
emergence of the new Spanish party Podemos, the vast majority of users in the political 
debate held on Twitter against the economic, social and political crisis did not feel 
represented for the traditional parties strongly affected by corruption and, were 
demanding alternative political actors to represent their interests. Finally, Jennings et al. 
(2017) demonstrated how, as suspected, political sympathy not only impacts on 
citizens’ attitudes towards political corruption in the face to face conversations, but also 
in the online debate about politics held on Twitter. When analysing the political debate 
held on Twitter, there is a high probability to find users having the same political 
preferences within a conversation (Aragón et al., 2013). Summarising the information 
above, political leaning, the emergence of new parties and political sympathy also play 
a key role when analysing the online debate about political corruption held on Twitter. 
Due to the huge volumes of data being continually published on Twitter, it is 
unsurprising that a significant amount of research is taking place to analyse the structure 
and content of the information. In the following section, it will be discussed different 
results obtained in previous researches where political conversations held on Twitter 
have been analysed.  
 Analysing Political Conversations on Twitter 2.3.6
In the following lines, it will be analysed some researches related to the use of 
Twitter as a platform to spread propaganda and generate political debate during the 
electoral campaigns, to the effectiveness of Twitter as a mobilizing platform for social 
movements, and to the ability of Twitter as a predictor of electoral outcomes. 
 Regarding the use of Twitter as a platform to spread propaganda and generate 
political debate during the electoral campaigns, Jennings et al. (2017) studied the 
Twitter conversation generated during the Democrat and Republican presidential 
primary debates held on TV in 2016. Concretely, the experiment consisted in analysing 
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the tweets posted while viewing the primary debate of their preferred party by a set of 
individuals. Therefore, on their arrival, participants were asked about their partisan 
leaning and classified into two groups: Democrats and Republicans. Then, each group 
was in turn divided into three new groups. The first group was indicated to follow the 
“control condition”, i.e., participants were required to simply tweet their thoughts. The 
second group was indicated to follow the “directional condition”, i.e., participants were 
required to tweet their evaluations about the candidates and were told that these 
evaluations would be reviewed in order to determine the winner and report to the media. 
The third group was indicated to follow the “accuracy condition”, i.e., participants were 
required to tweet their honest, non-partisan and unbiased evaluations about the 
candidates and were told that these evaluations would be reviewed and evaluated by 
experts in presidential debates in order to determine their accuracy. Each group was 
assigned a specific hashtag and participants were told to use the designated hashtag. 
Finally, after viewing the debate, all participants completed a post-test survey to 
establish their knowledge acquisition.  
These researchers hypothesised that as greater issue elaboration as greater is the 
knowledge acquisition. In order to address this issue, a total of 1082 tweets were 
analysed and classified manually as follows: “Image tweet”, when it referred to physical 
or mental attributes of a given candidate; “Issue tweet”, when it referred to a meaningful 
policy consideration present in the campaign; “Image and issue tweet”, when it referred 
to both; “Neither image nor issue”, when it did not refer to any. The results showed that 
those tweets related to issues led to more knowledge acquisition, therefore, it was 
concluded that tweeting about the specific policies while viewing a political debate on 
TV impacts positively on citizens’ knowledge about politics.  
Moreover, these authors investigated the frequency in which participants tweeted 
while viewing the primary debate on TV. The results depicted that the group of 
participants who tweeted following the “directional condition” had a higher frequency 
than those who tweeted following the “accuracy condition”. Considering that the 
“directional condition” was aiming to evaluate candidates in order to determine the 
winner and publish it by the media, it is reasonable that participants posted more tweets 
than when they were required to be critic and express unbiased assessments, being told 
that their impartiality was going to be evaluated by experts to establish their accuracy. 
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In other words, the reason which explains that participants following the “directional 
condition” tweeted with a higher frequency is because this condition led participants to 
evaluate candidates according with their predispositions while those participants 
following the “accuracy condition” may experiment any contradiction between their 
predispositions and the perceptions about how their preferred candidate is performing 
on the debate. The confirmatory bias directly impacts on citizens’ assessments and, as a 
consequence, participants under the “directional condition” find more pleasant to tweet 
than those under the “accuracy condition”. As it has been demonstrated, the 
confirmatory bias, which in this context can be interpreted as political sympathy, also 
plays a key role when analysing the online debate about politics held on Twitter. 
Aragón et al. (2013) analysed the Twitter conversation generated during the 
campaign of the Spanish General Elections held in November 2011. For this purpose, it 
was collected those tweets published between 4 and 24 November 2011 which satisfied 
at least one of the following conditions: contained a hashtag linked to the campaign; 
belonged to an official party account or to someone holding a position in one of the 
main Spanish parties; belonged to a user previously identified as activist, journalist, 
mass-media channel, radio or TV program focused on the campaign; mentioned a party 
or a candidate. This process yielded a dataset of 3074312 political tweets published by 
380164 distinct users. 
These authors justified their research was focused on Spain underlining on one 
hand, how the political use of Twitter in Spain had increased considerably since the 
Spanish protest in May 2011; and on the other hand, that while the Spanish electoral 
law regulated the offline campaign, there was no regulation for party campaigning on 
Twitter. 
These researchers were interested in testing their belief that the volume of tweets 
over time reflects the involvement of different parties in the key moments of the 
electoral campaign. In order to address this issue, they analysed the volume of tweets 
per day to identify if the most relevant events of the electoral campaign led to a higher 
activity on Twitter. The results, according with previous researches (Barberá and 
Rivero, 2012; Congosto and Aragón, 2012; Bruns and Burgess, 2011) verified their 
hypothesis as the higher volume of tweets (19% of the dataset), corresponded with the 
electoral debate day between the two leading candidates; the second peak (14% of the 
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dataset), was found in the election day; and the third peak (7% of the dataset), belonged 
to the day of the end of campaign. Besides, it is worth noting, that the reflection day, 
i.e., the day preceding the Election Day, it was registered less activity. The Spanish 
electoral law establishes an election silence in order to promote the reflection without 
influence from political parties prior to voting the Election Day, and as it was registered 
less activity on Twitter, it can be concluded that it was partially followed also on this 
platform in despite of this law does not regulate the online campaign. 
Related to the above, Hu et al. (2012) also investigated the crowd’s tweeting 
behavior, but in this case, within a political event. Concretely, these authors analysed 
two large sets of tweets related to President Obama’s speech on the Middle East in May 
2011 (22,000 tweets), and a Republican Primary debate in September 2011 (110,000 
tweets). These tweets were classified into two categories: “Steady tweets”, which were 
referred to the event in general; and “Episodic tweets”, which were related to specific 
topics. The results showed how the “Episodic tweets” were more posted during the 
event than before or after it. Besides, as the event evolved, the crowd tended to 
comment any topic independently if it had been discussed before, was being discussed, 
or was expected to be discussed later on. 
Moreover, Aragón et al. (2013) were also interested in testing their belief that the 
Spanish political Twittersphere was polarized. In order to address this issue, they 
analysed the communication between parties through the network of retweets and 
replies to identify if they cross party borders. The results, according with previous 
researches (Conover et al., 2012; Feller et al., 2011), also verified their hypothesis as the 
vast majority of retweets and replies were among members of the same party. Regarding 
the retweets network, it was found that members of PSOE and PP were retweeting 
messages of their own party, in the 99.2% and 99.7% of the cases respectively. Related 
to the replies network, it was found that members of PSOE and PP were replying mostly 
to messages from their own party, in the 85% and 84% of the cases respectively.  
Accordingly, Conover et al. (2011), when analysing the network of political 
retweets, demonstrated how it exhibits a highly segregated partisan structure with 
extremely limited connectivity between progressive and conservative users. These 
researchers suggested that what is behind this finding could be a users’ preference to 
retweet other users’ tweets with whom they agree politically. This high polarisation 
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shows how political sympathy plays a key role when analysing the online debate about 
politics held on Twitter. In addition, it was also found how the likelihood of a user to 
interact with other user with a different ideology increase as lower is his partisanship. 
In reference to the effectiveness of Twitter as a mobilizing platform for social 
movements, it will be reviewed the research conducted by Vallina-Rodriguez et al. 
(2012), who analysed the use of Twitter during the Spanish Revolution in May 2011. In 
the following lines it will be contextualised the political, economic and social situation 
at that time, which led to the well-known “Movimiento 15M” (15M Movement).  
Since 2008, Spain was going through an economic and social crisis like many other 
European countries. Following the CIS
34
, in May 2011 Spaniards were overwhelmingly 
concerned with the unemployment (which rate was over 20% of the active population), 
the economic situation and the party political system. Besides, Spain was facing 
Regional and Local Elections. Concretely, 13 out of 17 Spanish autonomous areas and 
more than 8000 municipalities were facing elections. Focusing on the main parties, on 
one side, the incumbent party (PSOE) was being accused to do not adopt the measures 
needed to tack the crisis; and on the other side, members of PP were accused of being 
involved in corruption scandals.  
In this precarious context, the political debate moved onto blogs and online social 
networks as Facebook and Twitter (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012), which managed to 
channel the collective indignation (Anduiza et al., 2014). The online political debate 
quickly gained adherents and, as a result of merging more than 200 smaller citizen 
grassroots organisations, student organisations and other civil movements, it was born 
the collective “¡Democracia Real, Ya!” (Real Democracy, Now!), which had a definite 
bias to the left (Peña-López et al., 2014; Anduiza et al., 2012). This collective called for 
public protests against the established situation to be held on 15 May 2011 in more than 
fifty cities across Spain, which led to activists setting up camps in many of the cities, 
originating the well-known “Movimiento 15M” (15M Movement), which members 
called themselves “Los Indignados” (The Indignant) (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012). 
The role played by the online social networks was crucial to generate and spread the call 
(Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-Sánchez, 2012; González-Bailón et al., 2011). The interaction 
between the physical and the virtual world was crucial for this movement to succeed, 
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feeding both each other with information, coordination and a sense of collective identity 
(Peña-López et al., 2014). Toret (2013) emphasized how this movement used actively 
Twitter as a channel to organise themselves and discuss their positions. 
Vallina-Rodriguez et al. (2012) were interested in studying the way in which 
Twitter was used in this period. For this purpose, it was identified on one hand, 400 
hashtags and key words related to the political debate; and on the other hand, a set of 
200 Twitter accounts used by political parties, their candidates, the “Democracia Real, 
Ya!” (Real Democracy, Now!) organisation and the main media sources. Then, it was 
collected through the Twitter Streaming API those tweets between 10 and 24 May 2011 
which contained one hashtag of the list, were mentioning a Twitter account of the list 
or, were published by a Twitter account of the list. This process yielded a dataset of 3 
million tweets sent by about 500000 Twitter users. These tweets contained more than 
115000 different hashtags. 
The results showed that the most popular hashtags were: #acampadasol (716434 
tweets), which was related to Madrid’s camps and protests; #spanishrevolution (642149 
tweets), which comprised all the Spanish protests; #acampadabcn (352088 tweets), 
which was related to Barcelona’s camps and protests; #nonosvamos (175.127 tweets), 
which means “we are not leaving” and was proclaiming the intention of not to leave the 
camps; and #nolesvotes (172093 tweets), which means “do not vote” and was 
encouraging citizens not to vote for the traditional parties PSOE and PP. The main 
conclusion was that the vast majority of the tweets expressed an alternative political 
orientation outside the traditional parties PSOE and PP. 
Concretely, on one side, when analysing the top 300 hashtags with a political scope, 
the 80% had an alternative scope while just the 10% had a traditional left and the 10% 
had a traditional right political scope. On the other side, when analysing the users’ 
accounts with more than 1000 mentions with a political scope, the 67% had an 
alternative scope while just the 19% had a traditional left and the 14% had a traditional 
right political scope. 
As a consequence, it is possible to establish that the online political debate was 
dominated for people who did not feel represented by the traditional parties. In fact, one 
of the mottos of the protests was “no nos representan” which means “they do not 
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represent us” and was referred mainly to PSOE and PP. The crowd was demanding 
alternative solutions to the economic and social crisis different from those offered by 
traditional parties, which were seriously affected by corruption. In other words, citizens 
needed new political actors to represent their interests. In turn, taking into account that 
this context served as the basis for the appearance of the new party Podemos 
(Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis, 2018; Franzé, 2017), the idea that the online political 
debate is dominated by users with a left political leaning is reinforced.   
Finally, regarding the ability of Twitter as a predictor of electoral outcomes, it will 
be summarised the main results of the research conducted by Congosto et al. (2011) and 
Tumasjan et al. (2010) related to the Catalan Elections of 2010 and the German General 
Elections of 2009 respectively. 
Congosto et al. (2011) analysed the political conversation related to the Catalan 
Elections of November 2010. Concretely, it was collected a total of 84000 tweets 
mentioning parties and candidates during 18 days previous to the Election Day. These 
researchers found a positive correlation between the number of mentions received for 
each party or candidate and the number of votes reached. They concluded emphasizing 
the usefulness of Twitter to measure the public opinion.  
Tumasjan et al. (2010), when analysing the political conversation related to the 
German General Elections of September 2009, found firstly, that Twitter is a platform 
for political deliberation, although such forums tend to be dominated by a small number 
of users with a high level of participation. Secondly, how parties and politicians’ 
profiles were seen as very similar, which was associated with the political proximity 
between parties in the weeks before the election. Thirdly, it was also discovered that 
joint mentions of two parties were in line with real world political ties and coalitions. 
Finally, the most surprising conclusion was that Twitter worked as a predictor of the 
results, as the percentage of messages mentioning each of the parties reflected its vote 
share. Related to this conclusion, it is necessary to underline that although the activity 
prior to the election validated the election outcome, the German political Twittersphere 




In this chapter it has been firstly, approached the definition of political corruption 
from different criteria; described its impact from different perspectives; and investigated 
the electoral consequences. Secondly, it has been reviewed and summarise the literature 
related to political awareness, political leaning, political sympathy, economic context, 
the news party’s emergence and social pressure. It has been concluded that these are 
decisive variables when studying citizens’ attitude towards political corruption. 
Finally, it has been studied the role played social media on politics. Concretely, it 
has been studied a set of researches in which it has been demonstrated the effectiveness 
of social media to impact on political attitude and behaviour; it has been described the 
platform Twitter and how to detect and measure the influence on this platform; it has 
been characterised the political debate held on Twitter; and finally, it has been reviewed 
a set of researches where it has been analysed political conversations held on this 
platform.  
Based on the literature review carried out in this chapter, in Chapter 3 it will be 
raised the hypotheses of this thesis which will be subsequently attempt to validate in 







Chapter 3. Hypotheses Formulation 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it has been reviewed the literature related to the main 
variables which have impact on citizens’ attitude towards political corruption: economic 
context, social pressure, political awareness, political leaning, the new parties’ 
emergence and political sympathy. The main goal of this thesis is to shed light on the 
puzzle of why political corruption does not seem to have the electoral consequences it 
could be expected, and even more important, to find out key factors to develop better 
strategies to promote citizens’ political criticism and achieve a higher quality 
democracy. 
 In this chapter it will be stated and justified a number of hypotheses relevant to 
these questions. These will be tested in the following two chapters, with the hypotheses 
related to what it has been called “Real World” being tested in Chapter 4, and those 
related to “Virtual World” in Chapter 5. The current chapter is organised as follows: it 
will be stated, set in context, and justified the hypotheses related to the real world in 
section 3.2, and those related to the virtual world in section 3.3. Finally, in section 3.4 it 
will be presented the model of the thesis. 
3.2 Hypotheses related to “Real World” 
In this section it will be stated and justified the hypotheses related to the real world 
(H1-H6), which involve all the variables mentioned previously, i.e., economic context, 
social pressure, political awareness, political leaning, the new parties’ emergence and 
political sympathy. 
 Hypothesis 1: Economic Context and Attitude towards Political 3.2.1
Corruption 
The economic context plays a crucial role in citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption. Scholars have analysed citizens’ electoral behaviour in periods of economic 
expansion and crisis in different countries and have concluded that citizens’ criticism 
towards political corruption increases when the country is going through an economic 
crisis (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; 
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Klasnja and Tucker, 2013; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013; Zechmeister and 
Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013; Jerit and Barabas 2012; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2010; 
Manzetti and Wilson, 2007; Golden, 2007; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2000; Duch et al., 2000; 
Mauro, 1995). Therefore, it is established the following hypothesis: 
H1- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower when the 
country’s economy is in crisis.  
In other words, it will be analysed if citizens’ punishment is higher when the 
corruption cases are discovered while they are suffering the social and economic 
consequences of an economic crisis.  
If it proved to be the case, it would show that an economic crisis supposes an 
opportunity to impact on citizens’ political attitude and, as a result, to improve the 
democracy’s quality.   
 Hypothesis 2: Social Pressure vs. Factual Information 3.2.2
There is a wide agreement among scholars in pointing out that social pressure plays 
a key role on citizens’ political attitude and behaviour. Concretely, it has been proved 
how social pressure plays a key role in mobilising citizens against the established 
political system and its corruption (Giraldo-Luque, 2018; Marinov and Schimmelfennig,  
2015; Anduiza et al., 2014; Peña-López et al., 2014; Toret, 2013; Anduiza et al., 2012; 
Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-Sánchez, 2012; Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012; Eltantawy and 
Wiest, 2011; González-Bailón et al., 2011; Shirky, 2011); Bond et al. (2012) have found 
how it impacts on political self-expression, political information seeking and on voting 
behaviour; and finally, Gerber and Rogers (2009) and Gerber et al. (2008) have 
demonstrated how by exerting it, political participation increases. 
Based on the results obtained in the researches above, it is theorized that social 
pressure is more effective than factual information when analysing their impact on 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption. Therefore, it is raised the following 
hypothesis: 
H2- Among the variables which influence the citizens’ attitude towards 
political corruption, social pressure has a higher impact than factual information. 
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In other words, it will be studied if the impact of an individual being informed 
about political corruption emphasizing there are already other people mobilizing against 
it and focusing on citizens’ economic and social losses is higher than just spreading 
factual information.  
If this hypothesis was verified, it would show the key influence that other 
individuals’ attitudes towards political corruption exert on citizens and, therefore, the 
greater effectiveness to reach a higher impact on citizens’ criticism towards political 
corruption of the information focused on other citizens’ reactions against it. In addition, 
it would indicate how emphasizing the social and economic consequences of corruption 
is also a more effective strategy than the spread of factual information. 
 Hypothesis 3: Political Awareness and Attitude towards Political 3.2.3
Corruption 
Citizens with a different level of knowledge about politics show different levels of 
tolerance towards political corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Anduiza et al., 2013; 
Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Arceneaux, 2007; Kam, 2005).  
Scholars have analysed how an increase in the level of corruption perceived by 
citizens plays against the electoral results of corrupt politicians (Cordero and Blais, 
2017; Fernández-Vázquez et al., 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Costas-Pérez et al., 2010; 
Figueiredo et al., 2010; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Chang and Kerr, 2009; 
Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Tavits, 2007; Gerring and Thacker, 2005; Adserá et al., 2003; 
Treisman, 2000; Fackler and Lin, 1995; Rundquist et al., 1977). 
Political awareness seems to play a decisive role to explain the attitude towards 
political corruption, therefore, it is proposed the following hypothesis: 
H3- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower as higher 
is their political awareness. 
In other words, it will be investigated if there are significant differences in the 
attitude towards political corruption between citizens with a different level of political 




If it proved to be the case, it would show that citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption can be modified by involving citizens in the political debate and therefore, 
the key role of the media.  
 Hypothesis 4: Political Leaning and Attitude towards Political 3.2.4
Corruption 
Citizens tend to analyse political information accordingly with their political 
predispositions (Jennings et al., 2017; Lodge and Taber, 2013; Brader and Tucker, 
2009; Anderson and Singer, 2008; Coan et al., 2008; Malhotra and Kuo, 2008; 
Anderson et al., 2005; Bartels, 2002, 2000; Gerber and Green, 1999; Miller and Shanks, 
1996; Zaller, 1992; Sherrod, 1971). Political leaning involves a position about a set of 
variables as the predisposition to change (Anderson and Singer, 2008; Devos et al., 
2002; Schwartz, 1992); social class and religion (Freire, 2006; Knutsen, 1997); 
economic issues (Hellwig, 2014; Dalton, 2006; Knutsen, 1995; Inglehart and 
Klingemann, 1976; Downs, 1957); inequality (Alesina et al., 2004; Jost et al., 2003a; 
Jost et al., 2003b; Jost and Hunyady, 2002; Listhaug and Aalberg, 1999; Tyler and 
McGraw, 1986; Lane, 1962); and issues related to immigration, multiculturalism, 
gender equality, lifestyle choices, quality of life and environmental policy (Inglehart, 
1990).  
Focusing on the topic of this thesis, it seems that political leaning also plays a key 
role in explaining the different levels of tolerance towards political corruption. It has 
been found that supporters of right parties are more tolerant towards corruption 
(Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Costas-Pérez et al., 2010). 
Considering this finding, it is established the following hypothesis: 
H4- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower as more 
politically progressive they are. 
In other words, it will be analysed if there are significant differences in the attitude 
towards political corruption between citizens with different political leaning in order to 
find out if those citizens with a left political leaning are less tolerant. 
If this hypothesis was verified, it would indicate that the electorate of left parties is 
more sensitive towards political corruption and, therefore, that these parties would need 
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to make greater efforts to fight against corruption. Besides, it would contribute to 
explain the success, in certain electoral campaigns, of right parties involved in 
corruption. 
 Hypothesis 5: New parties’ emergence and Attitude towards 3.2.5
Political Corruption 
The economic, social and political crisis has recently shaken the traditional political 
system contributing to the emergence of new parties (Altiparmakis and Lorenzini, 2018; 
Muro and Vidal, 2017; Della Porta, 2015). There is a wide set of democracies where it 
has emerged new political parties which have successfully broken into the political 
scene making the fight against corruption their leitmotif (Bågenholm and Charron, 
2014; Hanley and Sikk, 2014; Bågenholm, 2013; Sikk, 2012; Bélanger, 2004). For 
instance, it has recently appeared new parties which have reached remarkable electoral 
results in three countries of Southern Europe which were not only affected by the 
economic, social and political crisis; but also by political corruption (Hutter et al., 
2018): Syriza in Greece, Movimento Cinque Stelle in Italy and Podemos in Spain. 
The emergence of new parties represents an opportunity for citizens to punish 
traditional parties affected by political corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron 
and Bågenholm, 2016). In this thesis, it will be studied if those citizens who feel closer 
to new parties are less tolerant towards political corruption than those who support 
traditional parties. 
Taking into account the previous findings, it is raised the following hypothesis: 
H5- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower in those 
citizens who are supporting new parties. 
In other words, it will be studied if there are significant differences in the attitude 
towards political corruption between citizens supporting different parties in order to find 
out if those citizens who are supporting new parties are less tolerant. 
If it proved to be the case, it would show that new parties’ supporters are more 
sensitive towards political corruption and, therefore, the effectiveness of the new 
parties’ strategy based on showing themselves as anti-corruption parties. 
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 Hypothesis 6: Political Sympathy and Attitude towards Political 3.2.6
Corruption 
Citizens evaluate a corruption scandal differently depending on which is the party 
affected, being more tolerant when it affects their preferred party (Cordero and Blais, 
2017; Ecker et al., 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013). Charron and Bågenholm (2016) have 
explained how that is due to the “home team” psychology factor, which makes hard 
blaming the party they are supporting. There is a wide agreement among scholars in 
pointing out that voters’ political sympathy can balance the impact of corruption on the 
electoral results, being even the candidate involved in a corruption case re-elected 
(Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Welch and Hibbing, 1997; 
Peters and Welch, 1980). 
Considering the previous findings, it is proposed the following hypothesis: 
H6- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards corruption is higher as higher is the 
political sympathy towards the party involved. 
In other words, it will be investigated if there are significant differences in the 
attitude towards political corruption between citizens evaluating corruption when it is 
not indicated the party involved and when it is specified it is their preferred party the 
one affected. It will be studied if citizens are more tolerant when the case of corruption 
involves the party they are supporting. 
If this hypothesis was verified, it would clearly contribute to explain why political 
corruption is not as much penalized as it could be expected and, therefore, it would 
indicate how necessary is citizens to become aware of the importance to fight against 
political corruption independently of the party affected in order to reach a higher quality 
democracy.  
3.3 Hypotheses related to “Virtual World” 
The second part of this research will be focused on the analysis of the conversations 
about politics held on Twitter. There is a wide agreement among scholars in pointing 
out that Twitter is becoming a political platform, where politicians, media professionals 
and citizens engage in a personal type of political communication (Murthy, 2015; 
Ekman and Widholm, 2014; Aragón et al., 2013). This platform has been identified as a 
103 
 
network where users exchange information around topics rather than personal issues 
like others platforms as Facebook or Instagram (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2013; 
Anger and Kittl, 2011; Leavitt et al., 2009). There are many researches in which it has 
been successfully analysed the political debate held on Twitter (Jennings et al., 2017; 
Peña-López et al., 2014; Aragón et al., 2013;  Hu et al., 2012; Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 
2012; Conover et al., 2011; Tumasjan et al., 2010).  
It has been proved the effectiveness of this platform to spread social pressure and 
impact on citizens’ political attitudes and behaviour. For instance, it has been 
demonstrated the usefulness of this platform to spread propaganda and generate political 
debate during the electoral campaigns (Jennings et al., 2017; Aragón et al., 2013), and 
also as a mobilizing platform for social movements (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012). 
In this section it will be stated and justified the hypotheses related to the virtual 
world (H7-H9). Considering on one hand, that the main topic of the thesis is the analysis 
of citizens’ attitude towards political corruption; and on the other hand, the 
extraordinary capacity of Twitter to impact on citizens’ attitudes and behaviour, it will 
be studied the roles played by political leaning, preferred party and political sympathy 
in the online debate about political corruption held on this platform. 
The goal of the hypotheses H7, H8 and H9 is to analyse if the results of the real 
world analysis (concretely of H4, H5 and H6) are consistent in the virtual world.  
 Hypothesis 7: Political Leaning and Attitude towards Political 3.3.1
Corruption in the online debate 
As it has been proved, citizens tend to analyse political information accordingly 
with their political predispositions (Jennings et al., 2017; Lodge and Taber, 2013; 
Brader and Tucker, 2009; Anderson and Singer, 2008; Coan et al., 2008; Malhotra and 
Kuo, 2008; Anderson et al., 2005; Bartels, 2002, 2000; Gerber and Green, 1999; Miller 
and Shanks, 1996; Zaller, 1992; Sherrod, 1971). It has been studied how political 
leaning involves a position about a set of variables as the predisposition to change 
(Anderson and Singer, 2008; Devos et al., 2002; Schwartz, 1992); social class and 
religion (Freire, 2006; Knutsen, 1997); economic issues (Hellwig, 2014; Dalton, 2006; 
Knutsen, 1995; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Downs, 1957); inequality (Alesina et 
al., 2004; Jost et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 2003b; Jost and Hunyady, 2002; Listhaug and 
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Aalberg, 1999; Tyler and McGraw, 1986; Lane, 1962); and issues related to 
immigration, multiculturalism, gender equality, lifestyle choices, quality of life and 
environmental policy (Inglehart, 1990). 
Political leaning has been found as a key variable when analysing citizens’ attitude 
towards political corruption. Charron and Bågenholm (2016), Anduiza et al. (2013) and 
Costas-Pérez et al. (2010) showed how left voters tend to punish corruption more than 
right voters. Regarding the political debate held on Twitter, Peña-López et al. (2014) 
and Anduiza et al. (2012) found that the Spanish users who actively participate in the 
online political conversations held on Twitter against the established system and its 
corruption have mainly a left political leaning. 
In the hypotheses related to real world, it has been theorised that more politically 
progressive citizens are less tolerant towards political corruption than conservative. The 
goal of this hypothesis is to analyse if the previous theory can be verified when studying 
the online conversations about politics held on Twitter. Therefore, it is established the 
following hypothesis:    
H7- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of tolerance 
towards political corruption is lower in progressive users. 
In other words, it will be analysed if when reporting corruption in the online debate 
about politics, there are significant differences in the attitude towards political 
corruption between users with different political leaning. It will be studied if those users 
with a left political leaning are more active. 
If this proved to be the case, it would show that the electorate of left parties is 
dominating the online debate about political corruption. It would also indicate that those 
users who support left parties are more sensitive towards political corruption and, 
therefore, that these parties would need to make greater efforts to fight against 
corruption. Moreover, it would contribute to explain the success, in certain electoral 
campaigns, of right parties involved in corruption. 
105 
 
 Hypothesis 8: New parties’ emergence and Attitude towards 3.3.2
Political Corruption in the online debate 
As it has been seen, the economic, social and political crisis has recently shaken the 
traditional political system contributing to the emergence of new parties (Altiparmakis 
and Lorenzini, 2018; Muro and Vidal, 2017; Della Porta, 2015). There is a wide set of 
democracies where it has emerged new political parties which have successfully broken 
into the political scene making the fight against corruption their leitmotif (Bågenholm 
and Charron, 2014; Hanley and Sikk, 2014; Bågenholm, 2013; Sikk, 2012; Bélanger, 
2004). For instance, it has recently appeared new parties which have reached 
remarkable electoral results in three countries of Southern Europe which were not only 
affected by the economic, social and political crisis; but also by political corruption 
(Hutter et al., 2018): Syriza in Greece, Movimento Cinque Stelle in Italy and Podemos 
in Spain. 
The emergence of new parties represents an opportunity for citizens to punish 
traditional parties affected by political corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron 
and Bågenholm, 2016). Related to the political debate held on Twitter, Vallina-
Rodriguez et al. (2012) found how, before the emergence of the new party Podemos, the 
vast majority of Spanish users in the online political conversations held on Twitter 
against the economic, social and political crisis did not feel represented for the 
traditional parties strongly affected by corruption and, were demanding alternative 
political actors to represent their interests. Therefore, it is expected that when analysing 
the online debate about politics held on Twitter, those users who nowadays support the 
new parties which have recently emerged to fight against political corruption, will be 
less tolerant towards the scandals of corruption.  
In the hypotheses related to real world, it has been theorised that new parties’ 
supporters are less tolerant towards political corruption than traditional parties’ 
supporters. The goal of this hypothesis is to analyse if the previous theory can be 
verified when studying the online conversations about politics held on Twitter. For this 
purpose, it is raised the following hypothesis: 
H8 statement- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level 
of tolerance towards political corruption is lower in those users who are 
supporting new parties.  
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In other words, it will be studied if when reporting corruption in the online debate 
about politics, there are significant differences in the attitude towards political 
corruption between users supporting new and traditional parties. It will be investigated 
if those users supporting new parties are more active. 
If this hypothesis was verified, it would show that new parties’ supporters are more 
sensitive towards political corruption and, therefore, the effectiveness of the new 
parties’ strategy based on showing themselves as anti-corruption parties. 
 Hypothesis 9: Political Sympathy and Attitude towards Political 3.3.3
Corruption in the online debate 
As it has been demonstrated, citizens evaluate a corruption scandal differently 
depending on which is the party affected, being more tolerant when it affects their 
preferred party (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Ecker et al., 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013). 
Charron and Bågenholm (2016) have explained how that is due to the “home team” 
psychology factor, which makes hard blaming the party they are supporting. Voters’ 
sympathy towards a party can reduce the impact of corruption on the electoral results of 
a corrupt politician (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Welch 
and Hibbing, 1997; Peters and Welch, 1980). 
In reference to the political debate held on Twitter, Aragón et al. (2013) established 
that in the Spanish political Twittersphere there was a high probability to find users 
having the same political preferences within a conversation. It seems that political 
sympathy not only impacts on citizens’ attitudes towards political corruption in the face 
to face conversations, but also in the online debate about politics held on Twitter.  
In the hypotheses related to real world, it has been theorised that party’s supporters 
are more tolerant towards political corruption when it is their preferred party the one 
which is being involved. The goal of this hypothesis is to analyse if the previous theory 
can be verified when studying the online conversations about politics held on Twitter. 
As a consequence, it is proposed the following hypothesis: 
H9 statement- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level 
of tolerance towards political corruption is higher as higher is the political 
sympathy towards the party involved. 
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In other words, it will be investigated if when reporting corruption in the online 
debate about politics, there are significant differences in the attitude towards political 
corruption between the supporters of each party when they are facing corruption in 
another party and when it affects their party. It will be studied if users are more tolerant 
when it is their preferred party the one which is being involved. 
If this proved to be the case, it would clearly contribute to explain why political 
corruption is not as much penalized as it could be expected and, therefore, it would 
indicate how, in order to reach a higher quality democracy, it would be crucial citizens 
to become aware of the importance to fight against political corruption independently of 
the party affected.  
3.4 Model of the Thesis 
In this chapter it has been presented and justified the hypotheses of the thesis, 
which will be subsequently examined and tested in detail in the following chapters. The 
hypotheses themselves, and the environments in which they will be tested are 
summarised in Table 3-1, and the model of this thesis is presented in diagrammatic form 
in Figure 3-1. 




H1- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower when the 
country’s economy is in crisis. 
H2- Among the variables which influence the citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption, social pressure has a higher impact than factual information. 
H3- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower as higher is 
their political awareness. 
H4- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower as more 
politically progressive they are.  
H5- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower in those 
citizens who are supporting new parties.  
H6- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is higher as higher is 
the political sympathy towards the party involved. 
Virtual 
World 
H7- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of tolerance 
towards political corruption is lower in progressive users. 
H8- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of tolerance 
towards political corruption is lower in those users who are supporting new parties.  
H9- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of tolerance 
towards political corruption is higher as higher is the political sympathy towards 




Figure 3-1 Model of the Thesis 
 
Following the diagram above, in this thesis it will be analysed the impact of the 
variables which have been previously identified as the most relevant when studying the 
citizens' attitude towards political corruption (economic context, social pressure, 
political awareness, political leaning, preferred party and political sympathy) from two 
different perspectives, real and virtual world.  
Related to the real world, firstly, it will be analysed if citizens' attitude towards 
political corruption varies depending on the country’s economic situation (H1). 
Secondly, it will be studied if exerting social pressure, i.e., emphasizing other citizens’ 
reactions against political corruption and spreading information focused on the 
economic and social consequences it provokes, is a better strategy to increase citizens’ 
criticism towards political corruption than just providing factual information (H2). 
Thirdly, it will be investigated the impact of citizens’ political awareness on the attitude 
towards political corruption (H3). Then, it will be analysed if more politically 
progressive citizens have a lower level of tolerance towards political corruption (H4). 
Moreover, it will be studied if citizens' attitude towards political corruption varies 
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depending on citizens’ preferred party (H5). Finally, it will be investigated the role 
played by political sympathy in citizens’ attitude towards political corruption (H6).  
Regarding the virtual world, it will be analysed the debate about politics held on 
Twitter. Firstly, it will be studied if there is any difference between progressive and 
conservative users in their attitude towards political corruption (H7). Then, it will be 
investigated if it is possible to establish any difference between traditional and new 
parties’ supporters (H8). Finally, it will be analysed if users’ attitude towards political 
corruption varies depending on the sympathy they feel towards the party involved (H9). 
In order to test each of the hypotheses of the model, in the remaining chapters it 
will be developed experiments for both scenarios (real and virtual world) and presented 
the results, analysis and conclusions. Chapter 4 will be focused on the “Real World” to 
test hypotheses H1-H6, while Chapter 5 will be focused on the “Virtual World” to test 







Chapter 4. Citizens’ attitudes towards political 
corruption in the Real World: Experiments and 
analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, it will be presented the design and outcomes of the experiments 
which test the hypotheses relating to the “Real World” described in Chapter 3. These 
are repeated here in Table 4-1 for convenience. 




H1- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower when 
the country’s economy is in crisis 
H2- Among the variables which influence the citizens’ attitude towards 
political corruption, social pressure has a higher impact than factual 
information. 
H3- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower as 
higher is their political awareness. 
H4- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower as more 
politically progressive they are.  
H5- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower in those 
citizens who are supporting new parties.  
H6- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is higher as 
higher is the political sympathy towards the party involved. 
The experiments presented here are focused on the role played by the economic 
context, social pressure, political awareness, political leaning, the new parties’ 
emergence and political sympathy, in the study of the attitude towards political 
corruption. Firstly, it will be analysed if citizen’s criticism towards political corruption 
is higher when the country is in a context of economic crisis. Secondly, it will be 
studied which is the best strategy to impact on citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption, analysing if it is possible to reach a greater impact emphasizing other 
citizens’ reactions against political corruption and focusing on citizens’ losses rather 
than just providing factual information. Thirdly, it will be investigated the impact of 
political awareness, studying if it reduces the level of tolerance towards political 
corruption. Then, it will be analysed if progressive citizens and conservative citizens 
show different level of criticism towards political corruption. Moreover, it will be 
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studied if there is any difference in the level of tolerance towards political corruption 
between those citizens who are supporting new parties and those who are supporting 
traditional parties. Finally, it will be investigated if citizens’ criticism towards political 
corruption varies depending on the sympathy they feel towards the party which is being 
involved. 
The data needed to test the hypotheses above is provided on one hand, by two 
independent entities: CIS and INE; and on the other hand, by a survey specifically 
developed for this purpose. The data collection process of this survey was April 2017 
and participants faced questions related to all the variables of the model. 
The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows: in section 4.2 it will be 
explained the survey design, focusing on its structure, the sample and the procedures for 
each of the experiments conducted. In section 4.3, it will be tested the hypotheses, 
presenting the methodology followed and describing the main results and analysis. In 
section 4.4, it will be reported the analysis of the results obtained. Finally, in section 4.5 
it will be summarised the main conclusions. 
4.2 Survey design 
The technique used to collect the data needed to test the hypotheses H1- H6 was the 
personal interview. The main reasons are its high reliability and the possibility it offers 
to personally attend to any questions from the interviewees. 
In the following lines, it will be briefly contextualised the Spanish political 
situation of the last years focusing on the period in which the dataset was collected.  
In November 2011, PP won the General Elections reaching the outright majority. 
Since the beginning of its mandate, this party has been involved in a multitude of 
corruption scandals as the so-called “Gürtel case”, “Barcenas’ papers”, “Púnica 
operation” and “Brugal case”. As a consequence of all the corruption scandals, the 
majority of Spanish society has been aware and worried about political corruption and 
many Spaniards have been actively participating in demonstrations (Cordero and Blais, 
2017; Robles-Egea and Delgado-Fernandez, 2014). In this context, Podemos and C’s 
broke into the national political scene claiming to be the solution to regenerate a 
democracy strongly affected by political corruption and broke the traditional 
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bipartisanship in the General Elections of December 2015 and also in the repeated 
General Elections of June 2016.  
PP has remained in the government until June 2018, when a sentence that 
condemned this party for corruption led to a wide agreement among several parties of 
the opposition which allowed PSOE to win a no-confidence motion. Its mandates have 
been plagued with corruption cases. These cases are still in trial and have been 
constantly on the focus of the media, also in April 2017 when dataset was collected. As 
a consequence, at that time, the vast majority of Spanish society was aware and worried 
about corruption. Concretely, following the CIS
35
, in April 2017, the 42% of the 
population mentioned corruption as one of the main Spanish problems, becoming the 
second greatest concern for Spaniards after unemployment.  
In the following subsections, it will be considered in detail the survey structure, the 
sample and the procedures.   
 Survey structure 4.2.1
The first part of the survey is a short introduction in which participants were 
informed about the purpose of this research, the voluntary nature of the participation, 
and the confidentiality of the data to be collected. Then, participants faced a set of 
questions related to each of the variables of this thesis. In those questions where 
participants had to express their opinion, it was asked them to indicate their position on 
a scale anchored at 1 to 5 (indicating in each case the values of the extremes). In order 
to design these questions properly, it was followed several authors who have proven 
their goodness in previous researches (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron and 
Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Gromet et al., 2013; Pollitt and Shaorshadze, 
2011; Allcott, 2011; Nolan et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2007; Gatti et al., 2003; 
McClelland and Cook, 1980). 
Finally, the questionnaire concludes with a set of socio-demographic questions 
related to gender, age, civil status, studies completed, current job, number of people 
living at home and the household’s income. 
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The participants interviewed were a total of 400 individuals over 18 years old and 
no monetary compensation was offered. The interviews were distributed proportionally 
among the three capitals of province of the Region of Valencia (Castellón, Valencia and 
Alicante) based on the number of inhabitants according to the INE (Table 4-2). 
Table 4-2 Interviews’ distribution 
 Castellón Valencia Alicante Total 
Population 170.990 790.201 330.525 1.291.716 
Distribution 
of population 
13.2% 61.2% 25.6% 100% 
Surveys 
assigned 
53 245 102 400 
Source: INE  
Finally, in Table 4-3 it is presented the technical form of the survey. 




The universe studied was the population resident in Spain over 18 




The sampling was carried out in the three capitals of province of 
the Region of Valencia: Castellón, Valencia y Alicante. 
Sampling units 
The sampling units were men and women 
residents in Spain, over 18 years old. 
Technique and 
sample size 
The technique used was a simple random probabilistic sampling. 
Given that the population under study was greater than 100,000 
individuals, it was considered an infinite sample size. 
Demanding a confidence level of 95% (K=2), and assuming the 
most unfavorable case P=Q=0.5, it was carried out 400 interviews.  
Sample size = (K2*P*Q)/e
2
= (22*0.5*0.5)/0.052 = 400.  
In order to distribute proportionally the number of surveys among 
the three capitals of province of the Region of Valencia it was 






Experiment 1:  The effect of the economic context on citizens´ attitude towards 
political corruption.  
In this experiment, it is studied if citizens’ criticism towards political corruption 
varies depending on the country’s economic situation. It has been hypothesised that it 
will be higher when the country is going through an economic crisis.  
One of the main factors which citizens consider when they are evaluating political 
issues is the economic situation. It is believed that if a citizen feels that his country is 
going through an economic crisis, his opinion about the political situation will be 
probably negative. In order to test this belief, it will be analysed citizens’ evaluation 
about the economic and political situation to determine if it is possible to establish a 
relation between both indicators. It will be used public data from the CIS, an 
independent entity whose main objective is “to contribute scientific knowledge on 
Spanish society”. The CIS carries out surveys which allow finding out the Spaniards 
opinion in a very different fields and its evolution over time. For this purpose, it will be 
studied the evolution of citizens’ opinion on economic and political situation measured 
through the following indicators: “Economic situation assessment” and “Political 
situation assessment”. 
Moreover, it has been considered interesting to analyse the relationship between the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the concern over corruption. It is believed that it 
will be possible to establish a negative relationship between both indicators, i.e., the 
concern over corruption will increase when the GDP decreases. In this case it will be 
used data from the INE, an independent entity whose main objective is “to collect, 
produce and disseminate relevant, high-quality, official statistical information”; and also 
from the CIS. Concretely, it will be studied the evolution of the following indicators: 
“GDP growth rate” and “Growth rate of the concern over corruption”.  
Finally, and taking into account that Spain has recently moved from a situation of 
economic expansion to an economic crisis, participants were directly asked in the 
survey how was their criticism’s level towards political corruption since the economic 
crisis started.  
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Experiment 2:  The effect of social pressure on citizens´ attitude towards political 
corruption.  
The goal of this experiment is to investigate whether there is a different impact on 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption between social pressure and factual 
information. It has been hypothesised that social pressure has a greater impact than 
factual information, i.e., the impact of an individual facing a scenario where it is being 
explained that other citizens are strongly against to a specific case of corruption or the 
impact of facing the citizens’ losses caused by political corruption is higher than just 
spreading factual information about it. 
In order to test this belief, it was designed two versions of the survey. Each one 
contains a different scenario and was assigned aleatory to half of the sample. In the 
version measuring the impact of factual information, it is just explained a corruption 
case which has been discovered; while in the version containing the social pressure 
scenario, the information about the corruption case is accompanied by information 
about how citizens are reacting. The specific scenarios are presented in Table 4-4. After 
reading the scenarios below, participants were asked to indicate their opinion about the 
corruption case showed on a scale anchored at 1 (not serious at all) to 5 (very serious). 
Table 4-4 Scenarios proposed 
Factual information Social pressure 
A mayor has hired his son as one of his 
consultants 
It has been discovered that a politician has 
hired his soon as one of his consultants in 
despite of his qualifications. His son has 
not the qualification expected to hold this 
position, usually held by economists or 
lawyers. 
A mayor has hired his son as one of his 
consultants 
It has been discovered that a politician has 
hired his soon as one of his consultants in 
despite of his qualifications. His son has 
not the qualification expected to hold this 
position, usually held by economists or 
lawyers. 
Citizens consider completely 
unacceptable this situation and have 
organised a protest in front of the Town 
Hall next Saturday at 8pm. 
In order to be able to focus exclusively on the impact of the different scenarios, it 
will be needed to compare the opinion expressed by participants after reading the 
scenario, with the opinion expressed previously; otherwise it would not be possible to 
discern between how much their response were based on their attitude towards the 
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political corruption case, and how much they were modified by the scenario’s impact. 
For this purpose, it will be considered the information provided in a previous question 
where participants expressed their opinion about four different situations corresponding 
with four different cases of political corruption on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means “it 
is not serious at all” and 5 means “it is very serious” (Table 4-5).  
Table 4-5 Attitude towards political corruption 
Situations of political corruption 
1- A politician gets money to change the established land use of a plot. 
2- A politician hires a relative or close friend, regardless of his/her professional skills. 
3- A politician uses his official car for private trips. 
4- A politician accepts valuable presents. 
Concretely, it will be used the information provided in the second item, which can 
be interpreted as a summary of the case of corruption explained with more detail in both 
scenarios.  
Besides, in order to analyse if it possible to reach a higher impact on citizens’ 
criticism towards political corruption through information focused on citizens’ losses, it 
was presented the four hypothetical pieces of news about political corruption described 
in Table 4-6 to participants: two of them just providing factual information, and the 
other two emphasizing the economic and social losses they provoke. Then, participants 
were asked to choose the one which they felt as the most serious.   
Table 4-6 Economic and Social consequences vs. Factual Information 
Pieces of news of political corruption 
1- As a consequence of the political corruption, it will not be possible to build a new 
hospital in the city.   
2- It is necessary to increase the taxes because all losses caused by political 
corruption.  
3-The political corruption cases have increased in the last year. 
4-The Mayor of the city has been involved in a corruption case. 
Experiment 3:  The effect of political awareness on citizens´ attitude towards 
political corruption.  
The purpose of this experiment is to examine whether there is a significant 
difference in citizens’ attitude towards political corruption related to political 
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awareness. It has been hypothesised that citizens with higher awareness will be less 
tolerant towards corruption.  
In order to analyse citizens’s political awareness, participants were asked about two 
questions related to politics. Concretely, in the first question they were asked about a 
name of a corrupted politician or a corruption case; while in the second one they were 
asked about the position which Maria Dolores de Cospedal held in the Spanish 
Government. 
Regarding the analysis of the attitude towards political corruption, it was presented 
the four situations corresponding with four different cases of political corruption 
described before (Table 4-5), and then, participants were asked about their opinion on 
each one on a scale anchored at 1 (not serious at all) to 5 (very serious). 
Experiment 4:  The effect of political leaning on citizens´ attitude towards political 
corruption.  
In this experiment it is studied whether there is a significant difference in citizens’ 
attitude towards political corruption depending on their political leaning. It has been 
hypothesised that more politically progressive citizens will be less tolerant towards 
corruption. 
In order to find out participants’ political leaning, they were asked to place 
themselves on a scale anchored at 1 (extreme left) to 5 (extreme right). The attitude 
towards political corruption, as it has been already explained, was measured with the 
information provided in Table 4-5. 
Experiment 5:  The effect of new parties’ emergence on citizens´ attitude towards 
political corruption.  
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate whether there is a significant 
difference in citizens’ attitude towards political corruption between those citizens who 
support traditional and new parties. It has been hypothesised that new parties’ 
supporters will be less tolerant towards corruption. 
In order to find out participants’ preferred party, they were asked to indicate the 
party which they felt closer to their ideas. The four main parties were presented: PP, 
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PSOE, UP and C’s. It was also provided the option “Other Party”, although even in 
those cases where an individual is not supporting one of the 4 main parties, he may also 
feel relatively closer to one of them. Once again, it was used the information provided 
in Table 4-5 to take into account participants’ attitude towards political corruption. 
Finally, it will be used the information provided in the question related to the age to 
investigate if the relation between this variable and preferred party drew by the Spanish 
CIS, i.e., new parties are supported by younger citizens than traditional parties, keeps 
being true in our study. 
Experiment 6:  The effect of political sympathy on citizens´ attitude towards 
political corruption.  
The goal of this experiment is to examine whether there is a significant difference 
in citizens’ attitude towards political corruption depending on the proximity they feel to 
the party which is being involved in corruption. It has been hypothesised that citizens 
will be more tolerant towards corruption when it affects to their own party.  
For this purpose, firstly, it was asked participants about the corruption perceived in 
each of the four main Spanish parties (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s) on a scale anchored at 1 
(not corrupted at all) to 5 (completely corrupted).  
Moreover, it was considered the information provided in the previous experiment 
where participants indicated the party they felt closer to their ideas to formulate a new 
question in which participants faced a hypothetical case of corruption where their 
preferred party was involved (Table 4-7).  




This situation represents the same corruption case it is summarised in the fourth 
item of Table 4-5, with the only difference that this time it is specified the party 
involved is their preferred party.  Participants were asked to indicate, as they did when 
evaluating the corruption case without the specification of the party affected, how 
Corruption in (Preferred) Party: Mayor may have accepted a present 
from a company 
The anti-corruption prosecution has evidence that the politician of the 
(Preferred party) has accepted an expensive present from a company. 
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serious they felt the situation was on a scale anchored at 1 (not serious at all) to 5 (very 
serious). It will be needed to compare both responses in order to be able to isolate the 
partisanship effect. 
4.3 Methodology and Experiments 
In this section, it will be performed the experiments needed in order to empirically 
test the hypotheses related to the “Real World” with the statistical program SPSS 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) and it will be shown the results indicating if 
they have been or not verified.  
 Hypothesis 1: Experiments and outcomes  4.3.1
In hypothesis H1 it will be tested the belief that criticism towards political 
corruption is higher when the country is going through an economic crisis. The 
statement of H1 is as follows: 
H1 statement- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower 
when the country’s economy is in crisis. 
If validated, H1 would show that a crisis represents an opportunity to impact on 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption and, as a consequence, it would contribute 
to the goal of reaching a higher quality democracy. 
Experiment Description 
To test this hypothesis H1 it has been considered the following variables: 
1. Economic situation assessment. The information used to construct this 
variable was provided by the CIS Data Bank. The CIS elaborates a monthly 
survey where participants are asked, among other questions, to ass the 
current economic situation. They have to place their assessment in one of the 
following five alternatives: “Very good”; “Good”; “Acceptable”; “Bad”; and 
“Very bad”. 
In reference to the construction of this variable, it is specified: 
- The information available starts in January 1996, therefore, the period 
studied was January 1996 - September 2017. 
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- In order to focus on those who had a negative opinion about the 
economic situation, it was taken into account the percentage of 
participants whose assessment had been “Bad” or “Very bad”. 
- With the aim of simplifying the graphic information, it was calculated the 
mean per year of the percentage of participants whose assessment had 
been “Bad” or “Very bad”. 
 
2. Political situation assessment. The information used to construct this 
variable was also provided by the CIS Data Bank. The CIS, in its monthly 
survey, ask participants to ass the current political situation as well. Again, 
they have to place their assessment in one of the following five alternatives: 
“Very good”; “Good”; “Acceptable”; “Bad”; and “Very bad”. The 
specifications explained in the construction of the previous variable also 
applied in this case, i.e., the period studied was January 1996 - September 
2017; it was considered the percentage of participants whose assessment had 
been “Bad” or “Very bad”; and the information was summarized by 
calculating annual averages. 
 
3. GDP growth rate. The information about the annual growth rate of the GDP 
was directly provided by the INE. It starts in 1996 and currently, the last data 
corresponds to the year 2016. As it was needed to compare the GDP growth 
rate with the following variable, the growth rate of the concern over 
corruption, and the information available of this variable starts in 2003, the 
period studied was 2003 - 2016. 
 
4. Growth rate of the concern over corruption. The CIS, in its monthly 
survey, ask participants to indicate the three principal problems of the 
country in a list that currently has 54 options. It was taken into account those 
citizens who had mentioned “corruption” as one of the main three problems.  
The specifications for the construction of this variable are the following: 
- In order to compare this variable with the previous one, it was calculated, 
firstly, the mean per year of the percentage of participants who had 
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indicated “corruption and fraud” as one of the three main problems; then, 
it was calculated the growth rate. 
- The “corruption” became one of the options on a regular basis in 2002, 
therefore, as the goal was to calculate annual growth rates, the period 
studied was 2003 - 2016. 
 
5. Evolution of the criticism’s level towards political corruption. The 
information to construct this variable was collected through the survey 
specifically designed for this thesis. Concretely, participants were asked how 
was their criticism' level towards political corruption since the economic 
crisis started. They were requested to place themselves on a scale anchored at 
1 (much lower) to 5 (much higher). This variable was recoded as follows:  as 
“Lower”, when participants answered “1” or “2”; as “Equal”, when they 
answered “3”; and as “Higher”, when they answered “4” or “5”.  
The goal of this hypothesis is to test if citizens’ level of tolerance towards political 
corruption depends on the country’s economic context. For this purpose, it will be 
performed the following analysis: 
1. H1A1: Bivariate correlation to find out if it is possible to establish a 
relationship statistically significant between citizens’ Economic situation 
assessment and citizens’ Political situation assessment throughout the period 
1996-2017.  
 
2. H1A2: Bivariate correlation to find out if it is possible to establish a 
relationship statistically significant between GDP growth rate and Growth 
rate of the concern over corruption throughout the period 2003-2017. 
 
3. H1A3: A descriptive analysis of the Evolution of the criticism’s level towards 
political corruption since the economic crisis started compared with how 





In this section, it will be performed the statistical analysis carried out to test the 
hypothesis H1: 
1. H1A1: Bivariate correlation “Economic situation assessment” - “Political 
situation assessment”. 
The hypotheses of the bivariate correlation H1A1 are presented in Table 4-8. 
Table 4-8 Hypotheses – Bivariate correlation H1A1 - 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: There is not a relationship statistically significant between those citizens with an 
Economic situation assessment negative (bad or very bad) and those with a Political 
situation assessment negative (bad or very bad) throughout the period 1996-2017. 
H1: There is a relationship statistically significant between those citizens with an 
Economic situation assessment negative (bad or very bad) and those with a Political 
situation assessment negative (bad or very bad) throughout the period 1996-2017. 
In order to test the hypotheses, it will be performed the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (Table 4-9): 
Table 4-9 Pearson’s correlation coefficient for H1A1 
Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient r 
Range Statistical significance 
0.93 -1 < r < 1 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a relationship statistically 
significant between those citizens with an economic situation assessment negative (bad 
or very bad) and those with a political situation assessment negative (bad or very bad) 
throughout the period 1996-2017. Considering the r=0.93, p<0.05, the previous 
statistically significant relationship is characterised as strong and positive. 
2. H1A2: Bivariate correlation “GDP growth rate” - “Growth rate of the 
concern over corruption”. 




Table 4-10 Hypotheses – Bivariate correlation H1A2 - 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: There is not a relationship statistically significant between GDP growth rate and 
Growth rate of the concern over corruption throughout the period 2003-2016. 
H1: There is a relationship statistically significant between GDP growth rate and 
Growth rate of the concern over corruption throughout the period 2003-2016. 
In order to test the hypotheses, it will be performed the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (Table 4-11): 
Table 4-11 Pearson’s correlation coefficient for H5A2 
Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient r 
Range Statistical significance 
-0.56 -1 < r < 1 0.039 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a relationship statistically 
significant between GDP growth rate and Growth rate of the concern over corruption 
throughout the period 2003-2016. Considering the r= -0.56, p<0.05, the previous 
statistically significant relationship is characterised as moderate and negative. 
3. H1A3: Descriptive analysis “Evolution of the criticism’s level towards 
political corruption”. 
In Table 4-12 it is presented the frequency response when participants were asked 
about how was their criticism’ level towards political corruption since the economic 
crisis started. 
Table 4-12 Evolution of the criticism’s level towards political corruption for H1A3 
How is your criticism’s level towards political corruption since the 
economic crisis started? 
Frequency 




Much higher 121 
As it is depicted, most of participants feel their criticism’s level towards political 





In this section, it will be reported the most relevant conclusions of the statistical 
analysis carried out in the previous section.  
The first analysis it has been performed is the correlation between the assessments 
of political and economic situation throughout the period 1996-2017 (Figure 4-1). It is 
reminded that this analysis has been focused on those citizens with a negative opinion, 
i.e., those who assessed “bad” or “very bad” the political and economic situation.  
It has been proved a relationship statistically significant, concretely, strong and 
positive. It means that those citizens with a negative opinion about the political situation 
have also a negative opinion about the economic situation. In Figure 4-1, it is 
graphically shown the annual evolution of citizens’ percentage whit a negative opinion 
about the political and economic situation throughout the period 1996-2017. 
Figure 4-1 Citizens with a negative assessment (%) (1996 – 2017) 
 Source: CIS Data Bank 
The second analysis it has been performed is the correlation between the GDP 
growth rate and the growth rate of the concern over corruption throughout the period 
2003-2017. 
It has been proved a relationship statistically significant, concretely, moderate and 
negative. It means that an increase in the GDP growth rate is associated with a decrease 
in the growth rate of the concern over corruption. In Figure 4-2, it is graphically shown 
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to see the negative relationship between these variables, it has been represented the 
GDP growth rate in percentage as usually, however, the growth rate of the concern over 
corruption is represented in decimal. The reason is that throughout the period studied 
the concern over corruption reaches such high rates that it would be impossible to 
appreciate graphically the negative correlation between both variables. 
Figure 4-2 Growth rates of concern over corruption and GDP (%) (2003 – 2017) 
Source: CIS Data Bank and INE 
Finally, focusing on the results obtained in the survey specifically designed for this 
thesis, it is indicated how citizens find their criticism’s level towards political corruption 
higher since the economic crisis started. Concretely, 58% find it is higher, 18.5% equal 
and 23.5% lower (Figure 4-3). 
Figure 4-3 Evolution of the criticism’s level towards political corruption since the 
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Summarising all the conclusions obtained in this section, firstly, it has been proved 
that there is a strong and positive correlation between citizens’ economic and political 
assessment which indicates how citizens’ attitude towards political issues are clearly 
affected by the economic context; secondly, it has been established a negative 
correlation between the GDP growth rate and the growth rate of the concern over 
corruption, which shows how citizens’ criticism towards political corruption is greater 
when the country is going through an economic crisis; and finally, asking citizens 
directly about how is their criticism’s level since the economic crisis started, the 
majority responds it is higher, which reinforces the previous conclusion about how an 
economic crisis impacts on citizens attitude towards political corruption. 
As a consequence of all the conclusions summarised above, the hypothesis H1 has 
been verified, i.e., citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower when 
the country’s economy is in crisis. This finding is consistent with previous researches 
where it was shown how citizens’ tolerance towards political corruption depends on 
country’s economy situation, being more tolerant when it is positive (Cordero and Blais, 
2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Klasnja and Tucker, 2013; 
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013; Jerit and 
Barabas 2012; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Manzetti and Wilson, 2007; Golden, 
2007; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2000; Duch et al., 2000; Mauro, 1995). 
The validation of this hypothesis would show that an economic crisis can be seen as 
an opportunity to increase citizens’ criticism towards political corruption and, therefore, 
to achieve a higher quality democracy. However, to reach this goal, once the crisis is 
overcome, it would be necessary to keep the level of tolerance towards political 
corruption over the level it was before the crisis started.  
 Hypothesis 2: Experiments and outcomes 4.3.2
In Hypothesis H2 it will be tested the belief that social pressure has a greater impact 
on citizens’ attitude towards political corruption than just spreading factual information. 
The statement of H2 is as follows: 
H2 statement- Among the variables which influence the citizens’ attitude 




If verified, H2 would show that in order to increase citizens’ criticism towards 
political corruption, the social pressure exerted by other citizens is a key factor, i.e., the 
attitude towards political corruption of a citizen is influenced by other citizens´ attitude 
towards political corruption. Besides, it would indicate how the information which 
emphasises the social and economic losses that political corruption provokes is more 
effective than just spreading factual information. 
Experiment Description 
 To test this hypothesis H2 it has been considered the following variables: 
1. Scenario. It was designed the two scenarios already explained (see Table 
4-4) in order to be able to analyse the attitude towards a specific political 
corruption case related to nepotism with and without social pressure. 
Therefore, this variable has two different values: social pressure and factual 
information. This variable has not needed any recoding; it has been worked 
directly with the data from the survey. 
 
2. Attitude towards political corruption (Nepotism) pre scenario. The 
information needed for this variable was provided by the second item of the 
Table 4-5, where participants, before reading any of the two scenarios, 
evaluated the following corruption case related to nepotism “A politician 
hires a relative or close friend, regardless of his/her professional skills”, 
indicating how serious they perceived it on a scale anchored at 1 (not serious 
at all) to 5 (very serious). It has been worked directly with the data provided 
by the survey without any recoding. 
 
3. Attitude towards political corruption (Nepotism) post scenario. After 
reading one of the previous scenarios which represent the same political 
corruption case related to nepotism that it has been considered in the previous 
variable, participants were asked to indicate how serious they perceived it on 
a scale anchored at 1 (not serious at all) to 5 (very serious). As the previous 
variable, this one has not needed any recoding; it has been worked with the 




4. Differential attitude towards political corruption (Nepotism) post-pre 
scenario. Considering the variable Attitude towards political corruption 
(Nepotism) post scenario, and the variable Attitude towards political 
corruption (Nepotism) pre scenario, it was constructed a new variable: 
Differential attitude towards political corruption (Nepotism) post-pre 
scenario. It measures the difference between the corruption perceived in a 
specific corruption case related to nepotism after reading the information 
provided in the scenario assigned, and the corruption perceived in the same 
specific corruption related to nepotism before the scenario was presented. 
This variable has not needed any recoding, it has been worked directly with 
the data from the survey.  
It was necessary to construct this variable because the goal was to ensure that 
it was being strictly measured the impact of the scenario. If it was considered 
just the attitude towards political corruption post scenario, it would not have 
been possible to analyse which scenario has a greater impact, as the attitude 
towards a political corruption case is not only affected by the scenario in 
which it is presented, but also by the attitude towards the political corruption 
case independently of the scenario. 
 
5. Pieces of news. A list of four hypothetical pieces of news about political 
corruption was presented to participants (see Table 4-6): in the first one, 
corruption is directly related to a decrease in the welfare state which clearly 
affects citizens; in the second news, corruption is related to an increase in 
taxes; the third one, states that corruption increased the last year; and finally, 
the fourth news is about an specific case of local corruption. Participants 
were requested to choose the one which they considered as the most serious. 
The objective of this hypothesis is to test if social pressure has a higher impact than 
the spread of factual information. For this purpose, it will be performed the following 
analysis:  
1. H2A1: T-test to study if the Differential attitude towards political corruption 
post-pre scenario varies significantly between those participants who faced 
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the Factual information scenario and those who faced the Social pressure 
scenario. 
 
2. H2A2: A descriptive analysis of the impact that different Pieces of news have 
on the Attitude towards political corruption.  
Statistical analysis 
In this section, it will be performed the statistical analysis carried out to test the 
hypothesis H2: 
1. H2A1: T-test analysis “Differential attitude towards political corruption 
post-pre scenario” – “Scenario”. 
The hypotheses of the T-test analysis H2A1 are presented in Table 4-13. 
Table 4-13 Hypotheses –T-test analysis H2A1- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Differential attitude towards political 
corruption post-pre scenario is equal for both scenarios: factual information and 
social pressure.  
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Differential attitude towards political 
corruption post-pre scenario is not equal for both scenarios: factual information and 
social pressure. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform T-test analysis, the first 
step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this purpose, it 
will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses are shown 
in Table 4-14: 
Table 4-14 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H2A1- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Differential attitude towards 
political corruption post-pre scenario is equal for both scenarios: factual information 
and social pressure. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Differential attitude towards 
political corruption post-pre scenario is not equal for both scenarios: factual 
information and social pressure. 
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In Table 4-15 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=258, p<0.05, the H0 is rejected, i.e., it is not possible to assume that the 
variances are equal for both groups. 
Table 4-15 Levene’s Test for H2A1 
Levene’s Statistic Statistical significance 
258 0.000 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is not met; therefore, it will be used the t 
statistic for the case where the variance is not equal for both groups (Table 4-16).  







95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
9.8 260  0.54 0.055 0.000 0.43 0.65 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the differential attitude towards political corruption post-pre scenario 
between those citizens who faced the “Factual Information” scenario and those who 
faced the “Social Pressure” scenario t(260)= 9.8, p<0.05. 
2. H2A2: Descriptive analysis “Pieces of news”.  
In Table 4-17 are presented the four pieces of news which participants faced, and 
the frequency in which each one was selected as the most serious. 
Table 4-17 Pieces of news’ impact for H2A2 
News Frequency 
As a consequence of the political corruption, it will not be possible to 
build a new hospital in the city. 
240 
It is necessary to increase the taxes because all losses caused by 
political corruption. 
103 
The political corruption cases have increased in the last year. 26 
The Mayor of the city has been involved in a corruption case. 31 
As it is shown, those pieces of news where citizens’ losses in welfare and 





In this section, it will be reported the most relevant conclusions of the statistical 
analysis carried out in the previous section.  
Once it has been proved that there is a statistically significant difference in the 
differential attitude towards political corruption between citizens who face a factual 
information scenario and those who face a social pressure scenario, it is presented the 
mean of the attitude towards political corruption for each group before and after facing 
the scenario (Figure 4-4). 
Figure 4-4 Attitude towards political corruption vs. Scenario 
 
The main conclusion is that the impact of social pressure on citizens’ attitude 
towards political corruption is higher than the factual information. Concretely, when 
participants are evaluating a specific case of corruption related to nepotism, it is shown 
how on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means “it is not serious at all” and 5 means “it is 
very serious”, those participants who face the factual information scenario show 
practically the same attitude towards the political corruption case that they showed 
previously (+0.07), while those who face the social pressure scenario clearly increase 
their criticism towards the political corruption case (+0.61). 
Analysing the pieces of news’ impact proposed (Figure 4-5), the main conclusion is 
that the most part of citizens find most serious those pieces of news in which citizens’ 
losses caused by political corruption are emphasized (Local decrease in the welfare 











































information (General corruption information 6.5% and Local case of corruption 
information 7.7%). 
Figure 4-5 Pieces of News’ impact 
 
As a result of the previous findings, the hypothesis H2 has been verified, i.e., among 
the variables which influence the citizens’ attitude towards political corruption, social 
pressure has a higher impact than factual information. This result is consistent with 
previous researches where it was proved the impact of social pressure on mobilising 
citizens against the established political system and its corruption (Giraldo-Luque, 
2018; Marinov and Schimmelfennig, 2015; Anduiza et al., 2014; Peña-López et al., 
2014; Toret, 2013; Anduiza et al., 2012; Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-Sánchez, 2012; 
Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012; Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011; González-Bailón et al., 
2011; Shirky, 2011); on political self-expression, political information seeking and on 
political participation (Bond et al., 2012; Gerber and Rogers, 2009; and Gerber et al., 
2008). Besides, analysing the impact on citizens’ attitude of the different pieces of news 
about political corruption, it has been found how it is greater when underlining citizens’ 
losses in welfare and economics. 
The verification of this hypothesis would indicate how, by exerting social pressure, 
parties, media or any citizen group can reach a greater amount of supporters against 
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 Hypothesis 3: Experiments and outcomes 4.3.3
In Hypothesis H3 it will be tested the belief that those citizens with higher political 
awareness have a lower level of tolerance. The statement of H3 is as follows: 
H3 statement- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower 
as higher is their political awareness. 
If this hypothesis was validated, it would show how important is to involve citizens 
in political issues in order to increase their criticism towards corruption. 
Experiment Description 
To test this hypothesis H3 it has been considered the following two variables: 
1. Political awareness. This variable involves two different questions: “Could 
you indicate some corrupted politician or corruption case you have heard 
about?” and “Could you tell me which position holds Maria Dolores de 
Cospedal in the current government?” This variable has been recoded as 
“High”, when participants answered correctly both questions; as “Medium”, 
when they answered correctly just one of the two questions; and as “Low”, 
when they did not know any answer.  
 
Attitude towards political corruption. This variable was measured through 
a scale which contains four items related to political corruption. Participants 
evaluated them on a scale anchored at 1 (it is not serious at all) to 5 means (it 
is very serious).  
 
The first step was to analyse the reliability and validity of the scale. In Table 
4-18 are summarised the conditions necessaries for a scale to achieve the 





Table 4-18 Reliability and Validity Conditions 
Reliability 
conditions 
Cronbach’s Alpha Statistic > 0.5 
Correlation between each item with total correlation > 0.5 
Validity 
conditions 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic > 0.5 
Bartlett test  p < 0.05 
Number of concepts measured = 1 (Just one Initial  
Eingenvalues > 1 + Values for each item on the 




The results of the reliability analysis are presented in Table 4-19 and Table 
4-20. 
Table 4-19 Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach’s Alpha Range Nº of items 
0.908 0 < Cronbach’s Alpha < 1 4 
 
Table 4-20 Item-Total Statistics 
Items 
Corrected Item – 
Total Correlation 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
if Item deleted 
A politician gets money to 
change the established land 
use of a plot.  
0.701 0.920 
A politician hires a relative 
or close friend, regardless of 
his/her professional skills. 
0.884 0.847 
A politician uses his official 
car for private trips. 
0.832 0.873 




As it is shown, the Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.908 > 0.5; and the correlation 
between each item of the scale with the total correlation is greater than 0.5; 






Regarding the validity, it was performed a Factor Analysis. The results are 
shown in Table 4-21, Table 4-22, Table 4-23 and Table 4-24. 
 
Table 4-21 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
KMO Statistic Range 
0.810 0 < KMO < 1 
 
Table 4-22 Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
Aprox. Chi-Square df 
Statistical 
significance 
1220 6 0.000 
 




Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
(% of Variance) 
1 3.20 79.7 
2 0.44  
3 0.23  
4 0.14  
 




A politician gets money to change the 
established land use of a plot.  
0.940 
A politician hires a relative or close friend, 
regardless of his/her professional skills. 
0.904 
A politician uses his official car for private 
trips. 
0.901 
A politician accepts valuable presents. 0.823 
 
As it is shown, KMO = 0.810 > 0.5; Bartlett test has a p = 0.00 < 0.05; and 
finally, the scale is measuring just one concept: on one hand, there is just a 
component with an initial eingenvalue greater than 1, which is able to explain 
the 79.7% of the total variance; and on the other hand, the values for each 
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item on the component matrix are in all the cases greater than 0.5. As a 
consequence, it was possible to conclude that the scale was valid.  
 
Once it was proved the reliability and validity of the scale, it was created the 
variable “Attitude towards political corruption” which summarises the 
information of this scale by considering the mean of the scores in each item 
for each citizen.  
The aim of this hypothesis H3 is to test if different levels of political awareness 
have a different impact on citizens’ attitude towards corruption. For this purpose, it will 
be performed the following analysis: 
1. H3A1: ANOVA analysis to find out if the mean of the Attitude towards 
political corruption varies significantly with the level of Political awareness. 
Statistical analysis 
In this section, it will be performed the statistical analysis carried out to test the 
hypothesis H3: 
1. H3A1: ANOVA analysis “Attitude towards political corruption” – 
“Political awareness”. 
The hypotheses of the ANOVA analysis H3A1 are presented in Table 4-25. 
Table 4-25 Hypotheses -ANOVA analysis H3A1- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
is equal for all groups: low, medium and high level of awareness.  
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
is not equal for all groups: low, medium and high level of awareness. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform the ANOVA analysis, the 
first step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this 
purpose, it will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses 
are shown in Table 4-26:  
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Table 4-26 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H3A1- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption is equal for all groups: low, medium and high level of awareness. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption is not equal for all groups: low, medium and high level of awareness. 
In Table 4-27 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=0.10, p>0.05, the H0 is not rejected, i.e., it is possible to assume that the 
variances are equal across all the groups. 
Table 4-27 Levene’s Test for H3A1 
Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
0.10 2 397 0.907 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is met; therefore, it will be used the F statistic 
to perform the ANOVA analysis (Table 4-28).  










58.7 2 29.3 40.2 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
290 397 0.73   
Total 348 399    
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the attitude towards corruption between citizens with a different level of 
political awareness F(2,397)=40.2, p<0.05. 
Once it has been proved the attitude towards political corruption varies with the 
level of political awareness, it will be deeply analysed in which pair of groups it is 
possible to establish a difference statistically significant. For this purpose, as the 
assumption of homoscedasticity is met and the number of groups to be compared are 














95% Confidence Interval 
A B Lower Upper 
High 
Low  1.65 0.19 0.000 1.20 2.10 
Medium  0.41 0.09 0.000 0.19 0.63 
Medium 
Low  1.24 0.18 0.000 0.80 1.68 
High  -0.41 0.09 0.000 -0.63 -0.19 
Low 
Medium  -1.24 0.18 0.000 -1.68 -0.80 
High  -1.65 0.19 0.000 -2.10 -1.20 
As it is indicated, it is possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
attitude towards political corruption between the group of citizens with a high level of 
political awareness and those with a low level of political awareness t(397)=8.7, 
p<0.05. Besides, between those with a high level and those with a medium level 
t(397)=5.3, p<0.05. Finally, it is also possible to establish differences statistically 
significant between the group of citizens with a medium level of political awareness and 
those with a low level t(397)=10.5, p<0.05. 
The conclusion of the previous analysis is that when studying the impact of the 
political awareness on the attitude towards political corruption, there are differences 
statistically significant between the three groups of citizens considered. 
Report 
In this section, it will be reported the most relevant conclusions of the statistical 
analysis carried out in the previous section. 
Once it has been proved that there is a statistically significant difference in the 
attitude towards political corruption between citizens with a different level of political 
awareness, it is presented the mean of the attitude towards political corruption for each 




Figure 4-6 Attitude towards political corruption vs. Political awareness 
 
The main conclusion is that citizens are less tolerant towards political corruption as 
higher is their political awareness. Concretely, when participants are evaluating a set of 
political corruption cases, it is shown how the mean of the attitude towards political 
corruption on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means “it is not serious at all” and 5 means “it 
is very serious”, is 2.6, for those who have a low level; 3.8, for those who have a 
medium level; and 4.2, for those who have a high level. 
As a consequence, the hypothesis H3 has been verified, i.e., citizens’ level of 
tolerance towards political corruption is lower as higher is their political awareness. 
This conclusion is consistent with previous researches where it was proved how citizens 
with a different level of knowledge about politics show different levels of tolerance 
towards political corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Anduiza et al., 2013; Weitz-
Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Arceneaux, 2007; Kam, 2005).  
The validation of this hypothesis would show that the attitude towards political 
corruption can be modified by bringing citizens into politics and, therefore, the key role 
of the media to achieve a higher quality democracy. 
 Hypothesis 4: Experiments and outcomes 4.3.4
In Hypothesis H4 it will be tested the belief that more progressive citizens have a 
lower level of tolerance. The statement of H4 is as follows: 
H4 statement- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower 









































If this hypothesis was verified, it would indicate that the electorate of left parties is 
more sensitive towards political corruption and, as a consequence, that parties with a 
left political leaning would need to fight against corruption stronger than parties with a 
right political leaning which are less penalised by corruption. Besides, it would help to 
explain the electoral success of some right parties involved in corruption. 
Experiment Description 
To test this hypothesis H4 it has been considered the following variables:  
1. Political leaning. Participants were asked to indicate their political position 
on a scale anchored at 1 (extreme left) to 5 (extreme right). This variable has 
not needed any recoding, it has been worked with the data provided by the 
survey directly.  
 
2. Attitude towards political corruption. As it has been already seen, this 
variable was measured through a scale with four items about political 
corruption which participants evaluated on a scale anchored at 1 (it is not 
serious at all) to 5 means (it is very serious). As it has been shown, the 
reliability and validity of the scale was proved.  
The goal of this hypothesis H4 is to test if different political leanings have a 
different impact on citizens’ attitude towards political corruption. For this purpose, it 
will be performed the following analysis: 
1. H4A1: ANOVA analysis to explore if the mean of the Attitude towards 
political corruption varies significantly with the Political leaning.    
Statistical analysis 
In this section, it will be performed the statistical analysis carried out to test the 
hypothesis H4: 
1. H4A1: ANOVA analysis “Attitude towards political corruption” – 
“Political leaning”. 
The hypotheses of the ANOVA analysis H4A1 are presented in Table 4-30. 
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Table 4-30 Hypotheses -ANOVA analysis H4A1- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
is equal for all groups: extreme left, left, center, right and extreme right political 
leaning. 
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
is not equal for all groups: extreme left, left, center, right and extreme right political 
leaning. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform the ANOVA analysis, the 
first step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this 
purpose, it will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses 
are shown in Table 4-31: 
Table 4-31 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H3A1- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption is equal for all groups: extreme left, left, center, right and extreme right 
political leaning. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption is not equal for all groups: extreme left, left, center, right and extreme right 
political leaning. 
In Table 4-32 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=14.6, p<0.05, the H0 is rejected, i.e., it is not possible to assume that the 
variances are equal across all the groups. 
Table 4-32 Levene’s Test for H4A1 
Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
14.6 4 395 0.000 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is not met; therefore, it will be used the Welch 
statistic to perform the ANOVA analysis (Table 4-33).  
Table 4-33 ANOVA analysis H4A1 
Welch’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
99.1 4 40.6 0.000 
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Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the attitude towards corruption between citizens with a different political 
leaning Welch’s statistic=99.1, p<0.05. 
Once it has been proved the attitude towards political corruption varies with the 
political leaning, it will be deeply analysed in which pair of groups it is possible to 
establish a difference statistically significant. For this purpose, as the assumption of 
homoscedasticity is not met, it will be performed the Games-Howell’s Test (Table 
4-34). 









95% Confidence Interval 
A B Lower Upper 
Extreme 
Left 
Left  0.64 0.06 0.000 0.46 0.81 
Centre  1.21 0.10 0.000 0.93 1.50 
Right 1.54 0.10 0.000 1.27 1.81 
Extreme 
Right 




-0.64 0.06 0.000 -0.81 -0.46 
Centre  0.58 0.11 0.000 0.29 0.87 
Right 0.91 0.10 0.000 0.62 1.19 
Extreme 
Right 




-1.21 0.10 0.000 -1.50 -0.93 
Left  -0.58 0.11 0.000 -0.87 -0.29 
Right 0.33 0.13 0.091 -0.03 0.68 
Extreme 
Right 




-1.54 0.10 0.000 -1.81 -1.27 
Left  -0.91 0.10 0.000 -1.19 -0.62 
Centre -0.33 0.13 0.091 -0.68 0.03 
Extreme 
Right 





-2.72 0.35 0.001 -4.04 -1.41 
Left  -2.08 0.36 0.005 -3.40 -0.77 
Centre  -1.51 0.36 0.026 -2.81 -0.20 
Right -1.18 0.36 0.077 -2.49 0.13 
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As it is indicated, it is possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
attitude towards political corruption between the group of citizens with an extreme left 
political leaning and those with a left t(40.6)=10.2 p<0.05, centre t(40.6)=12, p<0.05, 
right t(40.6)=16, p<0.05 and extreme right t(40.6)=7.7, p<0.05 political leaning; 
between those citizens with a left political leaning and those with a centre t(40.6)=5.5, 
p<0.05, right t(40.6)=8.9, p<0.05 and extreme right t(40.6)=5.9, p<0.05 political 
leaning; and finally, between the group of citizens who locate themselves in the centre 
and those with an extreme right t(40.6)=4.1, p<0.05 political leaning. However, it is not 
possible to establish differences statistically significant in the attitude towards political 
corruption between the group of citizens who locate themselves in the centre and those 
with a right t(40.6)=2.5, p>0.05 political leaning; and neither between those citizens 
with a right political leaning and those with an extreme right t(40.6)=3.3, p>0.05 
political leaning. 
The conclusion of the previous analysis is that when studying the impact of the 
political leaning on the attitude towards political corruption, among the ten possible 
comparisons pairs, there are differences statistically significant in eight of them. 
Report 
In this section, it will be reported the most relevant conclusions of the statistical 
analysis carried out in the previous section. 
Once it has been proved that there is a statistically significant difference in the 
attitude towards political corruption between citizens with a different political leaning, it 
is presented the mean of the attitude towards political corruption for each group in 
Figure 4-7. 












































The main conclusion is that citizens are less tolerant towards political corruption as 
more progressive they are. Concretely, when participants are evaluating a set of political 
corruption cases, the mean of the attitude towards political corruption on a scale from 1 
to 5 where 1 means “it is not serious at all” and 5 means “it is very serious”, is 4.9, for 
those who identify themselves as having an extreme left political leaning; 4.3, for those 
who identify themselves as having a left political leaning; 3.7, for those who place 
themselves on the centre; 3.4, for those who identify themselves as having an right 
political leaning; and finally, 2.2 for those who identify themselves as having an 
extreme right political leaning. 
As a consequence, the hypothesis H4 has been verified, i.e., citizens’ level of 
tolerance towards political corruption is lower as more politically progressive they are. 
This finding is consistent with previous researches where it was proved how left parties’ 
supporters punish corruption more than right parties’ supporters (Charron and 
Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Costas-Pérez et al., 2010). 
The verification of this hypothesis could be seen, at least in a short term, as a 
disadvantage for parties with a left political leaning, which would need to make greater 
efforts to fight against corruption. Moreover, this conclusion would contribute to 
explain the success of some right parties involved in corruption in certain electoral 
campaigns. 
 Hypothesis 5: Experiments and outcomes 4.3.5
In Hypothesis H5 it will be tested the belief that those citizens who feel closer to 
new parties have a lower level of tolerance towards political corruption. The statement 
of H5 is as follows: 
H5 statement- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower 
in those citizens who are supporting new parties.  
If validated, it would show the effectiveness of the new parties’ strategy focused on 
the fight against corruption. 
Experiment Description 
To test this hypothesis H5 it has been considered the following variables: 
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1. Preferred party. A list with the main parties (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s) and 
the option “Other party” was shown to participants, who were asked to 
choose the one which they felt closer to their ideas. This variable has not 
needed any recoding; it has been worked with the data from the survey 
directly. 
 
2. Preferred parties’ group (New vs. Traditional). Taking as a starting point 
the previous variable “preferred party”, it was recoded as follows: as “New 
party”, when participants chose UP or C’s; and as “Traditional party”, when 
they chose PP, PSOE or the option “Other party”. 
 
3. Attitude towards political corruption. As it has been already explained, 
this variable was measured through four items evaluated on a scale anchored 
at 1 (it is not serious at all) to 5 means (it is very serious). Besides, it was 
proved its reliability and validity. 
 
4. Age. In order to simplify the analysis, this variable was recoded as follows: 
as “18-45”, for participants who belonged to the “18-30” and “31-45” age 
ranges; and as “>45” for participants who belonged to the “45-60” and “>60” 
age ranges.   
The objective of this hypothesis H5 is to test if those citizens who are supporting 
new parties are less tolerant towards political corruption than those who are supporting 
traditional parties. For this purpose, it will be performed the following analysis: 
1. H5A1: T-test to study if the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
varies significantly between New parties’ supporters and Traditional parties’ 
supporters. 
 
2. H5A2: A crosstabs analysis to find out if it is possible to establish a 
relationship statistically significant between Voters’ age (18-45 vs. > 45) and 





Then, once the hypothesis will be tested, it will be analysed the previous 
relationships considering directly the preferred party. For this purpose, it will be 
performed the following analysis: 
3. H5A3: ANOVA analysis to find out if the mean of the Attitude towards 
political corruption varies significantly taking into account the Preferred 
party. 
 
4. H5A4: A crosstabs analysis to find out if it is possible to establish a 
relationship statistically significant between Voters’ age (18-45 vs. > 45) and 
Preferred Party.  
Statistical analysis 
In this section, it will be performed the statistical analysis carried out to test the 
hypothesis H5: 
1. H5A1: T-test analysis “Attitude towards political corruption” – 
“Preferred parties’ group (New vs. Traditional)”. 
The hypotheses of the T-test analysis H5A1 are presented in Table 4-35. 
Table 4-35 Hypotheses –T-test analysis H5A1- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
is equal for both groups: new parties’ supporters and traditional parties’ supporters. 
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
is not equal for both groups: new parties’ supporters and traditional parties’ 
supporters. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform T-test analysis, the first 
step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this purpose, it 
will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses are shown 




Table 4-36 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H5A1- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption is equal for both groups: new parties’ supporters and traditional parties’ 
supporters. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption is not equal for both groups: new parties’ supporters and traditional 
parties’ supporters. 
In Table 4-37 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=32.6, p<0.05, the H0 is rejected, i.e., it is not possible to assume that the 
variances are equal for both groups. 
Table 4-37 Levene’s Test for H5A1 
Levene’s Statistic Statistical significance 
32.6 0.000 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is not met; therefore, it will be used the t 
statistic for the case where the variance is not equal for both groups (Table 4-38).  







95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
-11.7 378  -0.93 0.08 0.000 -1.09 -0.78 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the attitude towards corruption between supporters of new and traditional 
parties t(378)= -11.7, p<0.05. 
2. H5A2: Crosstabs analysis “Voters’ age (18-45 vs. > 45)” – “Preferred 
parties’ group (New vs. Traditional)”. 
The hypotheses of the Crosstabs analysis H5A2 are presented in Table 4-39. 
Table 4-39 Hypotheses –Crosstabs analysis H5A2- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: There is not association between Voters’ age (18-45 vs. > 45) and Preferred 
parties’ group (New vs. Traditional). 
H1: There is association between Voters’ age (18-45 vs. > 45) and Preferred parties’ 
group (New vs. Traditional). 
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In order to test the hypotheses, it will be performed the Chi-Squared Test (Table 
4-40): 
Table 4-40 Chi-Squared Test for H5A2 
Pearson Chi-Square df1 Statistical significance 
71.1 1 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
association between Voters’ age (18-45 vs. > 45) and Preferred parties’ group (New vs. 
Traditional), χ
2 
(1) = 71.1, p < 0.05. Besides, in order to characterise the relationship, as 
the crosstab is 2x2, it will be performed the Cramer’s V Test (Table 4-41). 
Table 4-41 Cramer’s V Test for H5A2 
Cramer’s V Statistic Range Statistical significance 
0.421 0 < Cramer’s V < 1 0.000 
Considering the Cramer’s V Statistic = 0.421, p<0.05 the previous statistically 
significant relationship is characterised as moderate.  
3. H5A3: ANOVA analysis “Attitude towards political corruption” – 
“Preferred party”. 
The hypotheses of the ANOVA analysis H5A3 are presented in Table 4-42. 
Table 4-42 Hypotheses -ANOVA analysis H5A3- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
is equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP, C’s and Other party. 
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
is not equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP, C’s and Other party. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform the ANOVA analysis, the 
first step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this 
purpose, it will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses 





Table 4-43 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H5A3- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption is equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP, C’s and Other party. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption is not equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP, C’s and Other 
party. 
In Table 4-44 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=3.9, p<0.05, the H0 is rejected, i.e., it is not possible to assume that the 
variances are equal across all the groups. 
Table 4-44 Levene’s Test for H5A3 
Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
3.9 4 395 0.004 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is not met; therefore, it will be used the Welch 
statistic to perform the ANOVA analysis (Table 4-45).  
Table 4-45 ANOVA analysis H5A3 
Welch’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
44.6 4 7.9 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the attitude towards corruption between supporters of different parties 
Welch’s statistic=44.6, p<0.05.  
Once it has been proved the attitude towards political corruption varies with the 
preferred party, it will be deeply analysed in which pair of groups it is possible to 
establish a difference statistically significant. For this purpose, as the assumption of 





Table 4-46 Games-Howell’s Test for H5A3 
Preferred Party Mean 
Difference  




95% Confidence Interval 
A B Lower Upper 
PP 
PSOE  -0.92 0.11 0.000 -1.22 -0.62 
UP -1.44 0.10 0.000 -1.71 -1.18 
C’s -1.12 0.12 0.000 -1.45 -0.79 
Other -1.56 0.38 0.290 -9.58 6.47 
PSOE 
PP  0.92 0.11 0.000 0.62 1.22 
UP -0.52 0.09 0.000 -0.77 -0.28 
C’s -0.20 0.10 0.408 -0.51 0.11 
Other -0.63 0.38 0.641 -9.03 7.76 
UP 
PP 1.44 0.10 0.000 1.18 1.71 
PSOE 0.52 0.09 0.000 0.28 0.77 
C’s 0.33 0.10 0.015 0.04 0.61 
Other 1.12 0.38 0.996 -9.09 8.87 
C’s 
PP -1.54 0.12 0.000 0.79 1.45 
PSOE 0.20 0.11 0.408 -0.11 0.51 
UP -0.33 0.10 0.015 -0.61 -0.04 
Other -0.44 0.39 0.798 -8.27 7.40 
Other 
PP 1.56 0.38 0.290 -6.47 9.58 
PSOE 0.63 0.38 0.641 -7.76 9.03 
UP 0.11 0.38 0.996 -8.87 9.09 
C’s 0.44 0.39 0.798 -7.40 8.27 
As it is indicated, it is possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
attitude towards political corruption between PP supporters and PSOE supporters 
t(7.9)= -8.5, p<0.05, UP supporters t(7.9)= -14.8, p<0.05, and C’s supporters t(7.9)= -
9.4, p<0.05; between PSOE supporters and UP supporters t(7.9)= -5.9, p<0.05; and 
finally, between UP supporters and C’s supporters t(7.9)=3.2, p<0.05. However, it is 
not possible to establish differences statistically significant in the attitude towards 
political corruption between PSOE supporters and C’s supporters t(7.9)= -1.8, p>0.05; 
and between those who are supporting “other party” (a party different from the main 
four parties) and those who are supporting one of the main four parties, i.e., PP 
supporters t(7.9)=4.1, p>0.05, PSOE supporters t(7.9)=1.7, p>0.05, UP supporters 
t(7.9)=0.29, p>0.05, and C’s supporters t(7.9)=1.1, p>0.05. 
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The conclusion of the previous analysis is that when studying the impact of the 
preferred party on the attitude towards political corruption, there are differences 
statistically significant only in half of the possible comparison pairs. However, focusing 
on the main parties, the differences are statistically significant in five of the six possible 
comparison pairs, concretely, in all pair of parties’ supporters except between PSOE and 
C’s supporters. 
4. H5A4: Crosstabs analysis “Voters’ age (18-45 vs. > 45)” – “Preferred 
Party (PP, PSOE, UP or C’s)”. Note- In order to simplify the analysis, it 
will be excluded the option “Other party”, which was selected just by 2 
participants. 
The hypotheses of the Crosstabs analysis H5A4 are presented in Table 4-47. 
Table 4-47 Hypotheses –Crosstabs analysis H5A4- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: There is not association between Voters’ age (18-45 vs. > 45) and Preferred 
Party (PP, PSOE, UP or C’s). 
H1: There is association between Voters’ age (18-45 vs. > 45) and Preferred Party 
(PP, PSOE, UP or C’s). 
In order to test the hypotheses, it will be performed the Chi-Squared Test (Table 
4-48): 
Table 4-48 Chi-Squared Test for H5A4 
Pearson Chi-Square df1 Statistical significance 
76.1 3 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
association between Voters’ age (18-45 vs. > 45) and Preferred Party (PP, PSOE, UP or 
C’s), χ
2 
(3) = 76.1, p < 0.05. Besides, in order to characterise the relationship, as the 
crosstab is larger than 2x2, it will be performed the Contingency Coefficient Test 
(Table 4-49). 
Table 4-49 Contingency Coefficient Test for H5A4 
Contingency Coefficient 
Statistic C 
Range Statistical significance 
0.401 0 < C < 0.707 0.000 
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Considering the C = 0.401, p<0.05, the previous statistically significant 
relationship is characterised as moderate. 
Report 
In this section, it will be reported the most relevant conclusions of the statistical 
analysis carried out in the previous section. 
Firstly, it will be reported the results obtained when it has been proved that there is 
a statistically significant difference in the attitude towards political corruption between 
those citizens who support traditional parties and those who support new parties. In 
Figure 4-8 it is presented the mean of the attitude towards political corruption of each of 
the groups. 
Figure 4-8 Attitude towards political corruption vs. Traditional/New parties’ 
supporters 
 
As it is depicted, new parties’ supporters are less tolerant towards political 
corruption than traditional parties’ supporters. Concretely, when participants are 
evaluating a set of political corruption cases on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means “it is 
not serious at all” and 5 means “it is very serious”, the mean of the attitude towards 
political corruption is 3.46 for traditional parties’ supporters and 4.40 for new parties’ 
supporters. 
Secondly, it will be reported the results obtained in when it has been demonstrated 
that it is possible to establish a relationship statistically significant between voters’ age 













































Table 4-50 Voter’s distribution by age and parties’ group supported 
 New parties’ supporters Traditional parties’ supporters 
18-45 years 66% 34% 
> 45 years 23.9% 76.1% 
As it is indicated, the 66% of younger voters prefer new parties while the 76.1% of 
older voters feel closer to traditional parties. This finding is according with the 
information provided by the CIS (Figure 1-3) where it was shown that voters between 
18 and 44 years felt closer to new parties while those with more than 45 years clearly 
preferred traditional parties. 
Thirdly, it will be reported the results obtained when it has been proved that the 
attitude towards political corruption varies significantly when considering directly the 
preferred party. In Figure 4-9 it is displayed the mean of the attitude towards political 
corruption for the supporters of each of the main parties. 
Figure 4-9 Attitude towards political corruption vs. Preferred party 
 
As it is seen, when participants are evaluating a set of political corruption cases on 
a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means “it is not serious at all” and 5 means “it is very 
serious”, the mean of the attitude towards political corruption is 3.1 for PP supporters, 4 
for PSOE supporters, 4.5 for UP supporters and 4.2 for C’s supporters.  
Finally, it will be reported the results obtained in the crosstabs analysis performed 
in order to find out if it is possible to establish a relationship statistically significant 
between voters’ age and preferred party. As it has been already demonstrated, there is 










































closer to UP (41%) and C’s (25.7%); and on the other hand, the vast majority of older 
voters choose PP (45.2%) or PSOE (30.9%) (Table 4-51).  










18-45 years 17.1% 16.2% 41% 25.7% 
> 45 years 45.2% 30.9% 18.1% 5.9% 
Summarising the information above, it has been found that new parties’ supporters 
are less tolerant towards political corruption and younger than those who are supporting 
traditional parties, therefore, the hypothesis H5 has been verified, i.e., citizens’ level of 
tolerance towards political corruption is lower in those citizens who are supporting new 
parties. This result is consistent with previous researches where it was established how 
the emergence of new parties represents an opportunity for citizens to punish traditional 
parties affected by political corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron and 
Bågenholm, 2016). 
The validation of this hypothesis would help to understand the new parties’ 
emergence and success. In addition, the fact that new parties’ supporters have been 
identified as younger than traditional parties’ supporters, could be seen on one hand, as 
a clear advantage for new parties because traditional parties would need to attract 
younger voters if they want to stay in power; and on the other hand, as a hope for the 
democracy’s quality. 
 Hypothesis 6: Experiments and outcomes 4.3.6
In Hypothesis H6 it will be tested the belief that citizens’ criticism towards political 
corruption varies depending on the political sympathy they have towards the party 
involved. The statement of H6 is as follows: 
H6 statement- Citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is higher 
as higher is the political sympathy towards the party involved. 
If verified, it would help to understand why political corruption is not as much 
penalized as it could be expected and, as a consequence, it would point out the need that 
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citizens show themselves against political corruption independently of the party affected 
in order to reach a higher quality democracy.  
Experiment Description 
To test this hypothesis H6 it has been considered the following variables:  
1. Preferred party. It has been worked directly with the data provided by the 
survey, where respondents indicated the party which they felt closer to their 
ideas. In this case, in order to simplify the analysis, it will be excluded the 
option “Other party”, which was selected just by 2 participants. 
 
2. Corruption perceived in political parties (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s). In 
order to measure this variable, participants were asked to indicate the level of 
corruption they perceived in the Spanish main parties on a scale anchored at 
1 (not corrupted at all) to 5 (completely corrupted). This variable has not 
needed any recoding, it has been worked directly with the data from the 
survey. 
 
3. Attitude towards political corruption (Receiving valuable presents) 
without specifying the party involved. The information needed for this 
variable was provided by the fourth item of Table 4-5, where participants 
evaluated the corruption case “A politician accepts valuable presents” where 
it was not specified the party involved, on a scale anchored at 1 (not serious 
at all) to 5 (very serious). It has been worked directly with the data provided 
by the survey without any recoding. 
 
4. Attitude towards political corruption (Receiving valuable presents) 
specifying the party involved is their preferred party. Participants faced 
the same corruption case related to a valuable present that it has been 
considered in the previous variable, but in this case, it was indicated that the 
party involved was their preferred party (Table 4-7). Then, they were asked 
to indicate how serious they perceived it on a scale anchored at 1 (not serious 
at all) to 5 (very serious). This variable has not needed any recoding; it has 
been worked with the data from the survey directly. 
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5. Differential attitude towards political corruption (Receiving valuable 
presents) post-pre specifying the party involved. Considering the variable 
Attitude towards political corruption (Receiving valuable presents) post 
specifying the party involved is their preferred party, and the variable 
Attitude towards political corruption (Receiving valuable presents) pre 
specifying the party involved is their preferred party, it was constructed a 
new variable: Differential attitude towards political corruption (Receiving 
valuable presents) post-pre specifying the party involved. It measures the 
difference between the corruption perceived in a specific corruption case 
related to a valuable present when it is specified that their preferred party is 
the one involved and the corruption perceived in the same specific corruption 
related to a valuable present when it is not specified which is the party 
involved. This variable has not needed any recoding, it has been worked 
directly with the data from the survey. 
It was necessary to construct this variable because the goal was to ensure that 
it was being strictly measured the impact of being aware that it is their party 
the one which is involved. If it was considered just the attitude towards 
political corruption post specifying the party involved, it would not have 
been possible to analyse the impact of the preferred party, as the attitude 
towards a political corruption case is not only affected by the party involved, 
but also by the attitude towards this political corruption case independently 
of the corrupted party. 
The aim of this hypothesis is to test if citizens’ criticism towards political 
corruption varies significantly when it is their party the one which is being involved in 
corruption. For this purpose, it will be performed the following analysis: 
1. H6A1: ANOVA analysis to find out if the mean of the Corruption perceived 
in PP varies significantly considering the Preferred party.  
  
2. H6A2: ANOVA analysis to find out if the mean of the Corruption perceived 




3. H6A3: ANOVA analysis to find out if the mean of the Corruption perceived 
in UP varies significantly considering the Preferred party.  
 
4. H6A4: ANOVA analysis to find out if the mean of the Corruption perceived 
in C’s varies significantly considering the Preferred party.  
 
5. H6A5: ANOVA analysis to find out if the mean of the Attitude towards 
political corruption without specifying the party involved in a specific 
corruption case related to receiving valuable presents varies significantly 
considering the Preferred party.  
 
6. H6A6: ANOVA analysis to find out if the mean of the Attitude towards 
political corruption specifying the party involved is their preferred party in 
the same specific corruption case related to receiving valuable presents varies 
significantly considering the Preferred party.  
 
7. H6A7: ANOVA analysis to find out if the Differential attitude towards 
political corruption post-pre specifying the party involved varies significantly 
considering the Preferred party.  
Statistical analysis 
In this section, it will be performed the statistical analysis carried out to test the 
hypothesis H6: 
1. H6A1: ANOVA analysis “Corruption perceived in PP” – “Preferred 
party”. 
The hypotheses of the ANOVA analysis H6A1 are presented in Table 4-52. 
Table 4-52 Hypotheses -ANOVA analysis H6A1- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Corruption perceived in PP is equal 
for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Corruption perceived in PP is not 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
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In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform the ANOVA analysis, the 
first step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this 
purpose, it will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses 
are shown in Table 4-53: 
Table 4-53 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H6A1- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Corruption perceived in PP is 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of Corruption perceived in PP is not 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In Table 4-54 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=124, p<0.05, the H0 is rejected, i.e., it is not possible to assume that the 
variances are equal across all the groups. 
Table 4-54 Levene’s Test for H6A1 
Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
124 3 394 0.000 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is not met; therefore, it will be used the Welch 
statistic to perform the ANOVA analysis (Table 4-55).  
Table 4-55 ANOVA analysis H6A1 
Welch’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
76.4 3 150 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the corruption perceived in PP between supporters of different parties 
Welch’s statistic=76.4, p<0.05.  
Once it has been proved the corruption perceived in PP varies with the preferred 
party, it will be deeply analysed in which pair of groups it is possible to establish a 
difference statistically significant. For this purpose, as the assumption of 





Table 4-56 Games-Howell’s Test for H6A1 
Preferred Party Mean 
Difference  




95% Confidence Interval 
A B Lower Upper 
PP 
PSOE  -1.35 0.10 0.000 -1.61 -1.08 
UP -1.41 0.10 0.000 -1.66 -1.16 
C’s -1.22 0.11 0.000 -1.51 -0.94 
PSOE 
PP  1.35 0.10 0.000 1.08 1.61 
UP -0.07 0.04 0.384 -0.18 0.04 
C’s 0.12 0.07 0.275 -0.05 0.30 
UP 
PP 1.41 0.10 0.000 1.16 1.66 
PSOE 0.07 0.04 0.384 -0.04 0.18 
C’s 0.20 0.06 0.005 0.05 0.34 
C’s 
PP 1.22 0.11 0.000 0.94 1.51 
PSOE -0.12 0.07 0.275 -0.30 0.05 
UP -0.20 0.06 0.005 -0.34 -0.05 
As it is indicated, it is possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
corruption perceived in PP between PP supporters and PSOE supporters t(150)= -13, 
p<0.05, UP supporters t(150)= -14.8, p<0.05, and C’s supporters t(150)= -11.1 p<0.05; 
and between UP supporters and C’s supporters t(150)=3.5, p<0.05. However, it is not 
possible to establish differences statistically significant in the perception of corruption 
in PP between PSOE supporters and UP supporters t(150)= -1.6, p>0.05C’s’, and C’s 
supporters t(150)= 1.8, p>0.05. 
The conclusion of the previous analysis is that when studying the impact of the 
preferred party on the perception of corruption in PP, there are differences statistically 
significant in four of the six possible comparison pairs, concretely, in all pair of parties’ 
supporters except between PSOE and UP supporters, and between PSOE and C’s 
supporters. 
2. H6A2: ANOVA analysis “Corruption perceived in PSOE” – “Preferred 
party”. 




Table 4-57 Hypotheses -ANOVA analysis H6A2- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Corruption perceived in PSOE is 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Corruption perceived in PSOE is not 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform the ANOVA analysis, the 
first step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this 
purpose, it will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses 
are shown in Table 4-58: 
Table 4-58 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H6A2- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Corruption perceived in PSOE 
is equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of Corruption perceived in PSOE is 
not equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In Table 4-59 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=6.1, p<0.05, the H0 is rejected, i.e., it is not possible to assume that the 
variances are equal across all the groups. 
Table 4-59 Levene’s Test for H6A2 
Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
6.1 3 394 0.000 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is not met; therefore, it will be used the Welch 
statistic to perform the ANOVA analysis (Table 4-60).  
Table 4-60 ANOVA analysis H6A2 
Welch’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
80.5 3 209 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the corruption perceived in PSOE between supporters of different parties 
Welch’s statistic=80.5, p<0.05.  
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Once it has been proved the corruption perceived in PSOE varies with the preferred 
party, it will be deeply analysed in which pair of groups it is possible to establish a 
difference statistically significant. For this purpose, as the assumption of 
homoscedasticity is not met, it will be performed the Games-Howell’s Test (Table 
4-61).  
Table 4-61 Games-Howell’s Test for H6A2 
Preferred Party Mean 
Difference  




95% Confidence Interval 
A B Lower Upper 
PP 
PSOE  1.22 0.13 0.000 0.90 1.55 
UP -0.13 0.11 0.637 -0.40 0.15 
C’s -0.61 0.10 0.000 -0.86 -0.37 
PSOE 
PP  -1.22 0.13 0.000 -1.55 -0.90 
UP -1.35 0.13 0.000 -1.68 -1.02 
C’s -1.84 0.12 0.000 -2.15 -1.53 
UP 
PP 0.13 0.11 0.637 -0.15 0.40 
PSOE 1.35 0.13 0.000 1.02 1.68 
C’s -0.49 0.10 0.000 -0.74 -0.24 
C’s 
PP 0.61 0.10 0.000 0.37 0.86 
PSOE 1.84 0.12 0.000 1.53 2.15 
UP 0.49 0.10 0.000 0.24 0.74 
As it is indicated, it is possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
corruption perceived in PSOE between PP supporters and PSOE supporters t(209)= 9.7, 
p<0.05, and C’s supporters t(209)= -6.4, p<0.05; between PSOE supporters and UP 
supporters t(209)= -10.7, p<0.05, and C’s supporters t(209)= -15.6, p<0.05; and finally, 
between UP supporters and C’s supporters t(209)= -5.1, p<0.05. However, it is not 
possible to establish differences statistically significant in the corruption perceived in 
PSOE between PP supporters and UP supporters t(209)= -1.2, p>0.05. 
The conclusion of the previous analysis is that when studying the impact of the 
preferred party on the perception of corruption in PSOE, there are differences 
statistically significant in five of the six possible comparison pairs, concretely, in all 




3. H6A3: ANOVA analysis “Corruption perceived in UP” – “Preferred 
party”.  
The hypotheses of the ANOVA analysis H6A3 are presented in Table 4-62. 
Table 4-62 Hypotheses -ANOVA analysis H6A3- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Corruption perceived in UP is equal 
for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Corruption perceived in UP is not 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform the ANOVA analysis, the 
first step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this 
purpose, it will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses 
are shown in Table 4-63: 
Table 4-63 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H6A3- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Corruption perceived in UP is 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Corruption perceived in UP is 
not equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In Table 4-64 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=19.1, p<0.05, the H0 is rejected, i.e., it is not possible to assume that the 
variances are equal across all the groups. 
Table 4-64 Levene’s Test for H6A3 
Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
19.1 3 394 0.000 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is not met; therefore, it will be used the Welch 
statistic to perform the ANOVA analysis (Table 4-65).  
Table 4-65 ANOVA analysis H6A3 
Welch’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
376 3 173 0.000 
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Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the corruption perceived in UP between supporters of different parties 
Welch’s statistic=376, p<0.05. 
Once it has been proved the corruption perceived in UP varies with the preferred 
party, it will be deeply analysed in which pair of groups it is possible to establish a 
difference statistically significant. For this purpose, as the assumption of 
homoscedasticity is not met, it will be performed the Games-Howell’s Test (Table 
4-66). 
Table 4-66 Games-Howell’s Test for H6A3 
Preferred Party Mean 
Difference  




95% Confidence Interval 
A B Lower Upper 
PP 
PSOE  1,24 0,14 0,000 0,87 1,62 
UP 2,95 0,10 0,000 2,68 3,21 
C’s 0,19 0,16 0,649 -0,23 0,61 
PSOE 
PP  -1,24 0,14 0,000 -1,62 -0,87 
UP 1,71 0,12 0,000 1,39 2,02 
C’s -1,06 0,17 0,000 -1,50 -0,61 
UP 
PP -2,95 0,10 0,000 -3,21 -2,68 
PSOE -1,71 0,12 0,000 -2,02 -1,39 
C’s -2,76 0,14 0,000 -3,13 -2,39 
C’s 
PP -0,19 0,16 0,649 -0,61 0,23 
PSOE 1,06 0,17 0,000 0,61 1,50 
UP 2,76 0,14 0,000 2,39 3,13 
As it is indicated, it is possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
corruption perceived in UP between PP supporters and PSOE supporters t(173)= 8.6, 
p<0.05, and UP supporters t(173)= 28.8, p<0.05; between PSOE supporters and UP 
supporters t(173)= 14.2, p<0.05, and C’s supporters t(173)= -6.1, p<0.05; and finally, 
between UP supporters and C’s supporters t(173)= -19.7, p<0.05. However, it is not 
possible to establish differences statistically significant in the corruption perceived in 
UP between PP supporters and C’s supporters t(173)= 1.2, p>0.05. 
The conclusion of the previous analysis is that when studying the impact of the 
preferred party on the perception of corruption in UP, there are differences statistically 
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significant in five of the six possible comparison pairs, concretely, in all pair of parties’ 
supporters except between PP and C’s supporters. 
4. H6A4: ANOVA analysis “Corruption perceived in C’s” – “Preferred 
party”.  
The hypotheses of the ANOVA analysis H6A4 are presented in Table 4-67. 
Table 4-67 Hypotheses -ANOVA analysis H6A4- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Corruption perceived in C’s is equal 
for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Corruption perceived in C’s is not 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform the ANOVA analysis, the 
first step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this 
purpose, it will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses 
are shown in Table 4-68: 
Table 4-68 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H6A4- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Corruption perceived in C’s is 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of Corruption perceived in C’s is not 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In Table 4-69 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=2.4, p>0.05, the H0 is not rejected, i.e., it is possible to assume that the 
variances are equal across all the groups. 
Table 4-69 Levene’s Test for H6A4 
Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
2.4 3 394 0.066 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is met; therefore, it will be used the F statistic 














224 3 74.7 68.2 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
432 394 1.10   
Total 656 397    
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the perception of corruption in C’s between supporters of different parties 
F(3,394)=68.2, p<0.05. 
Once it has been proved the corruption perceived in C’s varies with the preferred 
party, it will be deeply analysed in which pair of groups it is possible to establish a 
difference statistically significant. For this purpose, as the assumption of 
homoscedasticity is met and the number of groups to be compared are just four, it will 
be performed the Bonferroni’s Test (Table 4-71).  
Table 4-71 Bonferroni Test for H6A4 
Preferred Party Mean 
Difference  




95% Confidence Interval 
A B Lower Upper 
PP 
PSOE  -0,27 0,14 0,368 -0,66 0,11 
UP -0,77 0,13 0,000 -1,12 -0,41 
C’s 1,51 0,16 0,000 1,08 1,93 
PSOE 
PP  0,27 0,14 0,368 -0,11 0,66 
UP -0,50 0,15 0,004 -0,88 -0,11 
C’s 1,78 0,17 0,000 1,33 2,23 
UP 
PP 0,77 0,13 0,000 0,41 1,12 
PSOE 0,50 0,15 0,004 0,11 0,88 
C’s 2,27 0,16 0,000 1,85 2,70 
C’s 
PP -1,51 0,16 0,000 -1,93 -1,08 
PSOE -1,78 0,17 0,000 -2,23 -1,33 
UP -2,27 0,16 0,000 -2,70 -1,85 
As it is indicated, it is possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
corruption perceived in C’s between PP supporters and UP supporters t(394)= -5.7, 
p<0.05, and C’s supporters t(394)= 9.4, p<0.05; between PSOE supporters and UP 
supporters t(394)= -3.4, p<0.05, and C’s supporters t(394)= 10.5, p<0.05; and finally, 
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between UP supporters and C’s supporters t(394)= 14.1, p<0.05. However, it is not 
possible to establish differences statistically significant in the corruption perceived in 
C’s between PP supporters and PSOE supporters t(394)= -1.9, p>0.05. 
The conclusion of the previous analysis is that when studying the impact of the 
preferred party on the perception of corruption in C’s, there are differences statistically 
significant in five of the six possible comparison pairs, concretely, in all pair of parties’ 
supporters except between PP and PSOE supporters. 
5. H6A5: ANOVA analysis “Attitude towards political corruption in a 
specific corruption case” – “Preferred party”.  
The hypotheses of the ANOVA analysis H6A5 are presented in Table 4-72. 
Table 4-72 Hypotheses -ANOVA analysis H6A5- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
in a specific corruption case is equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and 
C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
in a specific corruption case is not equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP 
and C’s. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform the ANOVA analysis, the 
first step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this 
purpose, it will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses 
are shown in Table 4-73: 
Table 4-73 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H6A5- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption in a specific corruption case is equal for all groups: supporters of PP, 
PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption in a specific corruption case is not equal for all groups: supporters of PP, 
PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In Table 4-74 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=4.9, p<0.05, the H0 is rejected, i.e., it is not possible to assume that the 
variances are equal across all the groups. 
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Table 4-74 Levene’s Test for H6A5 
Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
4.9 3 394 0.003 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is not met; therefore, it will be used the Welch 
statistic to perform the ANOVA analysis (Table 4-75).  
Table 4-75 ANOVA analysis H6A5 
Welch’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
74.6 3 187 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the attitude towards political corruption in a specific corruption case 
between supporters of different parties Welch’s statistic=74.6, p<0.05. 
Once it has been proved the attitude towards political corruption in a specific 
corruption case varies with the preferred party, it will be deeply analysed in which pair 
of groups it is possible to establish a difference statistically significant. For this purpose, 
as the assumption of homoscedasticity is not met, it will be performed the Games-
Howell’s Test (Table 4-76).  
Table 4-76 Games-Howell’s Test for H6A5 
Preferred Party Mean 
Difference  




95% Confidence Interval 
A B Lower Upper 
PP 
PSOE  -1,25 0,13 0,000 -1,58 -0,91 
UP -1,68 0,11 0,000 -1,96 -1,39 
C’s -1,27 0,15 0,000 -1,65 -0,88 
PSOE 
PP  1,25 0,13 0,000 0,91 1,58 
UP -0,43 0,10 0,000 -0,69 -0,17 
C’s -0,02 0,14 0,999 -0,39 0,35 
UP 
PP 1,68 0,11 0,000 1,39 1,96 
PSOE 0,43 0,10 0,000 0,17 0,69 
C’s 0,41 0,13 0,008 0,08 0,74 
C’s 
PP 1,27 0,15 0,000 0,88 1,65 
PSOE 0,02 0,14 0,999 -0,35 0,39 




As it is indicated, it is possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
attitude towards political corruption in a specific corruption case between PP supporters 
and PSOE supporters t(187)= -9.7, p<0.05, UP supporters t(187)= -15, p<0.05, and C’s 
supporters t(187)= -8.5, p<0.05; between PSOE supporters and UP supporters t(187)= -
4.3, p<0.05; and finally, between UP supporters and C’s supporters t(187)= 3.3, p<0.05. 
However, it is not possible to establish differences statistically significant in the attitude 
towards political corruption in a specific corruption case between PSOE supporters and 
C’s supporters t(187)= -0.14, p>0.05. 
The conclusion of the previous analysis is that when studying the impact of the 
preferred party on the attitude towards political corruption in a specific corruption case, 
there are differences statistically significant in five of the six possible comparison pairs, 
concretely, in all pair of parties’ supporters except between PSOE and C’s supporters.  
6. H6A6: ANOVA analysis “Attitude towards political corruption in a 
specific corruption case in which the preferred party is involved” – 
“Preferred party”.  
The hypotheses of the ANOVA analysis H6A6 are presented in Table 4-77. 
Table 4-77 Hypotheses -ANOVA analysis H6A6- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
in a specific corruption case in which the preferred party is involved is equal for all 
groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Attitude towards political corruption 
in a specific corruption case in which the preferred party is involved is not equal for 
all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform the ANOVA analysis, the 
first step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this 
purpose, it will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses 




Table 4-78 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H6A6- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption in a specific corruption case in which the preferred party is involved is 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Attitude towards political 
corruption in a specific corruption case in which the preferred party is involved is not 
equal for all groups: supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In Table 4-79 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=3.98, p<0.05, the H0 is rejected, i.e., it is not possible to assume that the 
variances are equal across all the groups. 
Table 4-79 Levene’s Test for H6A6 
Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
4 3 394 0.008 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is not met; therefore, it will be used the Welch 
statistic to perform the ANOVA analysis (Table 4-80).  
Table 4-80 ANOVA analysis H6A6 
Welch’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
78.7 3 189 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the attitude towards political corruption in a specific corruption case in 
which the preferred party is involved between supporters of different parties Welch’s 
statistic=78.7, p<0.05. 
Once it has been proved the attitude towards political corruption in a specific 
corruption case in which the preferred party is involved varies with the preferred party, 
it will be deeply analysed in which pair of groups it is possible to establish a difference 
statistically significant. For this purpose, as the assumption of homoscedasticity is not 





Table 4-81 Games-Howell’s Test for H6A6 
Preferred Party Mean 
Difference  




95% Confidence Interval 
A B Lower Upper 
PP 
PSOE  -0,95 0,16 0,000 -1,35 -0,55 
UP -2,01 0,13 0,000 -2,36 -1,67 
C’s -1,47 0,18 0,000 -1,94 -0,99 
PSOE 
PP  0,95 0,16 0,000 0,55 1,35 
UP -1,06 0,14 0,000 -1,42 -0,70 
C’s -0,52 0,19 0,032 -1,00 -0,03 
UP 
PP 2,01 0,13 0,000 1,67 2,36 
PSOE 1,06 0,14 0,000 0,70 1,42 
C’s 0,54 0,17 0,009 0,11 0,98 
C’s 
PP 1,47 0,18 0,000 0,99 1,94 
PSOE 0,52 0,19 0,032 0,03 1,00 
UP -0,54 0,17 0,009 -0,98 -0,11 
As it is indicated, it is possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
attitude towards political corruption in a specific corruption case in which the preferred 
party is involved between PP supporters and PSOE supporters t(189)= -6.1, p<0.05, UP 
supporters t(189)= -15.1, p<0.05, and C’s supporters t(189)= -8, p<0.05; between 
PSOE supporters and UP supporters t(189)= -7.7, p<0.05, and C’s supporters t(189)= -
2.8, p<0.05; and finally, between UP supporters and C’s supporters t(189)= 3.3, p<0.05. 
The conclusion of the previous analysis is that when studying the impact of the 
preferred party on the attitude towards political corruption in a specific corruption case 
in which the preferred party is involved, there are differences statistically significant 
between all the pair of parties’ supporters.  
7. H6A7: ANOVA analysis “Differential attitude towards political 
corruption post-pre specifying the party involved” – “Preferred party”.  




Table 4-82 Hypotheses -ANOVA analysis H6A7- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Differential attitude towards political 
corruption post-pre specifying the party involved  is equal for all groups: supporters 
of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of mean, i.e., the mean of the Differential attitude towards political 
corruption post-pre specifying the party involved is not equal for all groups: 
supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In order to decide which statistic will be used to perform the ANOVA analysis, the 
first step will be to find out if the assumption of homoscedasticity is met. For this 
purpose, it will be performed the Levene's Test. The null and the alternative hypotheses 
are shown in Table 4-83: 
Table 4-83 Hypotheses - Levene's Test for H6A7- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: Homogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Differential attitude towards 
political corruption post-pre specifying the party involved  is equal for all groups: 
supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
H1: Heterogeneity of variance, i.e., the variance of the Differential attitude towards 
political corruption post-pre specifying the party involved  is not equal for all groups: 
supporters of PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
In Table 4-84 it is depicted the results of the Levene’s test. As the Levene’s 
statistic=4.7, p<0.05, the H0 is rejected, i.e., it is not possible to assume that the 
variances are equal across all the groups. 
Table 4-84 Levene’s Test for H6A7 
Levene’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
4.7 3 394 0.003 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is not met; therefore, it will be used the Welch 
statistic to perform the ANOVA analysis (Table 4-85).  
Table 4-85 ANOVA analysis H6A7 
Welch’s Statistic df1 df2 
Statistical 
significance 
12.9 3 197 0.000 
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Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., there is a statistically significant 
difference in the differential attitude towards political corruption post-pre specifying the 
party involved between supporters of different parties Welch’s statistic=12.9, p<0.05. 
Once it has been proved the differential attitude towards political corruption post-
pre specifying the party involved varies with the preferred party, it will be deeply 
analysed in which pair of groups it is possible to establish a difference statistically 
significant. For this purpose, as the assumption of homoscedasticity is not met, it will be 
performed the Games-Howell’s Test (Table 4-86). 
Table 4-86 Games-Howell’s Test for H6A7 
Preferred Party Mean 
Difference  




95% Confidence Interval 
A B Lower Upper 
PP 
PSOE  0,29 0,11 0,054 0,00 0,59 
UP -0,34 0,09 0,002 -0,58 -0,09 
C’s -0,20 0,11 0,253 -0,49 0,08 
PSOE 
PP  -0,29 0,11 0,054 -0,59 0,00 
UP -0,63 0,11 0,000 -0,91 -0,35 
C’s -0,50 0,12 0,000 -0,81 -0,18 
UP 
PP 0,34 0,09 0,002 0,09 0,58 
PSOE 0,63 0,11 0,000 0,35 0,91 
C’s 0,13 0,10 0,540 -0,13 0,40 
C’s 
PP 0,20 0,11 0,253 -0,08 0,49 
PSOE 0,50 0,12 0,000 0,18 0,81 
UP -0,13 0,10 0,540 -0,40 0,13 
As it is indicated, it is possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
differential attitude towards political corruption post-pre specifying the party involved 
between PP supporters and UP supporters t(197)= -3.6, p<0.05; and also between PSOE 
supporters and UP supporters t(197)= -5.9, p<0.05, and C’s supporters t(197)= -4.1, 
p<0.05. However, it is not possible to establish differences statistically significant in the 
differential attitude towards political corruption post-pre specifying the party involved 
between PP supporters and PSOE supporters t(197)= 2.6, p>0.05, and C’s supporters 




The conclusion of the previous analysis is that when studying the impact of the 
preferred party on the differential attitude towards political corruption post-pre 
specifying the party involved, there are differences statistically significant just in three 
of the six possible comparison pairs, concretely, between PP supporters and UP 
supporters, and between PSOE supporters and the supporters of UP and C’s. 
Report 
In this section, it will be reported the most relevant conclusions of the statistical 
analysis carried out in the previous section.  
Firstly, it will be reported the results obtained in the four ANOVA analysis of the 
corruption perceived in PP, PSOE, UP and C’s in relation with the preferred party, 
which were performed in order to find out if the corruption perceived in each party 
varies significantly depending on the party that citizens feel closer to their ideas. As it 
has been already proved, for all the parties, there is a statistically significant difference 
in the perception of corruption between citizens with a different preferred party. In 
Table 4-87 it is presented the mean of corruption perceived in each party for the 
supporters of each of the main parties. 











PP 3.6 4.9 5 4.8 4.5 
PSOE 4 2.8 4.1 4.6 3.9 
UP 4.3 3.0 1.3 4.1 3.1 
C’s 3 3.3 3.8 1.5 3.1 
The main conclusion is that party’s supporters perceive less corruption in their 
party than other parties’ supporters. Classifying citizens by the party they feel closer 
and comparing their perception of corruption in each party, it is shown how in all the 
cases party supporters perceive their party as being less corrupted than those who feel 
closer to other parties, and these differences are significant. Concretely, on a scale from 
1 to 5 where 1 means “not corrupted at all” and 5 means “completely corrupted”, PP is 
perceived by their supporters as 3.6 while the mean is 4.5; PSOE supporters perceive 
their party as 2.8 and the mean is 3.9; UP is perceived by their supporters as 1.3 while 
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the mean is 3.1; and finally, C’s supporters perceive their party as 1.5 and the mean is 
also 3.1.  
It is remarkable how even if citizens perceive PP as the most corrupted party in 
Spain, this party won the last General Elections of June 2016 and has remained in the 
government until June 2018, when a sentence where it was condemned for corruption 
led to a wide agreement among several parties of the opposition which allowed PSOE to 
win a no-confidence motion. Besides, it is interesting how the supporters of all parties 
perceive their preferred party as the least corrupted except PP supporters who consider 
C’s less corrupted than their own party. Finally, it is also underlined the fact that new 
parties which have broken into the political scene emphasizing the fight against 
corruption are perceived as less corrupted than traditional parties. 
Then, in Table 4-88 it will be reported the results obtained in the following three 
analyses: ANOVA analysis of the attitude towards political corruption without 
specifying the party involved considering the supporters of each party; ANOVA 
analysis of the attitude towards political corruption specifying the party involved 
considering the supporters of each party; ANOVA analysis of the Differential attitude 
towards political corruption post-pre specifying the party involved considering the 
supporters of each party. 











Pre-Specifying 2.95 4.2 4.63 4.22 3.95 
Post-Specifying 2.36 3.32 4.38 3.83 3.43 
Difference -0.59 -0.88 -0.25 -0.38 -0.52 
Firstly, it is depicted how when the party involved in a specific case of corruption is 
not specified, PP supporters are the most tolerant while UP supporters are the least. 
Concretely, when participants are evaluating the corruption case “A politician accepts 
valuable presents” on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means “not serious at all” and 5 
means “very serious”, the mean of the attitude towards political corruption is 2.95 for 
PP supporters and 4.63 for UP supporters. Besides, according with the analysis 
performed in the previous section, where it has been proved that the differences are 
statistically significant between all pair of parties’ supporters except between PSOE and 
176 
 
C’s supporters, it is seen how the mean of the attitude towards corruption without 
specifying the party involved for these groups of supporters are practically the same, 
4.20 and 4.22 respectively. 
Secondly, when citizens are asked about the same specific case of corruption with 
the only difference that it appears their party as the one which is being involved, the 
conclusion is the same: PP supporters are the most tolerant while UP supporters are the 
least tolerant. In this case, it has been proved that the differences are statistically 
significant between all pair of parties’ supporters, and accordingly, it is seen how the 
means are quite different, concretely: 2.36 for PP supporters, 3.32 for PSOE supporters, 
4.38 for UP supporters, and 3.83 for C’s supporters. 
Finally, focusing on the differences between when it is not specified the party and 
when it is, it is found that even if the supporters of all the parties tend to downplay the 
importance of the corruption case when it is specified that their party is the one which is 
being involved, new parties’ supporters are those who less minimize the corruption 
when it affects to their own party. Concretely, the differences are -0.59 for PP 
supporters, -0.88 for PSOE supporters; -0.25 for UP supporters; and -0.38 for C’s 
supporters. 
Summarizing all the information above, it has been found on one hand, how 
citizens’ general perception about the level of corruption in the main parties varies 
depending on how close they feel to the party, being in all the cases party’s supporters 
those who perceive less corruption in their party than other parties’ supporters; and on 
the other hand, how citizens’ level of tolerance towards an specific case of corruption 
also varies depending on which party is being involved, downplaying it when it is their 
party the one which is being affected. As a consequence, the hypothesis H6 has been 
verified, i.e., citizens’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is higher as higher 
is the political sympathy towards the party involved. This conclusion is consistent with 
previous researches where it was proved that citizens’ level of tolerance towards 
political corruption depends on which is the party involved in the corruption case, being 
more tolerant when the corruption case affects to the party they are supporting (Cordero 
and Blais, 2017; Ecker et al., 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013). 
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The verification of this hypothesis would contribute to explain why political 
corruption is not as much penalized as it could be expected. It interferes with the well-
functioning of the political, economic and social system and, therefore, it clearly plays 
against the goal of reaching a higher quality democracy. In order to change it, it would 
be necessary citizens to show themselves against political corruption independently of 
the party which is being involved. 
4.4 Analysis of results 
The main objective of this thesis is to shed light on the puzzle of why political 
corruption does not seem to have the electoral consequences it could be expected and, 
even more important, to find out key factors to develop better strategies in order to 
encourage citizens to be less tolerant towards political corruption and, therefore, to 
achieve a higher quality democracy.   
For this purpose, this chapter has been focused on the hypothesis related to what it 
has been defined as “Real World”. The goal has been the analysis of the role played in 
the attitude towards political corruption by the economic context, social pressure, 
political awareness, political leaning, the new parties’ emergence and political 
sympathy. For this purpose, on one hand, it has been used data provided by two 
independent entities: CIS and INE; and on the other hand, it has been designed a 
specific survey in which participants faced questions related to each of the previous 
variables. In this section, it will be summarised the main conclusions obtained when 
analysing the impact of each of the variables on the attitude towards political corruption.  
Firstly, when analysing the effect of the economic context on citizens´ attitude 
towards political corruption, it has been found that citizens’ level of tolerance towards 
political corruption is lower when the country’s economy is in crisis (H1). It has been 
established on one hand, a positive and strong relationship between the negative 
assessments of political and economic situation, which shows how citizens’ attitude 
towards political issues are clearly affected by the economic context; and on the other 
hand, a negative correlation between the GDP growth rate and the growth rate of the 
concern over corruption, which proves how citizens’ criticism towards political 
corruption is greater when the country is going through an economic crisis. Besides, 
accordingly with the previous finding, when asking citizens directly about their 
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criticism’s level towards political corruption since the economic crisis started, most of 
them respond it is higher, reinforcing the previous conclusion about the impact that an 
economic crisis has on citizens’ attitude towards political corruption. These findings are 
consistent with previous researches where it was established that citizens are less 
tolerant towards political corruption when the country’s economy is in crisis (Cordero 
and Blais, 2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Klasnja and 
Tucker, 2013; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 
2013; Jerit and Barabas, 2012; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Manzetti and Wilson, 
2007; Golden, 2007; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2000; Duch et al., 2000; Mauro, 1995). 
As a consequence, an economic crisis could be seen as an opportunity to increase 
citizens’ criticism towards political corruption. However, once the crisis is overcome, it 
would be necessary to keep it over the level before the crisis started in order to reach a 
higher quality democracy. 
Secondly, when examining the effect of social pressure on citizens´ attitude towards 
political corruption, it has been found how among the variables which influence the 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption, social pressure has a higher impact than 
factual information (H2). It has been proved on one hand, how those citizens who face a 
case of political corruption in which other citizens´ reactions against it are emphasized, 
become less tolerant than those who face a scenario in which they are being informed 
through factual information exclusively; and on the other hand, how the piece of news 
which have a higher impact on the attitude towards political corruption are those in 
which it is underlined the social and economic losses it provokes rather than other in 
which the information about corruption is provided without being related with any 
social or economic consequence. As a result, it has been concluded that exerting social 
pressure based on other citizens´ reactions towards political corruption or emphasizing 
citizens’ losses in welfare and economics, is a better strategy to impact on citizens’ 
attitude towards political corruption than just providing factual information. These 
findings are consistent with previous researches where it was demonstrated the 
effectiveness of social pressure in mobilising citizens against the established political 
system and its corruption (Giraldo-Luque, 2018; Marinov and Schimmelfennig,  2015; 
Anduiza et al., 2014; Peña-López et al., 2014; Toret, 2013; Anduiza et al., 2012; 
Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-Sánchez, 2012; Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012; Eltantawy and 
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Wiest, 2011; González-Bailón et al., 2011; Shirky, 2011); in political self-expression, 
political information seeking and political participation (Bond et al., 2012; Gerber and 
Rogers, 2009; and Gerber et al., 2008). 
As a consequence of the effectiveness of social pressure on the attitude towards 
political corruption, it could be expected that if a political party, a media or any citizen 
group managed to mobilize a part of society against political corruption, the effect of 
social pressure would attract new supporters, which would contribute to achieve a 
higher quality democracy. 
Thirdly, when studying the effect of political awareness on citizens´ attitude 
towards political corruption, it has been found that citizens’ level of tolerance is lower 
as higher is their political awareness (H3). Based on citizens’ responses on questions 
about politics, citizens have been classified into three different groups according to their 
level of political awareness, and it has been demonstrated that as higher it is, citizens are 
less tolerant. These findings are consistent with previous researches where it was shown 
that citizens with a different level of knowledge about politics show different levels of 
tolerance towards political corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Anduiza et al., 2013; 
Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Arceneaux, 2007; Kam, 2005). It was established 
how an increase in the level of corruption perceived by citizens plays against the 
electoral results of corrupt politicians (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Fernández-Vázquez et 
al., 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Costas-Pérez et al., 2010; Figueiredo et al., 2010; Weitz-
Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Chang and Kerr, 2009; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Tavits, 
2007; Gerring and Thacker, 2005; Adserá et al., 2003; Treisman, 2000; Fackler and Lin, 
1995; Rundquist et al., 1977). 
The previous conclusion would prove that the attitude towards political corruption 
can be modified by bringing citizens into politics and, therefore, that involving citizens 
in political issues would also contribute to achieve a higher quality democracy. As a 
consequence, this conclusion would also emphasize the crucial role played by the 
media.  
Fourthly, when analysing the effect of political leaning on citizens´ attitude towards 
political corruption, it has been found that citizens’ level of tolerance towards political 
corruption is lower as more politically progressive they are (H4). When asking citizens 
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about their political leaning, it has been shown how those who proclaim to be more 
progressive are less tolerant towards political corruption than those who identify 
themselves as being more conservative. This conclusion is consistent with previous 
researches where it was found the key role played by political leaning, being left 
parties’ supporters those who punish corruption more than right parties’ supporters 
(Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Costas-Pérez et al., 2010). 
Political parties should consider the result obtained when they are designing their 
communication policy to face a corruption case. Besides, attending this result, left 
parties would need to make greater efforts to fight against corruption, not only 
implementing strictly measurements to avoid it, but also expelling of their parties those 
politicians who are involved in a case of political corruption. However, downplay 
corruption would be less harmful for those parties with a right political leaning. This 
finding, at least in a short term, could be seen as a disadvantage for parties with a left 
political leaning, as they would be stronger penalized in contrast with right parties, 
which have an electorate less sensitive towards political corruption. Finally, this finding 
would contribute to explain the success of some right parties in certain electoral 
campaigns in despite of being clearly involved in corruption. 
Fifthly, when examining the effect of new parties’ emergence on citizens´ attitude 
towards political corruption, it has been found how citizens’ level of tolerance towards 
political corruption is lower in those citizens who are supporting new parties (H5). 
Citizens who declare to feel closer to the emerging parties UP and C’s are less tolerant 
than those who indicate to feel closer to the traditional parties PP and PSOE. This 
finding is consistent on one hand, with previous researches where it was established 
how the emergence of new parties represents an opportunity for citizens to punish 
traditional parties affected by political corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron 
and Bågenholm, 2016); and on the other hand, with those in which it was identified the 
fight against corruption as a key factor to explain the new parties success (Bågenholm 
and Charron, 2014; Hanley and Sikk, 2014; Bågenholm, 2013; Sikk, 2012; Bélanger, 
2004). Besides, there is also consistency with other researchers who demonstrated that 
corruption benefits new parties pushing voters away not only from the party which is in 
the government, but also from all the traditional parties (Engler, 2015; Pop-Eleches, 
2010; Mainwaring et al., 2009). In addition, when evaluating deeply the results, they are 
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internally consistent with those obtained when analysing the political leaning impact. 
On one side, among traditional parties’ supporters, those who are supporting the left 
party PSOE are less tolerant than those who are supporting the right party PP; and on 
the other side, among the new parties’ supporters, it is found the same pattern, i.e., those 
who are supporting the left party UP are less tolerant than those who are supporting the 
right party C’s. 
Moreover, when investigating if it was possible to characterise these groups taking 
into account their age, it has been concluded, according with the data provided by the 
CIS, that those who prefer new parties can be characterised as younger than the 
traditional parties’ supporters.  
The fact that new parties’ supporters are less tolerant towards political corruption 
would be the key factor to explain the new parties’ emergence and success, as they have 
broken into the political scene emphasizing they are anti-corruption parties. Besides, the 
fact that their supporters have been identified as being younger than traditional parties’ 
supporters would suppose in a medium and long term a clear advantage, as traditional 
parties would need to attract younger voters if they want to stay in power. In addition, 
the fact that younger voters are less tolerant would show a positive evolution of the 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption which could be interpreted as a hope for 
the democracy’s quality. 
Sixthly, when studying the effect of political sympathy on citizens´ attitude towards 
political corruption it has been found that citizens’ level of tolerance towards political 
corruption is higher as higher is the sympathy towards the party involved (H6). On one 
hand, it has been seen how citizens’ perception of corruption in their preferred party is 
lower than the corruption perceived by other parties’ supporters; and on the other hand, 
how when citizens are facing a specific case of political corruption, they definitely 
downplay corruption if it is their party the one which is being affected. These findings 
are consistent with previous researches where it was shown that citizens’ level of 
tolerance towards political corruption depends on which was the party involved in the 
corruption case, being more tolerant when it affects their preferred party (Cordero and 
Blais, 2017; Ecker et al., 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013). Besides, it is also consistent with 
other researchers who demonstrated that voters’ sympathy towards a party reduces the 
impact of corruption on the electoral results of a corrupt politician (Cordero and Blais, 
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2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Welch and Hibbing, 1997; Peters and Welch, 
1980). Moreover, evaluating deeply the results, they are internally consistent with those 
obtained when analysing both, the political leaning's impact and the emergence of new 
parties’ impact, as UP supporters, the new party identified as being progressive, are 
those who not only have the least tolerance towards political corruption, but also who 
least downplay corruption when it affects to their own party. 
The previous findings would clearly contribute to explain why political corruption 
is not as much penalized as it could be expected. Parties’ supporters not only have lower 
perception of corruption in their party, but also when it is presented a specific case of 
corruption in their preferred party tend to minimize it. As a consequence, citizens’ 
attitude towards political corruption in their preferred party would play against to the 
well-functioning of the political, economic and social system. In order to achieve a 
higher quality democracy, it would be necessary citizens to be aware of the importance 
to fight against political corruption independently of the party affected, even being more 
demanding when it is their preferred party the one which is being involved. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The main goal of this chapter has been to test the hypotheses related to the real 
world in order to analyse the impact of the economic context, social pressure, political 
awareness, political leaning, the new parties’ emergence and political sympathy, on 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption. In the following lines, it will be briefly 
summarised the main conclusions of the experiments conducted to test each of the 
hypotheses. 
Firstly, when analysing the impact of the economic context on citizens´ attitude 
towards political corruption, it has been found that citizen’s criticism towards political 
corruption is higher when the country is in a context of economic crisis (H1). 
Secondly, when examining the impact of social pressure on citizens´ attitude 
towards political corruption, it has been showed how among the variables which 
influence citizens’ attitude towards political corruption, social pressure has a higher 
impact than factual information, i.e., how it is possible to reach a greater impact 
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emphasizing other citizens’ reactions against political corruption and focusing on 
citizens’ losses rather than just providing factual information (H2). 
Thirdly, when studying the impact of political awareness on citizens´ attitude 
towards political corruption, it has been proved that higher levels of political awareness 
increase citizens’ criticism towards political corruption (H3). 
Fourthly, when analysing the impact of political leaning on citizens´ attitude 
towards political corruption, it has been established that progressive citizens and 
conservative citizens show different level of criticism towards political corruption, 
being less tolerant those who identify themselves as being politically more progressive 
(H4). 
Fifthly, when examining the impact of the new parties’ emergence on citizens´ 
attitude towards political corruption, it has been found out how there are differences 
between supporters of new and traditional parties, being those who feel closer to new 
parties less tolerant towards political corruption (H5). Besides, new parties’ supporters 
have been characterised as being younger than traditional parties’ supporters.   
Finally, when studying the impact of political sympathy on citizens´ attitude 
towards political corruption, it has been concluded that citizens’ criticism towards 
political corruption varies depending on the sympathy they feel towards the party which 







Chapter 5. Political debate in the Online World: 
Experiments and analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The second part of the thesis is focused on the analysis of the conversations about 
politics in the online world. Online social networks have become hugely important in 
recent years, with information on every conceivable topic flowing continuously between 
people around the world. Their impact on citizens’ attitude and behaviour has been 
proved in a multitude of domains. Focusing on the topic of this thesis, it has been 
considered especially interesting to analyse what is being said about politics and the 
interaction and influence of actors in this debate.  
In the previous chapter, it has been seen that political leaning, the emergence of 
new parties and political sympathy play a key role to find out substantial differences in 
the attitude towards political corruption among citizens. The goal of this chapter is to 
analyse if the relationships established can be proved in the online world. For this 
purpose, it has been selected the social network Twitter. There are a variety of reasons 
for this choice. Firstly, this social network is completely open, which allows to collect 
all messages (“tweets”) related to a determinant hashtag. Secondly, Twitter is 
increasingly considered by scholars as a political platform, where politicians, media 
professionals and citizens engage in a personal type of political communication 
(Murthy, 2015; Ekman and Widholm, 2014; Aragón et al., 2013). Finally, Twitter has 
been successfully investigated through social network analysis in a wide variety of 
political researches in which it has been proved its usefulness as a platform to spread 
propaganda and generate political debate during the electoral campaigns (Jennings et 
al., 2017; Aragón et al., 2013), as a mobilizing platform for social movements (Vallina-
Rodriguez et al., 2012), and as a predictor of electoral outcomes (Tumasjan et al., 2010).  
In particular, Siegel (2018), Aragón et al. (2013) and Bruns and Burgess (2011) 
proved that the use of Twittter increases during political debates; Jennings et al. (2017) 
found how Twitter showed, in real time, not only the salience of political issues, but 
also the successes or failures of public sphere arguments; Vallina-Rodriguez et al. 
(2012) demonstrated the crucial role played by Twitter on the birth and development of 
the Spanish Movimiento 15M (15M Movement), allowing citizens to channel their 
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outrage (Anduiza et al., 2014), spreading the call for protests (Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-
Sánchez, 2012; González-Bailón et al., 2011), facilitating the sharing of information and 
a better coordination and giving their members a sense of collective identity (Peña-
López et al.,  2014); and Congosto et al. (2011) and Tumasjan et al. (2010) proved its 
capacity to predict electoral outcomes in the Catalan Elections of 2010 and the German 
General Elections of 2009 respectively.  
In this chapter, it will be presented the design and outcomes of the experiments 
which test the hypotheses H7 H8 and H9 relating to the “Virtual World” described in 
Chapter 3. For the reader’s convenience, these are reproduced in Table 5-1. 




H7- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of 
tolerance towards political corruption is lower in progressive users. 
H8- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of 
tolerance towards political corruption is lower in those users who are 
supporting new parties.  
H9- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of 
tolerance towards political corruption is higher as higher is the political 
sympathy towards the party involved. 
Firstly, it will be investigated if in the debate about politics held on Twitter, 
progressive and conservative users show different attitude towards political corruption. 
Secondly, it will be studied if there is any difference in the level of tolerance towards 
political corruption showed on Twitter between those citizens who are supporting new 
and traditional parties. Finally, it will be analysed if users’ criticism towards political 
corruption on Twitter varies depending on the political sympathy they feel towards the 
party which is being involved. 
The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows: in section 5.2 it will be 
explained the construction and usage of the dataset and the procedures for each of the 
experiments conducted. In section 5.3 it will be tested the hypotheses, presenting the 
methodology followed and describing the main results and analysis. In section 5.4, it 
will be reported the analysis of the results obtained. Finally, in section 5.5 it will be 




For the purpose of testing the hypotheses related to the “Virtual World”, it was 
analysed the political debate during the pre-campaign of the last Spanish General 
Elections of June 2016.  
In the following lines, it will be briefly contextualised the Spanish political 
situation of the last years, which has contributed to the growth of the use of Twitter as a 
platform for political debates, focusing on the period in which the Twitter dataset was 
collected. 
Since 2008, Spain is going through an economic, social and political crisis in which 
the traditional parties PSOE and PP have been involved in corruption. In 2011, the 
political debate moved onto blogs and online social networks as Facebook and Twitter 
(Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012) managed to channel the collective indignation (Anduiza 
et al., 2014). It was born the collective “¡Democracia Real, Ya!” (Real Democracy, 
Now!), which led to the “Movimiento 15M” (15M Movement) and massive protests 
against the established situation on May 2011, the so-called Spanish revolution.  
There is a wide agreement among scholars in pointing out the key role played by 
the online social networks, especially by Twitter. Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-Sánchez 
(2012) and González-Bailón et al. (2011) underlined that social networks were crucial 
to generate and spread the call for protests.  Peña-López et al. (2014) emphasised how 
the interaction between the physical and the virtual world was essential for this 
movement to succeed, feeding both each other with information, coordination and a 
sense of collective identity. Aragón et al. (2013) concluded that political use of Twitter 
in Spain increased considerably since the Spanish protests in May 2011. 
In November 2011, PP won the General Elections reaching the outright majority. 
Since the beginning of its mandate, this party has been involved in a multitude of 
corruption scandals as the so-called “Gürtel case”, “Barcenas’ papers”, “Púnica 
operation” and “Brugal case”. Spanish society has been aware and worried about 
political corruption and many Spaniards have been actively participating in 
demonstrations (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Robles-Egea and Delgado-Fernandez, 2014). 
In this context, Podemos and C’s broke into the national political scene claiming to be 
the solution to regenerate a democracy strongly affected by political corruption. Their 
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irruption ended with the traditional bipartisanship in the General Elections of December 
2015 and also in the repeated General Elections of June 2016.  
PP has remained in the government until June 2018, when a sentence that 
condemned this party for corruption led to a wide agreement among several parties of 
the opposition which allowed PSOE to win a no-confidence motion. Its mandates have 
been plagued with scandals of corruption which are still in trial and have been 
constantly on the focus of the media, also during the pre-campaign of June 2016 when 
the Twitter dataset was collected. At that time, the vast majority of Spanish society was 
aware and worried about corruption. Concretely, following the CIS
36
, in June 2016, the 
44.6% of the population mentioned corruption as one of the main Spanish problems, 
becoming the second greatest concern for Spaniards after unemployment.  
In this period, citizens have been increasingly worried and interested in political 
issues and, as a consequence, they have been continuously and deeply analysed in 
newspapers, radio and TV. Concretely, Spanish TV has lived a political revolution. It 
has appeared a multitude of programs in which politicians and journalists debate about 
political issues usually focused on scandals of corruption. Besides, these programs 
propose their audience hashtags which bring to their viewers the opportunity to express 
their own opinion in Twitter. It has definitely contributed to involve citizens on the 
online political debate. In fact, during all these years in general and also when the 
dataset was collected in particular, political hashtags, especially those related to political 
corruption, have become trending topics daily, i.e., corruption scandals have been the 
topics that have generated a greater debate on Twitter. 
Focusing on the period in which the dataset was collected, it was chose the pre-
campaign because once the campaign started the voting intention polls became daily 
and Twitter was widely used to diffuse their results, becoming these tweets the most 
popular messages in the network. Concretely, in order to build datasets of sufficient 




 of June 
2016 containing the following hashtags related to each of the main parties: #PP, #PSOE, 
#Podemos and #Ciudadanos. It was selected the acronyms for traditional parties while 
the full name for new parties because it is the way in which they are commonly referred.   
                                                 
36
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This process yielded a dataset of 38449 tweets, which allows to discern different 
types of conversations and users, and to identify messages/users which are clearly 
regarded as being more important than others.  
In the following subsections, it will be considered in detail the two principal aspects 
of the datasets that are relevant in testing the hypotheses, i.e., the structure and content 
and the tweet authorship. 
 Dataset Analysis: Structure and Content 5.2.1
The information and opinions expressed about politics have two principal paths of 
action on Twitter: provoke some reaction or be ignored. When the information or 
opinion provoke some reaction, users react whether replying or mentioning another 
users using the “replies to” and “mentions” conventions; or directly republishing him 
using the “retweet” convention. In these cases it will be inferred that those users have a 
certain degree of influence (Berger and Strathearn, 2013); otherwise, when they are 
ignored, it will be concluded those information or opinion does not spread online 
influence.  
The distribution of tweets of the dataset is depicted in Table 5-2. Original tweets 
refer to those tweets which are published by users who are not mentioning, replying or 
retweeting other users, while mentions, replies and retweets correspond with the three 
possible user’s reactions explained above when the information and opinions about 
politics provoke some reaction on Twitter. 
Table 5-2 Distribution of tweets 
Original 
Tweets 
Mentions Replies to Retweets Total 
6332 2834 841 28163 38170 
The relevant messages for the purpose of this thesis are those which show user’s 
reactions, i.e., mentions, replies and retweets. In Figure 5-1 it is presented the 




Figure 5-1 Distribution of users’ reactions on Twitter 
 
As it is indicated, retweets are clearly the most common option used by users to 
react on Twitter to the opinions and information about politics (88.5%). The vast 
majority of users choose to directly republish other users’ messages, which represents 
the quickest way to spread information. As a consequence, this part of the thesis will be 
focused on the analysis of the tweets with the highest rate of diffusion, i.e., on the most 
popular retweets which contain the information that is being disseminated most through 
the network. It is noted that “messages with the highest rate of diffusion” concretely 
refers to tweets which were retweeted 20 or more times. 
For this purpose, after removing the duplicate tweets, firstly, it was identified the 
retweets of the dataset by the “RT” convention at the beginning of the tweet. Secondly, 
the conversational connections were extracted and converted into a network using the 
NodeXL Social Network Analysis Software
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. The analysis performed by NodeXL led 
to clusters in which nodes represent users and edges the connections between them. The 
connections “A → B” means that user A is retweeting an original tweet created by B. 
Thirdly, as this part of the thesis is focused on the analysis of the tweets with the highest 
rate of diffusion, it was extracted those tweets which were retweeted 20 or more times. 
This process yielded a dataset of 9645 retweets.  
Finally, following Jennings et al. (2017), these tweets were examined manually in 
order to determine which were related to political corruption. In order to provide the 
reader with a better understanding of this classification, it will be illustrated with a 
couple of examples: 











- On 09/06/2016 at 1:50pm, a user retweeted the following tweet: 
“#EnCampañaARV al #PSOE Andalucia le crecen los imputados. La mano derecha de 
Manuel Chaves” (#InCampaignARV the number of accused of the Andalusian #PSOE 
is increasing. Manuel Chaves’ right arm), which was classified as related to political 
corruption. 
- On 07/06/2016 at 4:33pm, a user retweeted the following tweet: “Proponemos 
bajar el IVA cultural, tienen que saber que el #PP voto en contra…” (We propose to 
lower the cultural VAT, you have to know that the #PP voted against ...) which was 
conversely classified as not related to political corruption.  
 Dataset Analysis: Tweet Authorship 5.2.2
As the hypotheses to be tested are concerned with users’ political preferences, in 
order to identify them, it was necessary to perform a detailed analysis of the Twitter 
account of each user: their tweets, their websites, and the information provided in their 
profiles.  Following Jennings et al. (2017), these analyses were performed manually. 
The first classification (C1) was done considering the user’s political leaning. It 
was distinguished between those users with a left political leaning and those with a right 
political leaning. 
Then, by analysing deeply the tweets related to political issues published by users, 
it was assigned the party which seemed to be closer to their ideas (C2). In this 
classification, it was considered the following options which represent the main parties: 
PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
These processes yielded a dataset of 2192 retweets related to political corruption 
and classified by the political leaning and the preferred party of their authors. 
In the following Table 5-3 and 5-4 it is shown four examples of users’ 
classification. As mentioned, this classification was constructed analysing the 
information provided in the users’ accounts, specially, taking into account their profiles 









Madridista de corazón y no de ocasión, amante del Real Madrid, de la 
música y sobre todo de mi país. En defensa de la unidad y valores de 
España 
 
(Real supporter of Real Madrid, not occasionally. Lover of Real Madrid, 




Corrupción #PSOE Canarias enchufa 1,2millones a familiares, #Cs 
#podemos, pediréis la dimisión de #SanchezT5 algún día? 
 
(Corruption #PSOE Canarias gives 1.2 million to relatives, #Cs 
#Podemos, will you ask for the resignation of # SanchezT5 someday?) 
Key 
Tweet  
@Albiol_XG Como muchos miércoles en el mercadillo de #Badalona 
esta vez con @marianorajoy saludando a los vecinos y a los 
comerciantes #LaSoluciónEsPP 
 
(@Albiol_XG Like many Wednesdays at the #Badalona market this 







Mujer, maestra, feminista, jubilada activa, solidaria, comprometida con 
la igualdad, vocal consejo andaluz, participación de las mujeres 
 
(Woman, teacher, feminist, retired active, supportive, committed to 
equality, Andalusian council vocal, participation of women) 
Dataset’s 
Retweet 
A juicio varios miembros del #PP de Lugo por llevar a ancianos en sillas 
de ruedas a votar 
 
(Several members of Lugo's #PP go to trial because they have taken 
elderly people in wheelchairs to vote) 
Key 
Tweet  
Si antes no quiso Pablo ahora hará que se agache y volverá a reírse.  
Orgullosa de ser del PSOE 
 
(If Pablo did not want before, now he will make him bend over and he 











La esperanza tiene dos hijas: la ira, para indignarse por la realidad, y el 
valor para enfrentar esa realidad e intentar cambiarla 
 
(Hope has two daughters: anger, to be outraged by reality, and the 
courage to face that reality and try to change it) 
Dataset’s 
Retweet 
En un país decente sería un escándalo, menos en la España del #PP de 
Gürtel, Púnica, Rato... 
 
(In a decent country it would be a scandal, but not in the Spain of the 
#PP of Gürtel, Púnica, Rato...) 
Key 
Tweet  
Quien paga manda, y nosotros queremos que mandes tú. Por eso no 
pedimos un euro a los bancos y te pedimos el préstamo a ti. Apoya la 
campaña de @CatEnComu_Podem aquí 👉 
http://microcreditos.podemos.info #AhoraEntrasTú 
 
(Who pays decides, and we want you to decide. That's why we do not 
ask the banks for a euro and we ask you for the loan. Support the 
campaign of @CatEnComu_Podem here 👉 






40 años. Afiliado y defensor de proyecto C'S desde 2012. Grupo 
Ciudadanos, Diputación Provincial de León. #TiempodeAcuerdo 
#TiempodeCambio 
 
(40 years. Affiliate and supporter of C's’ project since 2012. Ciudadanos 




La Asamblea venezolana investigará la financiación del Chavismo a 
#Podemos 
 




Este sábado 16 de diciembre, te esperamos en nuestra mesa informativa 
en la Plaza de Roger de Flor, 12 (San Isidro), acompañando a nuestr@s 
vecin@s. #CsxMadrid 
 
(This Saturday, December 16, we are waiting for you at our information 







Experiment 7:  The effect of political leaning on users´ attitude towards political 
corruption in the online debate.  
In this experiment it is studied the online debate about politics held on Twitter to 
detect whether there is a significant difference in the attitude towards political 
corruption between users with a left and right political leaning. It has been hypothesised 
that politically progressive users will be less tolerant towards corruption. 
This chapter is focused on the messages most retweeted against political corruption. 
Therefore, once extracted the retweets with the highest rate of diffusion related to 
political corruption following the process already explained, the goal was to determine 
the authors’ political leaning. For this purpose, it was exhaustively examined their 
accounts and classified following the C1 criteria explained in the previous section into 
users with a left or right political leaning. 
Experiment 8:  The effect of new parties’ emergence on users’ attitude towards 
political corruption in the online debate.  
The goal of this experiment is to investigate the online debate about politics held on 
Twitter to analyse whether there is a significant difference in the attitude towards 
political corruption between users who support new and traditional parties. It has been 
hypothesised that new party supporters will be less tolerant towards corruption. 
For this purpose, it was used the dataset of the previous experiment, i.e., the 
retweets with the highest rate of diffusion related to political corruption. To find out 
authors’ preferred party, it was deeply analysed their accounts focusing on their tweets 
about politics. Then, following the C2 criteria explained above,  they were classified as 
being closer to one of the following main parties: PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. Finally, in 
order to be able to test H8 they were regrouped into two groups: new parties’ supporters, 
when they were supporting UP or C’s; and traditional parties’ supporters, when they 




Experiment 9:  The effect of political sympathy on users’ attitude towards political 
corruption in the online debate. 
The goal of this experiment is to examine the online debate about politics held on 
Twitter to discover whether there is a significant difference in users’ attitude towards 
political corruption when it affects to the party they feel closer to their ideas compared 
with when it is other party the one involved. Concretely, it is believed that it is not 
possible to establish any difference between party supporters when the online debate 
about political corruption involves their own party, i.e., it is expected that parties’ 
supporters will focus their reports on corruption mainly on any other party but not their 
preferred party. As a consequence, it has been hypothesised that citizens will be more 
tolerant towards corruption when it affects to their own party. 
For this purpose, it was also used the dataset containing those retweets related to 
political corruption with the highest rate of diffusion. In this case, it was directly applied 
C2 criteria stated in the previous section. The focus of this experiment was on those 
retweets where party’s supporters were reporting political corruption on their preferred 
party. 
5.3 Methodology and Experiments 
In this section, it will be performed the experiments needed in order to empirically 
test the hypotheses related to the “Virtual World” with the statistical program SPSS and 
it will be presented the results indicating if they have been or not verified. 
 Hypothesis 7: Experiments and outcomes  5.3.1
In Hypothesis H7 it will be tested the belief that in the online conversations about 
politics, progressive users have a lower level of tolerance. The statement of H7 is as 
follows: 
H7- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of tolerance 
towards political corruption is lower in progressive users. 
If this hypothesis was validated, it would show that the results obtained in the study 
of the “Real world” are consistent when analysing the online debate about political 
corruption held on Twitter. As a consequence, parties with a left political leaning would 
198 
 
need to fight against corruption stronger than parties with a right political leaning which 
are less penalised by corruption. 
Experiment Description 
To test this hypothesis H7 it has been considered the following variables: 
1. Users’ political leaning. Users retweeting those messages about political 
corruption with the highest rate of diffusion were classified into two 
categories according the C1 criteria stated before: Left parties’ supporters vs. 
Right parties’ supporters. 
 
2. Parties’ political leaning. Messages about political corruption with the 
highest rate of diffusion were classified by the party which was being 
involved in the corruption reported on Twitter:  PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. 
Then, they were regrouped into two groups as follows: “Left parties”, when 
the party reported was PSOE or UP; and “Right parties”, when the party 
reported was PP or C’s.   
The goal of this hypothesis H7 is to test if different political leanings have a 
different impact on users’ attitude towards political corruption in the online debate held 
on Twitter. For this purpose, it will be performed the following analysis: 
1. H7A1: A descriptive analysis of the Users’ political leaning of those users 
who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political corruption.  
 
2. H7A2: A descriptive analysis of the Parties’ political leaning of those parties 
involved in the corruption most reported on Twitter. 
 
3. H7A3: A crosstabs analysis to find out if it is possible to establish a 
relationship statistically significant between Users’ political leaning of those 
users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political 
corruption and Parties’ political leaning of those parties involved in the 





In this section, it will be performed the statistical analysis carried out to test the 
hypothesis H7: 
1. H7A1: Descriptive analysis “Users’ political leaning”. 
In Table 5-5 it is presented the frequency of the political leaning of those users who 
are spreading the most retweeted messages about political corruption.  
Table 5-5 User’s Political Leaning for H7A1 
Political Leaning Frequency 
Left 1790 
Right 402 
As it is depicted, the vast majority of the users who are spreading the most 
retweeted messages about political corruption are classified as having a left political 
leaning. 
2. H7A2: Descriptive analysis “Parties’ political leaning”. 
In Table 5-6 it is presented the frequency of the political leaning of those parties 
involved in the corruption most reported on Twitter.  
Table 5-6 Parties’ Political Leaning for H7A2 
Political Leaning Frequency 
Left 717 
Right 1475 
As it is seen, the corruption most reported on Twitter involves mainly traditional 
parties with a right political leaning. 
3. H7A3: Crosstabs analysis “Users’ political leaning (Left vs. Right)” and 
“Parties' political leaning (Left vs. Right)”. 




Table 5-7 Hypotheses –Crosstabs analysis H7A3- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: There is not association between Users’ political leaning (Left vs. Right) of those 
users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political corruption and 
Parties’ political leaning (Left vs. Right) of those parties involved in the corruption 
most reported on Twitter. 
H1: There is association between Users’ political leaning (Left vs. Right) of those 
users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political corruption and 
Parties’ political leaning (Left vs. Right) of those parties involved in the corruption 
most reported on Twitter. 
In order to test the hypotheses, it will be performed the Chi-Squared Test (Table 
5-8): 
Table 5-8 Chi-Squared Test for H7A3 
Pearson Chi-Square df1 Statistical significance 
1013 1 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., when analysing the online 
conversations about political corruption held on Twitter there is a statistically 
significant association between Users’ political leaning (Left vs. Right) of those users 
who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political corruption and Parties’ 
political leaning of those parties involved in the corruption most reported on Twitter 
(Left vs. Right), χ
2 
(1) = 1013, p < 0.05. Besides, in order to characterise the 
relationship, as the crosstab is 2x2, it will be performed the Cramer’s V Test (Table 
5-9). 
Table 5-9 Cramer’s V Test for H7A3 
Cramer’s V Statistic Range Statistical significance 
0.680 0 < Cramer’s V < 1 0.000 
Considering the Cramer’s V Statistic = 0.680, p<0.05, the previous statistically 
significant relationship is characterised as moderate-strong. 
Report  
In this section, it will be reported the most relevant conclusions of the statistical 
analysis carried out in the previous section. 
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Firstly, in Figure 5-2 it is indicated how the vast majority of the users who are 
diffusing the most retweeted messages against political corruption on Twitter have a left 
political leaning (81.7%). 
Figure 5-2 Political leaning of users who are spreading the most retweeted 
messages against political corruption on Twitter 
 
When analysing the political leaning of those parties which are being involved in 
the corruption most reported on Twitter, it is found how right parties are more reported 
than left parties, 67.3% and 37.2% respectively (Figure 5-3). 
Figure 5-3 Political leaning of parties most reported on corruption in Twitter 
 
Finally, it will be reported the results obtained when it has been proved that there is 
a relationship statistically significant between the political leaning of those users who 
are spreading the political corruption most diffused on Twitter and the political leaning 
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Table 5-10 Users’ reports distribution by political leaning of the party reported 
 Left parties  Right parties 
Reports of left parties’ 
supporters 
17.6% 82.4% 
Reports of right parties’ 
supporters 
100% 0% 
Considering the messages about political corruption with the highest rate of 
diffusion on Twitter, it is depicted how left parties’ supporters are reporting mostly 
corruption in right parties (82.4%) while right parties’ supporters are exclusively 
reporting corruption in left parties (100%).  
Summarising the information above, it has been found on one hand, how 
progressive users are those who most actively display against political corruption on the 
online debate held on Twitter; and on the other hand, how right parties are those which 
are being most reported. Besides, when analysing the relationship between  users’ 
political leaning who are reporting political corruption and parties' political leaning 
which are being reported, it has been proved a statistically significant difference, as 
expected, left parties’ supporters report mainly right parties while right parties’ 
supporters report left parties.  
As a consequence of the previous results, the hypothesis H7 has been verified, i.e., 
in the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of tolerance towards 
political corruption is lower in progressive users.  
This result is internally consistent with the analysis of the “Real World”, i.e., the 
electorate of left parties is more sensitive towards political corruption and progressive 
users are those who most actively show themselves against corruption on Twitter.  
Besides, it is also externally consistent with previous researches where it was found on 
one hand, that left voters tend to punish corruption cases more than right voters 
(Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Costas-Pérez et al., 2010); and on 
the other hand, how specifically in the political debate held on Twitter, Spanish users 
who actively participate in the online political conversations held on Twitter against the 
established system and its corruption have mainly a left political leaning (Peña-López et 
al., 2014; Anduiza et al., 2012). 
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The verification of this hypothesis could be seen as a left parties’ disadvantage, as 
they would need to make greater efforts to fight against corruption because their 
electorate is more sensitive than right parties’ supporters; but also as a left parties’ 
advantage, as they are clearly dominating the online debate about politics and, as it has 
been proved, social media is a powerful tool to spread social pressure.  
 Hypothesis 8: Experiments and outcomes 5.3.2
In Hypothesis H8 it will be tested the belief that in the online conversations about 
politics, new parties’ supporters have a lower level of tolerance towards political 
corruption. The statement of H8 is as follows: 
H8 statement- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level 
of tolerance towards political corruption is lower in those users who are 
supporting new parties.  
If this hypothesis was verified, it would also show that the results obtained in the 
study of the “Real World” are consistent when analysing the online debate about 
political corruption held on Twitter. As a consequence, the effectiveness of the new 
parties’ strategy focused on the fight against corruption would be confirmed. 
Experiment Description 
To test this hypothesis H8 it has been considered the following variables:  
1. Users’ preferred parties’ group (New vs. Traditional). Users retweeting 
those messages about political corruption with the highest rate of diffusion 
were classified into four categories according the C2 criteria stated 
previously: PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. Then, they were regrouped into two 
groups as follows: “New parties’ supporters”, when users were assigned as 
being closer to UP or C’s; and “Traditional parties’ supporters”, when they 
were assigned as being closer to PP or PSOE.  
 
2. Parties’ group (New vs. Traditional). Messages about political corruption 
with the highest rate of diffusion were classified by the party which was 
being involved in the corruption reported on Twitter:  PP, PSOE, UP and 
C’s. Then, they were regrouped into two groups as follows: “New party”, 
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when the party reported was UP or C’s; and “Traditional party”, when the 
party reported was PP or PSOE.   
The aim of this hypothesis H8 is to test if there is any difference between supporters 
of new and traditional parties regarding their tolerance towards political corruption in 
the online debate held on Twitter. For this purpose, it will be performed the following 
analysis: 
1. H8A1: A descriptive analysis of the Users’ preferred parties’ group (New vs. 
Traditional) of those users who are spreading the most retweeted messages 
about political corruption. 
 
2. H8A2: A descriptive analysis of the Parties’ group (New vs. Traditional) of 
those parties involved in the corruption most reported on Twitter. 
 
3. H8A3: A crosstabs analysis to find out if it is possible to establish a 
relationship statistically significant between Users’ preferred parties’ group 
(New vs. Traditional) of those users who are spreading the most retweeted 
messages about political corruption and Parties’ group (New vs. Traditional) 
of those parties involved in the corruption most reported on Twitter. 
Statistical analysis 
In this section, it will be performed the statistical analysis carried out to test the 
hypothesis H8: 
1. H8A1: Descriptive analysis “Users’ preferred parties’ group (New vs. 
Traditional)”.  
In Table 5-11 it is presented the frequency of the users’ preferred parties’ group 
(New vs. Traditional) of those users who are spreading the most retweeted messages 
about political corruption.  
Table 5-11 User’s preferred parties’ group for H8A1 





As it is indicated, the vast majority of the users who are spreading the most 
retweeted messages about political corruption are classified as closer to a new party. 
2. H8A2: Descriptive analysis “Parties’ group (New vs. Traditional)”.  
In Table 5-12 it is presented the frequency of the Parties’ group (New vs. 
Traditional) of those parties involved in the corruption most reported on Twitter. 
Table 5-12 Parties’ group for H8A2 
Parties’ group Frequency 
New 599 
Traditional 1593 
As it is seen, the corruption most reported on Twitter involves mainly traditional 
parties. 
3. H8A3: Crosstabs analysis “Users’ preferred parties’ group (New vs. 
Traditional)” and “Parties’ group (New vs. Traditional)”. 
The hypotheses of the Crosstabs analysis H8A3 are presented in Table 5-13. 
Table 5-13 Hypotheses –Crosstabs analysis H8A3- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: There is not association between Users’ preferred parties’ group (New vs. 
Traditional) of those users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about 
political corruption and Parties’ group (New vs. Traditional) of those parties involved 
in the corruption most reported on Twitter. 
H1: There is association between Users’ preferred parties’ group (New vs. 
Traditional) of those users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about 
political corruption and Parties’ group (New vs. Traditional) of those parties involved 
in the corruption most reported on Twitter. 
In order to test the hypotheses, it will be performed the Chi-Squared Test (Table 
5-14): 
Table 5-14 Chi-Squared Test for H8A3 
Pearson Chi-Square df1 Statistical significance 
177.3 1 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., when analysing the online 
conversations about political corruption held on Twitter there is a statistically 
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significant association between Users’ preferred parties’ group (New vs. Traditional) of 
those users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political corruption 
and Parties’ group (New vs. Traditional) of those parties involved in the corruption 
most reported on Twitter, χ
2 
(1) = 177.3, p < 0.05. Besides, in order to characterise the 
relationship, as the crosstab is 2x2, it will be performed the Cramer’s V Test (Table 
5-15).   
Table 5-15 Cramer’s V Test for H8A3 
Cramer’s V Statistic Range Statistical significance 
0.284 0 < Cramer’s V < 1 0.000 
Considering the Cramer’s V Statistic = 0.284, p<0.05, the previous statistically 
significant relationship is characterised as moderate.  
Report 
In this section it will be reported the most relevant conclusions of the statistical 
analysis carried out in the previous section.  
Firstly, in Figure 5-4  it is depicted how the vast majority of users who are diffusing 
the most retweeted messages against political corruption on Twitter are new parties’ 
supporters (81.3%). 
Figure 5-4 Preferred parties’ group of users who are spreading the most retweeted 















New parties' supporters Traditional parties' supporters
207 
 
When analysing the parties’ group of those parties which are being involved in the 
corruption most reported on Twitter it is found how traditional parties are more reported 
than new parties, 72.7% and 27.3% respectively (Figure 5-5). 
Figure 5-5 Parties’ group of parties reported on corruption on Twitter 
 
Finally, it will be reported the results obtained when it has been proved that there is 
a relationship statistically significant between the preferred parties’ group of those users 
who are spreading the political corruption most diffused on Twitter and the parties’ 
group of the parties which are being reported (Table 5-16).  
Table 5-16 Users’ reports distribution by parties’ group 
 New parties  Traditional parties 
Reports of new parties’ 
supporters 
21.3% 78.7% 
Reports of traditional 
parties’ supporters 
53.8% 46.2% 
Considering the messages about political corruption with the highest rate of 
diffusion on Twitter, it is indicated how new parties’ supporters are reporting mostly 
corruption in traditional parties (78.7%) while traditional parties’ supporters are slightly 
reporting more corruption in new parties than in traditional parties, 53.8% and 46.2% 
respectively.  
Summarising the information above, it has been found on one hand, how new 
parties’ supporters are those who most actively display against political corruption on 
the online debate held on Twitter; and on the other hand, how traditional parties are 
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the preferred parties’ group of the users who are reporting political corruption and the 
parties’ group of the parties which are being reported, it has been proved a statistically 
significant difference, new parties’ supporters are reporting corruption mainly on 
traditional parties while traditional parties’ supporters on both group of parties, although 
emphasizing a little bit more the corruption on new parties. 
As a result of the previous findings, the hypothesis H8 has been verified, i.e., in the 
online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of tolerance towards political 
corruption is lower in those users who are supporting new parties. This conclusion is 
internally consistent with the analysis of the “Real World”, i.e., the electorate of new 
parties is more sensitive towards political corruption and new parties’ supporters are 
those who most actively show themselves against corruption on Twitter. Besides it is 
also externally consistent with previous researches where it was established on one 
hand, how the emergence of new parties represents an opportunity for citizens to punish 
traditional parties affected by political corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron 
and Bågenholm, 2016); and on the other hand, how specifically in the political debate 
held on Twitter, before the emergence of the new party Podemos, the vast majority of 
Spanish users in the online political conversations held on Twitter against the economic, 
social and political crisis did not feel represented for the traditional parties strongly 
affected by corruption and, were demanding alternative political actors to represent their 
interests (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012). 
The validation of this hypothesis could be seen as a new parties’ advantage, as they 
are clearly dominating the online debate about politics and, as it has been proved, social 
media is a powerful tool to spread social pressure.  
 Hypothesis 9: Experiments and outcomes 5.3.3
In hypothesis H9 it will be tested the belief that in the online conversations about 
politics, users’ criticism towards political corruption varies depending on the political 
sympathy they have towards the party involved. The statement of H9 is as follows: 
H9 statement- In the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level 
of tolerance towards political corruption is higher as higher is the political 
sympathy towards the party involved. 
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If validated, it would show once again that the results obtained in the study of the 
“Real world” are also in this case consistent when analysing the online debate about 
political corruption held on Twitter, i.e., that the attitude towards political corruption 
varies depending on the users’ proximity to the party which is being affected, which 
would contribute to understand why corruption is not punished as much as it could be 
expected.  
Experiment Description 
To test this hypothesis H9 it has been considered the following variables:  
1. Users’ preferred party. Users retweeting those messages about political 
corruption with the highest rate of diffusion were classified into four 
categories according the C2 criteria stated previously: PP, PSOE, UP and 
C’s. This variable has not needed any recoding. 
 
2. Party reported on corruption. Messages about political corruption with the 
highest rate of diffusion were classified by the party which was being 
involved in the corruption reported on Twitter:  PP, PSOE, UP and C’s. This 
variable has not needed any recoding. 
The objective of this hypothesis H9 is to test if users’ attitude towards political 
corruption varies when corruption affects to their own party in the online debate held on 
Twitter. For this purpose, it will be performed the following analysis: 
1. H9A1: A descriptive analysis of the Users’ preferred party of those users 
who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political corruption. 
 
2. H9A2: A descriptive analysis of the Parties reported on corruption in the 
corruption most reported on Twitter. 
 
3. H9A3: A crosstabs analysis to find out if it is possible to establish a 
relationship statistically significant between Users’ preferred party of those 
users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political 
corruption and Parties reported on corruption in the corruption most 




In this section, it will be performed the statistical analysis carried out to test the 
hypothesis H9: 
1. H9A1: Descriptive analysis “Users’ preferred party”.  
In Table 5-17 it is presented the frequency of the preferred party of those users who 
are spreading the most retweeted messages about political corruption.  






As it is seen, UP supporters are clearly dominating the online debate about political 
corruption.  
2. H9A2: Descriptive analysis “Parties reported on corruption”.  
In Table 5-18 it is presented the frequency of the parties involved in the corruption 
most reported on Twitter. 






As it is depicted, the party most reported on Twitter as being involved in political 
corruption is PP. 
3. H9A3: Crosstabs analysis “Users’ preferred party (PP, PSOE, UP and 
C’s)” and “Parties reported on corruption (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s)”. 
The hypotheses of the Crosstabs analysis H9A3 are presented in Table 5-19. 
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Table 5-19 Hypotheses –Crosstabs analysis H9A3- 
Null (H0) and Alternative (H1) hypothesis 
H0: There is not association between Users’ preferred party (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s) 
of those users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political 
corruption and Parties reported on corruption (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s) in the 
corruption most reported on Twitter. 
H1: There is association between Users’ preferred party (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s) of 
those users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political corruption 
and Parties reported on corruption (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s) in the corruption most 
reported on Twitter. 
In order to test the hypotheses, it will be performed the Chi-Squared Test (Table 
5-20): 
Table 5-20 Chi-Squared Test for H9A3 
Pearson Chi-Square df1 Statistical significance 
1682 9 0.000 
Based on the results, the H0 is rejected, i.e., when analysing the online 
conversations about political corruption held on Twitter there is a statistically 
significant association between Users’ preferred party (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s) of those 
users who are spreading the most retweeted messages about political corruption and 
Parties reported on corruption (PP, PSOE, UP and C’s) in the corruption most reported 
on Twitter, χ
2 
(9) = 1682, p < 0.05. Besides, in order to characterise the relationship, as 
the crosstab is larger than 2x2, it will be performed the Contingency Coefficient Test 
(Table 5-21). 
Table 5-21 Contingency Coefficient Test for H9A3 
Contingency Coefficient 
Statistic C 
Range Statistical significance 
0.659 0 < C < 0.87 0.000 
Considering the C = 0.659, p<0.05, the previous statistically significant 
relationship is characterised as moderate. 
Report 
In this section, it will be reported the most relevant conclusions of the statistical 
analysis carried out in the previous section. 
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Firstly, in Figure 5-6 it is indicated how the vast majority of the users who are 
diffusing the most retweeted messages against political corruption on Twitter are UP 
supporters (76.9%).  In second position it is found PP supporters (13.9%), while PSOE 
and C’s supporters are those least active in the online debate. 
Figure 5-6 Preferred party of users who are spreading the most retweeted 
messages against political corruption on Twitter 
 
These results are especially useful as they allow to deepen the analysis carried out 
previously. Being true that new parties’ supporters are those who most actively show 
their criticism towards political corruption in the online debate held on Twitter, the 
distribution of the users who are spreading the messages about political corruption with 
the highest rate of diffusion by their preferred party, indicates that the previous 
conclusion is held exclusively by UP supporters, in fact, C’s supporters are the least 
active in the online debate. 
This conclusion could be relativized considering the followings: 
1. Parties’ support (Figure 1-2). As higher it is, without taking into account 
any other consideration, it would be expected a higher presence of online 
supporters on Twitter. This consideration would especially play against C’s, 
as it is the party with the least support. 
 
2. Twitter users’ age. Twitter has a relatively young audience and PP and 
PSOE supporters tend to be older that UP and C’s supporters (Figure 1-3). 
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However, in order to simplify, as the results obtained show clear evidence about 
which is the dominant profile on the online debate about political corruption held on 
Twitter, it will not be taken into account the considerations above.  
Focusing on the parties involved in the corruption most reported on Twitter, in 
Figure 5-7 it is found how PP (54.4%) is the party most reported while UP (14.5%) is 
the least.  
Figure 5-7 Parties reported on corruption on Twitter 
 
Finally, it will be reported the results obtained when it has been proved that there is 
a relationship statistically significant between the preferred party of those users who are 
spreading the political corruption most diffused on Twitter and the parties which are 
being reported (Table 5-22).  
Table 5-22 Users’ reports distribution by party reported 
 PP   PSOE  UP   C’s  
PP supporters 0% 38.4% 61.6% 0% 
PSOE supporters 69.2% 0% 30.8% 0% 
UP supporters 66.5% 16.8% 0% 16.7% 
C’s supporters 0% 0% 100% 0% 
The most relevant conclusion when analysing the messages about corruption with 
the highest diffusion on Twitter is that there is not a case where a party’s supporter is 
displaying against the corruption on his own party. As it is highlighted the main 
diagonal of the table is 0% in all the cases.  
54,4% 
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Deeply analysing, it is found how PP supporters report corruption on parties with a 
left political leaning, especially on the new party UP (61.6%), but also on the traditional 
party PSOE (38.4%); PSOE supporters mainly on the traditional party with a right 
political leaning PP (69.2%), but also on UP (30.8%); UP supporters display against 
corruption in the rest of the parties, but especially on PP (66.5%); and finally, C’s 
supporters focus their reports on corruption exclusively on UP (100%).  
Summarising the information above, it has been found that UP’ supporters are those 
who most actively display against political corruption on the online debate held on 
Twitter while PP is the party most reported on corruption. Then, when analysing the 
relationship between users’ preferred party and the party they are reporting on 
corruption, it has been shown that there is no a case where a party’s supporter report 
corruption on his own party. Besides, it has been found that: PP and C’s supporters 
report corruption mainly on UP while PSOE and UP supporters mainly on PP. It would 
indicate how in the online debate about political corruption held on Twitter users’ 
political leaning plays a stronger role than users’ preferred parties’ group (new vs. 
traditional). 
As a consequence of the previous findings, the hypothesis H9 has been verified, i.e., 
in the online debate about politics held on Twitter, users’ level of tolerance towards 
political corruption is higher as higher is the political sympathy towards the party 
involved. This result is internally consistent with the analysis of the “Real World”, i.e., 
parties’ supporters downplay corruption and do not report it on Twitter when it is their 
preferred party the one which is being involved. Besides, it is also externally consistent 
with previous researches where it was proved on one hand, that citizens’ level of 
tolerance towards political corruption depends on which is the party involved in the 
corruption case, being more tolerant when the corruption case affects to the party they 
are supporting (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Ecker et al., 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013); and 
on the other hand, how in the Spanish political Twittersphere, there is a high probability 
to find clusters of users engaged in a political conversation having the same political 
preferences. 
The verification of this hypothesis would contribute to explain why political 
corruption is not as much penalized as it could be expected. Besides, taking into account 
that social media has been identified as a powerful tool to spread social pressure, the 
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fact that UP supporters are those users who clearly dominate the online debate could be 
seen as an advantage for UP.  
5.4 Analysis of results 
The main objective of this thesis is to shed light on the puzzle of why political 
corruption does not seem to have the electoral consequences it could be expected, and 
even more important, to find out key factors to develop better strategies in order to 
encourage citizens to be less tolerant towards political corruption, and therefore, to 
achieve a higher quality democracy.    
For this purpose, this chapter has been focused on the hypothesis related to what it 
has been defined as “Virtual World”. Online social networks have become hugely 
important in recent years, and their impact on citizens’ attitudes and behaviour related to 
politics has been widely studied (Marinov and Schimmelfennig, 2015; Bond et al., 
2012; Shirky, 2011). As a consequence, it has been considered especially interesting to 
analyse the online conversations about political corruption and the interaction and 
influence of actors in this debate. In the previous chapter, it has been shown that 
political leaning, the emergence of new parties and political sympathy towards a party 
play a key role to find out substantial differences in citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption. The goal of this chapter has been to analyse if the relationships established 
could be proved also in the online world. For this purpose, it has been selected the 
social network Twitter because of a variety of reasons. This social network is 
completely open, which allows to collect all messages (“tweets”) related to a 
determinant hashtag. Besides, it is increasingly considered by scholars as a political 
platform, where politicians, media professionals and citizens engage in a personal type 
of political communication (Murthy, 2015; Ekman and Widholm, 2014; Aragón et al., 
2013). Finally, it has been proved its usefulness as a platform to spread propaganda and 
generate political debate during the electoral campaigns (Jennings et al., 2017; Aragón 
et al., 2013), as a mobilizing platform for social movements (Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 
2012), and as a predictor of electoral outcomes (Tumasjan et al., 2010).  
Firstly, when analysing the effect of political leaning on users’ attitude towards 
political corruption in the online debate about politics held on Twitter, it has been found 
that users’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower in progressive users 
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(H7). Analysing the messages about political corruption with the highest rate of 
diffusion, it has been seen on one hand, that the majority of users who are displaying 
against political corruption have a left political leaning; and on the other hand, that right 
parties are those which are being more reported. Moreover, when analysing the 
relationship between users’ political leaning who are reporting political corruption and 
political leaning of those parties which are being involved in the corruption most 
reported, it has been established a statistically significant difference, left parties’ 
supporters report mainly right parties while right parties’ supporters report left parties. 
These results are not only internally consistent, i.e., the results obtained when 
analysing the online debate about political corruption held on Twitter are consistent 
with those obtained in the previous chapter through the personal interviews, but also 
externally consistent with previous researches where it was found on one hand, that 
voters with a left political leaning tend to punish corruption cases more than voters with 
a right political leaning (Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Costas-
Pérez et al., 2010); and on the other hand, how, when analysing the political debate held 
on Twitter, Spaniards actively participating in the online political conversations against 
the established system and its corruption have mainly a left political leaning (Peña-
López et al., 2014; Anduiza et al., 2012). 
On one side, these findings could be seen as a left parties’ disadvantage as they 
would need to make greater efforts to fight against corruption, not only implementing 
strictly measurements to avoid it, but also expelling of their parties those politicians 
who are involved in a case of political corruption. However, downplay corruption 
would be less harmful for those parties with a right political leaning. On the other side, 
these findings could be seen as a left parties’ advantage, as they are clearly dominating 
the online debate about politics and, as it has been proved, social media is a powerful 
tool to spread social pressure. In addition, this finding contributes to explain the success 
of right parties in certain electoral campaigns, in despite of being clearly involved in 
corruption. 
Secondly, when analysing the effect of new parties’ emergence on users’ attitude 
towards political corruption in the online debate about politics held on Twitter, it has 
been shown how users’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower in those 
users who are supporting new parties (H8). Analysing the messages about political 
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corruption with the highest rate of diffusion on Twitter, it has been shown on one hand, 
that new parties’ supporters are those who most actively display against political 
corruption; and on the other hand, that traditional parties are those which are being more 
reported. Moreover, when analysing the relationship between users’ preferred parties’ 
group who are reporting political corruption and parties’ group which are being 
reported, it has been established a statistically significant difference, new parties’ 
supporters report corruption mainly on traditional parties while traditional parties’ 
supporters on both group of parties, although a little bit more on new parties.  
These results are also not only internally consistent, but also externally consistent 
with previous researches where it was found on one hand, that the emergence of new 
parties represents an opportunity for citizens to punish traditional parties affected by 
political corruption (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016); and on 
the other hand, how when analysing the political debate held on Twitter before the 
emergence of the new party Podemos, Spaniards actively participating in the online 
political conversations against the economic, social and political crisis did not feel 
represented for the traditional parties strongly affected by corruption and, were 
demanding alternative political actors to represent their interests (Vallina-Rodriguez et 
al., 2012).  
The fact that new parties’ supporters are clearly dominating the online debate about 
politics could be seen as a new parties’ advantage, as it has been proved how social 
media is a powerful tool to spread social pressure. In addition, the fact that new parties’ 
supporters are less tolerant towards political corruption could be seen as one of the key 
factors to explain the new parties’ emergence and success.  
Thirdly, when analysing the effect of political sympathy on users’ attitude towards 
political corruption in the online debate about politics held on Twitter, it has been 
established that users’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is higher as higher 
is the political sympathy towards the party involved (H9). Analysing the messages about 
political corruption with the highest rate of diffusion on Twitter, it has been seen on one 
hand, that UP’ supporters are those who most actively display against political 
corruption, which taking into account that social media has been identified as a 
powerful tool to spread social pressure could be seen as a UP’ advantage; and on the 
other hand, that PP is the party most reported.  
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Moreover, when analysing the relationship between users’ preferred party who are 
reporting political corruption and parties which are being reported, it has been 
established a statistically significant differences. On one side, it has been shown that PP 
and C’s supporters report corruption mainly on UP while PSOE and UP supporters 
mainly on PP. It would indicate how users’ political leaning plays a stronger role than 
users’ preferred parties’ group (new vs. traditional) when studying their impact on the 
attitude towards political corruption in the online debate about political corruption held 
on Twitter. On the other side, it has been found how all the parties’ supporters report 
corruption exclusively on other parties, i.e., there is not a case where a party’s supporter 
displays against the corruption on his own party.  
This result is once again not only internally consistent, but also externally 
consistent with previous researches where it was proved on one hand, that voters’ 
political sympathy towards a party plays a key role on their attitude towards a specific 
case of political corruption being more tolerant when the corruption case affects to their 
preferred party (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Ecker et al., 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013); and 
on the other hand, how, when analysing the Spanish political debate held on Twitter, 
there is a high probability to find clusters of users engaged in a political conversation 
having the same political preferences.  
The political sympathy impact on the attitude towards political corruption would 
contribute to explain why political corruption is not as much penalized as expected. 
Users’ attitude towards political corruption in their preferred party plays clearly against 
to the well-functioning of the political, economic and social system. It would be 
necessary a society disapproving political corruption independently of the party affected 
in order to reach a higher quality democracy. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The main goal of this chapter has been to test the hypotheses related to the virtual 
world in order to analyse the role played by political leaning, new parties’ emergence 
and political sympathy, on citizens’ attitude towards political corruption in the online 
debate held on Twitter. It is especially interesting to analyse if the relationships 
established in the previous chapter related to the real world can be proved also in the 
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online world. In the following lines, it will be briefly summarised the main conclusions 
of the experiments conducted to test each of the hypotheses. 
Firstly, when analysing the effect of political leaning on users’ attitude towards 
political corruption in the online debate about politics held on Twitter, it has been 
demonstrated that users’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower in 
progressive users (H7).  
Secondly, when analysing the effect of new parties’ emergence on users’ attitude 
towards political corruption in the online debate about politics held on Twitter, it has 
been proved how users’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is lower in those 
users who are supporting new parties (H8).  
Thirdly, when analysing the effect of political sympathy on users’ attitude towards 
political corruption in the online debate about politics held on Twitter, it has been 
concluded that users’ level of tolerance towards political corruption is higher as higher 






Chapter 6. Conclusions 
The main topic of this thesis is the analysis of citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption. Political corruption is severely damaging the quality of the democracy, and 
in recent years, it has become one of the biggest citizens’ concerns.  
Political parties need the citizens’ confidence to obtain a greater representation, 
therefore, it should be expected that in order to prove their honesty, they were the first 
to react against their own corruption, recognising it and expelling those members who 
have been involved. However, even if during the electoral campaigns, political parties 
commit themselves to fight against corruption, once the legislature starts, they tend to 
emphasize the others parties’ corruption while downplay or even ignore their own 
corruption.  
It could be theorised that those parties who do not react against corruption as they 
should, will suffer a considerable loss of support, nevertheless, the evidence proves that 
this theory cannot be generalised. Although it seems that a vast majority of citizens are 
strongly against political corruption, there are several electoral processes in which 
corrupted politicians keep being re-elected. 
The goal of this thesis is to shed light on the puzzle of why political corruption does 
not seem to have the electoral consequences it would be expected, and even more 
important, to find out key factors to develop better strategies in order to encourage 
citizens to be less tolerant towards political corruption, and therefore, to achieve a 
higher quality democracy. 
For this purpose, it has been identified those factors which have a greater impact on 
citizens’ attitude towards political corruption and it has been set out the nine hypotheses 
of the model related to each of them. The studies conducted to test these hypotheses 
spanned both, real world (H1-H6), where it has been analysed the information obtained 
in the personals interviews; and virtual world (H7-H9), where it has been analysed the 
online debate about political corruption held on Twitter. 
The objective of the hypotheses related to the real world (H1-H6) has been to 
analyse the role played in the attitude towards political corruption by the economic 
context, social pressure, political awareness, political leaning, the new parties’ 
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emergence and political sympathy. For this purpose, on one hand, it has been used data 
provided by the independent entities CIS and INE; and on the other hand, it has been 
designed a specific survey in which participants faced questions related to each of the 
previous variables. The objective of the hypotheses related to the virtual world (H7-H9) 
has been to demonstrate if the relationships established when studying the impact of 
political leaning, the emergence of new parties and the political sympathy towards a 
party in the real world, could be proved also in the virtual world. For this purpose, it has 
been analysed the online debate about political corruption held on Twitter. In the 
following lines, it will be summarised the main conclusions obtained when analysing 
the impact of each of the variables on the attitude towards political corruption. 
Regarding the effect of the economic context on citizens´ attitude towards political 
corruption, in agreement with previous results (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Charron and 
Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Klasnja and Tucker, 2013; Winters and Weitz-
Shapiro, 2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013; Jerit and Barabas, 2012; 
Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Manzetti and Wilson, 2007; Golden, 2007; Diaz-
Cayeros et al., 2000; Duch et al., 2000; Mauro, 1995), it has been demonstrated how 
citizens’ tolerance towards political corruption depends on the country’s economic 
situation, being lower when it is going through a crisis. It has been established on one 
hand, a positive and strong relationship between the negative assessments of political 
and economic situation, which would show how citizens’ attitude towards political 
issues are clearly affected by the economic context; and on the other hand, a negative 
correlation between the GDP growth rate and the growth rate of the concern over 
corruption, which would prove how citizens’ criticism towards political corruption is 
greater when the country is going through an economic crisis. Besides, analysing the 
information provided by the personal interviews, it has been found that the majority find 
itself less tolerant towards political corruption since the economic crisis started. As a 
consequence, an economic crisis could be seen as an opportunity to increase citizens’ 
criticism towards political corruption. However, once the crisis is overcome, it would be 
necessary to keep it over the level before the crisis started in order to reach a higher 
quality democracy. 
Related to the effect of social pressure on citizens´ attitude towards political 
corruption, it has been proved their effectiveness to reach a higher impact than factual 
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information. This finding is consistent with previous researches where it was already 
demonstrated the effectiveness of social pressure in mobilising citizens against the 
established political system and its corruption (Giraldo-Luque, 2018; Marinov and 
Schimmelfennig,  2015; Anduiza et al., 2014; Peña-López et al., 2014; Toret, 2013; 
Anduiza et al., 2012; Piñeiro-Otero and Costa-Sánchez, 2012; Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 
2012; Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011; González-Bailón et al., 2011; Shirky, 2011); in 
political self-expression, political information seeking and political participation (Bond 
et al., 2012; Gerber and Rogers, 2009; and Gerber et al., 2008). Concretely, in this 
thesis, it has been established on one hand, how those citizens who face a case of 
political corruption in which other citizens´ reactions against it are emphasized, become 
less tolerant than those who face a scenario in which they are being informed through 
factual information exclusively; and on the other hand, how the pieces of news which 
have a higher impact on the attitude towards political corruption are those in which it is 
underlined citizens’ losses in welfare and economics rather than other in which the 
information about corruption is provided without being related with any social or 
economic consequence. As a result, if a political party, a media or any citizen group 
managed to mobilize a part of society against political corruption, the impact of social 
pressure would attract new supporters and, therefore, it would contribute to achieve a 
higher quality democracy.  
In reference to the effect of political awareness on citizens´ attitude towards 
political corruption, in agreement with previous researches (Cordero and Blais, 2017; 
Anduiza et al., 2013; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2010; Arceneaux, 2007; Kam, 2005), 
it has been found how as higher it is, as lower is their tolerance towards political 
corruption. This finding would indicate that the attitude towards political corruption 
could be modified by bringing citizens into politics and, therefore, involving citizens in 
political issues would also contribute to achieve a higher quality democracy.  
Regarding the effect of political leaning on citizens’ attitude towards political 
corruption, it has been shown how as more progressive citizens are, as lower is their 
tolerance towards political corruption. This conclusion is externally consistent with 
previous researches where it was found how left voters tend to punish corruption cases 
more than right voters (Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013; Costas-
Pérez et al., 2010). 
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Moving to the virtual world analysis, it has been found that in the online debate 
about politics held on Twitter, politically progressive users are also less tolerant towards 
corruption than those users who support right parties. Concretely, when analysing the 
messages about political corruption with the highest rate of diffusion on Twitter, it has 
been seen on one hand, that the majority of users who are displaying against political 
corruption have a left political leaning; and on the other hand, that right parties are those 
which are being more reported. Moreover, when analysing the relationship between 
users’ political leaning who are reporting political corruption and parties' political 
leaning which are being reported, it has been established a statistically significant 
difference, left parties’ supporters report mainly right parties while right parties’ 
supporters report left parties. Therefore, there is an internal consistency between the 
results obtained with the analysis of the online debate about political corruption held on 
Twitter and those obtained when analysing the real world through the personal 
interviews. Besides, there is also an external consistency with previous researches 
where it was proved how, when analysing the political debate held on Twitter, 
Spaniards actively participating in the online political conversations against the 
established system and its corruption, have mainly a left political leaning (Peña-López 
et al., 2014; Anduiza et al., 2012). 
These results would indicate that left parties should be more carefully when 
designing their communication policy to face a corruption case. Besides, they would 
probably need to make greater efforts to fight against corruption, not only implementing 
strictly measurements to avoid it, but also expelling of their parties those politicians 
who are involved in a case of political corruption. Therefore, at least in a short term, this 
finding would play against parties with a left political leaning, as they would be more 
penalized than right parties, which have an electorate less sensitive towards political 
corruption. However, the fact that users with a left political leaning are those who 
dominate the online debate about political corruption could be seen as a left parties’ 
strength, as social media has been identified as a powerful tool to spread social pressure. 
Finally, the higher level of tolerance towards political corruption of conservative 
citizens would contribute to explain the success of right parties in certain electoral 
campaigns, in despite of being clearly involved in corruption. 
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Related to the effect of new parties’ emergence on citizens´ attitude towards 
political corruption, it has been demonstrated how new party’ supporters are less 
tolerant towards political corruption than traditional parties’ supporters. In previous 
researches, it was proved that the emergence of new parties represents an opportunity 
for citizens to punish traditional parties affected by political corruption (Cordero and 
Blais, 2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016); how corruption benefits new parties 
pushing voters away not only from the party which is in the government, but also from 
all the traditional parties (Engler, 2015; Pop-Eleches, 2010; Mainwaring et al., 2009); 
and the effectiveness of focusing the new parties’ message on the fight against 
corruption in order to succeed (Bågenholm and Charron, 2014; Hanley and Sikk, 2014; 
Bågenholm, 2013; Sikk, 2012; Bélanger, 2004). Accordingly with these findings, in this 
thesis it has been found how citizens who declare to feel closer to the emerging parties 
UP and C’s are less tolerant towards political corruption than those who indicate they 
feel closer to the traditional parties PP and PSOE. Besides, evaluating deeply the 
results, they are internally consistent with those obtained when analysing the political 
leaning impact: among traditional parties’ supporters, those who are supporting the left 
party PSOE are less tolerant than those who are supporting the right party PP; and 
among the new parties’ supporters, UP supporters are less tolerant than C’s supporters. 
Finally, according with the data provided by the CIS, in this thesis new parties’ 
supporters have been also characterised as being younger than traditional parties’ 
supporters. It would play against traditional parties in a medium and long term, as they 
would need to attract younger voters if they want to stay in power. In addition, the fact 
that younger voters are less tolerant would show a positive evolution of the citizens’ 
attitude towards political corruption which could be interpreted as a hope for the 
democracy’s quality. 
Moving to the virtual world analysis, it has been found that in the online debate 
about politics held on Twitter, users closer to new parties are also less tolerant towards 
political corruption than those users closer to traditional parties. Concretely, when 
analysing the messages about political corruption with the highest rate of diffusion on 
Twitter, it has been shown on one hand, that new parties’ supporters are those who most 
actively display against political corruption which could be seen as a new parties’ 
strength, as social media has been identified as a powerful tool to spread social pressure; 
and on the other hand, that traditional parties are those which are being more reported. 
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Moreover, when analysing the relationship between users’ preferred parties’ group who 
are reporting political corruption and parties’ group which are being reported, it has 
been established a statistically significant difference, new parties’ supporters report 
corruption mainly on traditional parties while traditional parties’ supporters on both 
group of parties, although a little bit more on new parties. Therefore, there is also an 
internal consistency between the results obtained with the analysis of the online debate 
about political corruption held on Twitter and those obtained when analysing the real 
world through the personal interviews, and all of them would contribute to understand 
the new parties’ emergence and success. Besides, there is also an external consistency 
with previous researches where it was established how, when analysing the political 
debate held on Twitter before the emergence of the new party Podemos, Spaniards 
actively participating in the online political conversations against the economic, social 
and political crisis did not feel represented for the traditional parties strongly affected by 
corruption and, were demanding alternative political actors to represent their interests 
(Vallina-Rodriguez et al., 2012).  
Finally, when analysing the effect of political sympathy on citizens´ attitude 
towards political corruption, it has been seen how as higher is citizens’ sympathy 
towards the party involved in corruption, as higher is their tolerance. This finding is 
consistent with previous researches where it was found how citizens’ level of tolerance 
towards political corruption depends on which was the party involved in the corruption 
case, being more tolerant when the corruption case affects to the party they are 
supporting (Cordero and Blais, 2017; Ecker et al., 2016; Anduiza et al., 2013), and also 
with other researches where it was proved that voters’ sympathy towards a party 
reduces the impact of corruption on the electoral results of a corrupt politician (Cordero 
and Blais, 2017; Charron and Bågenholm, 2016; Welch and Hibbing, 1997; Peters and 
Welch, 1980). Concretely, in this thesis, it has been established on one hand, how 
citizens’ perception of corruption in their preferred party is lower than the corruption 
perceived by other parties’ supporters; and on the other hand, how when citizens are 
facing a specific scandal of corruption, they definitely downplay corruption if it is their 
party the one which is being affected. Besides, evaluating deeply the results, they are 
internally consistent with those obtained when analysing both, the political leaning's 
impact and the emergence of new parties’ impact, as UP supporters, the new party 
identified as being progressive, are those who not only have the least tolerance towards 
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political corruption, but also who least downplay corruption when it affects to their own 
party. 
Moving to the virtual world analysis, it has been found that in the online debate 
about politics held on Twitter, users’ tolerance towards political corruption is also 
higher as higher is the sympathy towards the party involved. Concretely, when 
analysing the messages about political corruption with the highest rate of diffusion on 
Twitter, it has been shown on one hand, that UP’ supporters are those who most actively 
display against political corruption, which taking into account that social media has 
been identified as a powerful tool to spread social pressure could be seen as a UP’ 
advantage; and on the other hand, that PP is the most reported party. Moreover, when 
analysing the relationship between users’ preferred party who are reporting political 
corruption and parties which are being reported, it has been established a statistically 
significant differences. On one side, it has been shown that PP and C’s supporters report 
corruption mainly on UP while PSOE and UP supporters mainly on PP. It would 
indicate how users’ political leaning plays a stronger role than users’ preferred parties’ 
group (new vs. traditional) when studying their impact on the attitude towards political 
corruption in the online debate about political corruption held on Twitter. On the other 
side, it has been found how all the parties’ supporters report corruption exclusively on 
other parties, i.e., there is not a case where a party’s supporter displays against the 
corruption on his own party. Therefore, there is once again an internal consistency 
between the results obtained with the analysis of the online debate about political 
corruption held on Twitter and those obtained when analysing the real world through 
the personal interviews. Besides, there is also an external consistency with previous 
researches where it was concluded how, when analysing the Spanish political debate 
held on Twitter, there is a high probability to find clusters of users engaged in a political 
conversation having the same political preferences. 
The previous findings would clearly contribute to understand why political 
corruption is not as much penalized as it could be expected. Parties’ supporters not only 
have lower perception of corruption in their party, but also when it is presented a 
specific case of corruption they tend to minimize and even ignore it in the online debate. 
Therefore, citizens’ attitude towards political corruption in their preferred party would 
play against to the well-functioning of the political, economic and social system. It 
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would be necessary citizens to be intolerant towards all political corruption 
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